Posts
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\12\23\story_23-12-2009_pg3_3
Investors were avoiding Pakistan even before the Taliban threat and they will remain so even after the Taliban are gone. Pakistan has multiple problems that repulse the foreigners, whether they are investors or tourists
I ran into Mr Eric Lawson, an investor, in a conference organised by a Pakistani group. My unusual take on Pakistan’s troubles intrigued him quite a bit and he asked me to get together sometime. After six months, out of the blue he called me and invited me over for dinner in a downtown Spanish restaurant.
I have passed from that street hundreds of times but I never noticed the Restaurant Hispania where a bottle of wine can cost up to $ 500 or above. Mr Lawson, noticing my shocked state of mind, laughed and told me that most of the people around us were from the World Bank and IMF being dined-wined and wowed by developing world governments. This restaurant runs on the loan/aid money given to developing countries or people like me who make money in those countries in other ways, he added.
After we were settled, he asked me as to what was going on in Pakistan and if the military could eliminate the Taliban insurgency. I told him that I was reasonably optimistic that the military will prevail because it was their creation. In the past, the military was not confronting them sincerely because of their misplaced fairytale policy of getting strategic depth in Afghanistan. Now, the military has learnt the lesson as suicide bombings kill people near the capital of Islamabad. I further added that I hope investors like you can return to Pakistan, and ended my explanation with a smile.
“No, you are wrong here. I hope your optimism is realistic as far as the Taliban are concerned. But the Western investors are not going to return to Pakistan even then. Investors were avoiding Pakistan even before the Taliban threat and they will remain so even after the Taliban are gone. Pakistan has multiple problems that repulse the foreigners, whether they are investors or tourists,” he told me.
“I know there is immense corruption in Pakistan and foreigners do not know how to deal with it. But so are most of the developing countries where the US and European investors and tourists readily go. What is special about Pakistan other than this?” I asked.
He became a little frustrated and impatient and promptly busted out “No, this is where Pakistanis do not get it. We all know about corruption in the developing world and we know how to deal with it and make money. But Pakistan’s problem is Islamisation and restrictions on personal liberties and most aspects of entertainment that we consider a necessary part of life. Why would we go to a prison-like country to make money when we have better choices all around? Why not to go to India or China where we can make money and enjoy life as we like to.”
I could not fully appreciate his highly negative characterisation of Pakistan and could not resist rebutting in pointing out: “If you are talking about unavailability of alcohol, you as foreigners can buy it from any five-star hotel. Oh, and if you are talking about other entertainment, that is also arranged easily.” To keep the atmosphere pleasant, I joked, “By creating some hurdles in your way, we provide you the chance to save some money.”
He was more upset now and almost yelling “You guys will never understand us. We make money to spend it not like you guys who earn to horde. This is why we progressed and you did not.” He went on, “To answer your take on alcohol and so-called other entertainment by which you probably meant prostitutes, I will say we are neither addicted to alcohol or prostitutes. We enjoy these things as you enjoy tea and company. The difference may be that we have female friends along with males, which is rare in your societies. Buying alcohol from five-star hotels feels just like stealing and drinking like thieves. We want to go out to bars of different kinds where we can see and meet different types of people and enjoy their company for a while.”
I was more perplexed than ever and did not know how to respond to him. After having lived three decades in the West I knew what he was talking about. But for face saving I threw my last argument, “Pakistan is not the only ideological state. Israel, Saudi Arabia and some others are ideological too and you do business in those countries.”
He laughed whole-heartedly and said, “Thank you. I was expecting this excuse much earlier. This is a favourite excuse Pakistanis use. But let me tell you that Israel may be too cruel for Palestinians, but it is an open society like any European nation. Saudi Arabia can afford any ideology because of its oil wealth and tribal society. Furthermore, not many investors go there except oil companies and the Saudis have created free zones for foreigners that Pakistan cannot. Your society is very poor but relatively open-minded. You can neither feed them like Saudi Arabia nor create islands for foreigners because society is very vocal. You are stuck by imposing an ideology that you cannot afford. Therefore, you will remain stuck even after the Taliban are gone. And, the worst part is that even intelligent people like you do not appreciate the gravity of the problem.”
I did not know what to say and decided to move the conversation to Obama’s healthcare plan instead.
The writer can be reached at manzurejaz@yahoo.com
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Friday, December 11, 2009
Afghanistan and Pakistan: Anatomy of a Proxy War
Obama's Afghan surge and new strategy attempt sophistication and nuance, but fail to grasp the terrible complexities of the Afghan war. In his speech the President noted two key issues: Afghanistan's rampant corruption and the problematic role of Pakistan. But these problems are more vexing than he admits.
I know the depth of these problems from study and from years of -- sometimes bitter and disappointing -- experience working in Afghanistan. From 2001 until very recently I was intimately involved with Afghan security and intelligence agencies; helped to create the Afghan National Security Council; did reconstruction work; trained NATO forces for deployment; and traveled across much of the country by road, in the process coming to know many of its local and regional leaders.
First, the issue of a "credible" Afghan partner. Obama wants Karzai to fight corruption and he wants to sidestep Karzai to effectively deliver aid. Good luck with that.
But what about the heart of the strategy, the Afghan National Army? This force is supposed to "stand up as we stand down." Sadly this is a phantom Army. Made up from the recombined remnants of Northern Alliance militias, held together by British and American money and training, it has nowhere near the numbers needed nor claimed. Drug addiction and demoralization are rampant among its soldiers.
Most importantly, the ANA is a largely Tajik army. Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and are based in the north of the country. The Pashtun are the largest group and dominate the south. The Taliban draws its support from the Pashtun. Tajik and Pashtuns are bitter rivals.
In the eyes of Tajik leaders, Karzai (a Pashtun) isn't "their" president, and this isn't "their" war, nor are Tajiks too keen on getting killed in it, as many US soldiers have noticed.
Even if Tajik forces were willing to fight and replace NATO soldiers, sending the Tajik dominated ANA into the south to control the Pashtun would not amount to a "national army" fighting "its own" war. The Pashtun would and do see these Tajiks as invaders.
In short, this is not the force that will beat the Taliban.
What about our other ally, Pakistan? Regardless of what they tell you, the Pakistani military is not on America's side. They pretend to be because they enjoy receiving billions and billions of dollars in aid every year, but in the end the Pakistani Army is obsessed with India. Their fear of India means they want a weak Islamic Afghanistan behind them.
The Pakistani officer class sees the current Afghan government as allied to India and thus hostile to Islamabad -- which it is. India supported the communist government of Afghanistan and then the northern Alliance and now the Karzai government. It is heavily involved in Afghanistan. But Pakistan is determined that it will dominate Afghanistan once we, the foreigners, leave.
Despite its weakness, Afghanistan's political leaders have always coveted large areas of Pakistan: the Pashtun inhabited North West Frontier Province, (the NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (the FATA). Afghanistan lost these regions to what was British India in 1893 when it accepted the so-called "Durand line" which is now the border with Pakistan.
In the 1950s and early 60s, Afghanistan did its best to destabilise Pakistani control in these regions, and actually sent armed tribal groups to invade them. This did much to encourage Islamabad's later enthusiastic support of the US-back Mujahadeen in the late 1970s and 1980s.
In the Pakistani military's view, the international community will leave Afghanistan, as they did after the Soviets left, and indeed as Obama has promised to do. When that happens Pakistan feels that it must be in position to install a friendly regime in Kabul, one that will expel the Indian advisors, spies, diplomats, contactors, etc and provide a potentially friendly area to the rear of Pakistan in the event of another major war with India. This is the Pakistani idea of "strategic depth."
Who would be that friendly government: most likely, the Taliban.
And if they cannot get a friendly government in Kabul, an ungoverned Afghanistan is better than the present Indian dominated one.
This pro-Taliban stance remains the Pakistani position, despite the blow back from their encouragement of extremist Islamic groups. Pakistan uses radical jihadist groups as proxies in Indian-administered Kashmir.
Sometime it looks different, because the Pakistanis do just enough by way of arresting Arabs and other Islamic extremists to keep the US happy. Bluntly speaking, the Pakistanis desperately need the US money (billions every year, year on year) to equip themselves in the build up against India.
And the Pakistan military is being forced to push back the various newly formed Pakistani Taliban groups. So it can look like the Pakistani's really are US allies. But that is an illusion.
Whilst the Pakistani Taliban maintain strong connections with the Afghan Taliban and other Islamic rebels and extremists, the Pakistani military regards the two forces as entirely separate. In their eyes, the Pakistani Taliban are dangerous rebels, whereas the Afghan Taliban are the next government of Afghanistan; and must be kept on good terms and assisted at every juncture.
It has taken US intelligence, military and diplomats years to see this and they still don't quite know what to do about it.
The Afghan Taliban created themselves almost spontaneously in 1994, with the intention of improving justice and security, and removing illegal checkpoints and local warlords. But the Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, soon began supporting them. And soon this vigilante force became a religious army of Pashtun nationalists, believing that they have a god-given right to rule.
This Pakistani encouragement of radical Islam in Afghanistan and in Kashmir has seriously "blown back." Much of the Pashtun areas of Pakistan are now in rebellion and the Pakistani Taliban does not answer to the ISI. From here it may seem like one single movement and threat however, it is essential to understand that Pakistani military and intelligence officers regard the two Taleban organizations (or clusters of organizations) as separate.
The present action against the Pakistani Taliban is just that. The Pakistan has, definitively, not moved against the Afghan Taliban. In fact, the Afghan Taliban leadership remains secure in Pakistan. Indeed they are widely thought to have moved the Quetta Shura (Mullah Omar's command structure) to Karachi, to protect it from possible air strikes.
Powerful elements in Pakistan will continue to support the Pashtun insurgency in Afghanistan no matter what Islamabad's government says or does. This is only one of many problems affecting Afghanistan, but it is the core problem.
Unless the international community can address the proxy fight between Pakistan and India at a political level -- through a settlement on the line of control through Kashmir and a guarantee of security for Pakistan -- it is unlikely that Pakistan's support of the Afghan Taliban can be stopped. And without that stabilizing Afghanistan is very unlikely.
Bob Churcher is a former British Army Officer with a degree in history. He served in Northern Ireland and Africa and has spent the last 20 years in conflict or post-conflict environments, including, the Balkans, East Timor and Afghanistan.
I know the depth of these problems from study and from years of -- sometimes bitter and disappointing -- experience working in Afghanistan. From 2001 until very recently I was intimately involved with Afghan security and intelligence agencies; helped to create the Afghan National Security Council; did reconstruction work; trained NATO forces for deployment; and traveled across much of the country by road, in the process coming to know many of its local and regional leaders.
First, the issue of a "credible" Afghan partner. Obama wants Karzai to fight corruption and he wants to sidestep Karzai to effectively deliver aid. Good luck with that.
But what about the heart of the strategy, the Afghan National Army? This force is supposed to "stand up as we stand down." Sadly this is a phantom Army. Made up from the recombined remnants of Northern Alliance militias, held together by British and American money and training, it has nowhere near the numbers needed nor claimed. Drug addiction and demoralization are rampant among its soldiers.
Most importantly, the ANA is a largely Tajik army. Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and are based in the north of the country. The Pashtun are the largest group and dominate the south. The Taliban draws its support from the Pashtun. Tajik and Pashtuns are bitter rivals.
In the eyes of Tajik leaders, Karzai (a Pashtun) isn't "their" president, and this isn't "their" war, nor are Tajiks too keen on getting killed in it, as many US soldiers have noticed.
Even if Tajik forces were willing to fight and replace NATO soldiers, sending the Tajik dominated ANA into the south to control the Pashtun would not amount to a "national army" fighting "its own" war. The Pashtun would and do see these Tajiks as invaders.
In short, this is not the force that will beat the Taliban.
What about our other ally, Pakistan? Regardless of what they tell you, the Pakistani military is not on America's side. They pretend to be because they enjoy receiving billions and billions of dollars in aid every year, but in the end the Pakistani Army is obsessed with India. Their fear of India means they want a weak Islamic Afghanistan behind them.
The Pakistani officer class sees the current Afghan government as allied to India and thus hostile to Islamabad -- which it is. India supported the communist government of Afghanistan and then the northern Alliance and now the Karzai government. It is heavily involved in Afghanistan. But Pakistan is determined that it will dominate Afghanistan once we, the foreigners, leave.
Despite its weakness, Afghanistan's political leaders have always coveted large areas of Pakistan: the Pashtun inhabited North West Frontier Province, (the NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (the FATA). Afghanistan lost these regions to what was British India in 1893 when it accepted the so-called "Durand line" which is now the border with Pakistan.
In the 1950s and early 60s, Afghanistan did its best to destabilise Pakistani control in these regions, and actually sent armed tribal groups to invade them. This did much to encourage Islamabad's later enthusiastic support of the US-back Mujahadeen in the late 1970s and 1980s.
In the Pakistani military's view, the international community will leave Afghanistan, as they did after the Soviets left, and indeed as Obama has promised to do. When that happens Pakistan feels that it must be in position to install a friendly regime in Kabul, one that will expel the Indian advisors, spies, diplomats, contactors, etc and provide a potentially friendly area to the rear of Pakistan in the event of another major war with India. This is the Pakistani idea of "strategic depth."
Who would be that friendly government: most likely, the Taliban.
And if they cannot get a friendly government in Kabul, an ungoverned Afghanistan is better than the present Indian dominated one.
This pro-Taliban stance remains the Pakistani position, despite the blow back from their encouragement of extremist Islamic groups. Pakistan uses radical jihadist groups as proxies in Indian-administered Kashmir.
Sometime it looks different, because the Pakistanis do just enough by way of arresting Arabs and other Islamic extremists to keep the US happy. Bluntly speaking, the Pakistanis desperately need the US money (billions every year, year on year) to equip themselves in the build up against India.
And the Pakistan military is being forced to push back the various newly formed Pakistani Taliban groups. So it can look like the Pakistani's really are US allies. But that is an illusion.
Whilst the Pakistani Taliban maintain strong connections with the Afghan Taliban and other Islamic rebels and extremists, the Pakistani military regards the two forces as entirely separate. In their eyes, the Pakistani Taliban are dangerous rebels, whereas the Afghan Taliban are the next government of Afghanistan; and must be kept on good terms and assisted at every juncture.
It has taken US intelligence, military and diplomats years to see this and they still don't quite know what to do about it.
The Afghan Taliban created themselves almost spontaneously in 1994, with the intention of improving justice and security, and removing illegal checkpoints and local warlords. But the Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, soon began supporting them. And soon this vigilante force became a religious army of Pashtun nationalists, believing that they have a god-given right to rule.
This Pakistani encouragement of radical Islam in Afghanistan and in Kashmir has seriously "blown back." Much of the Pashtun areas of Pakistan are now in rebellion and the Pakistani Taliban does not answer to the ISI. From here it may seem like one single movement and threat however, it is essential to understand that Pakistani military and intelligence officers regard the two Taleban organizations (or clusters of organizations) as separate.
The present action against the Pakistani Taliban is just that. The Pakistan has, definitively, not moved against the Afghan Taliban. In fact, the Afghan Taliban leadership remains secure in Pakistan. Indeed they are widely thought to have moved the Quetta Shura (Mullah Omar's command structure) to Karachi, to protect it from possible air strikes.
Powerful elements in Pakistan will continue to support the Pashtun insurgency in Afghanistan no matter what Islamabad's government says or does. This is only one of many problems affecting Afghanistan, but it is the core problem.
Unless the international community can address the proxy fight between Pakistan and India at a political level -- through a settlement on the line of control through Kashmir and a guarantee of security for Pakistan -- it is unlikely that Pakistan's support of the Afghan Taliban can be stopped. And without that stabilizing Afghanistan is very unlikely.
Bob Churcher is a former British Army Officer with a degree in history. He served in Northern Ireland and Africa and has spent the last 20 years in conflict or post-conflict environments, including, the Balkans, East Timor and Afghanistan.
Thursday, December 3, 2009
Can China Deliver in Pakistan?
The success or failure of President Barack Obama's new Afghanistan strategy will depend on numerous international factors, from the contributions of Washington's NATO allies to the performance of Afghanistan's beleaguered government.
However, few factors loom larger than Pakistan.
Indeed, the Obama administration has conceded that unless Islamabad intensifies its efforts against Taliban and al-Qaida forces based in Pakistan, the Afghanistan plan will likely fail. Predictably, the U.S. government has renewed pressure on Pakistan to launch a more aggressive campaign against militancy within its borders.
However, Washington has little credibility and leverage in Pakistan, and Pakistani mistrust of the United States runs high. According to one poll from earlier this year, 64 percent of Pakistanis regard America as an enemy, and only 9 percent see it as a partner. Such sentiments pose a major challenge to the development of an expanded strategic partnership with Pakistan, which Obama reportedly offered to Islamabad in recent weeks.
Given these unsavory views of the United States, Washington's appeals for stronger Pakistani action against extremism could easily fall flat -- unless they are accompanied by similar pleas from nations with more credibility in Pakistan.
Enter China. Since this spring -- and presumably during Obama's discussions with his Chinese counterpart, President Hu Jintao, last month in Beijing -- Washington has been asking China to help stabilize Pakistan. This makes good sense. Pakistan's instability jeopardizes critical Chinese interests (.pdf), and the time has never been more ripe for Beijing to lean on its longstanding ally.
Ten thousand Chinese workers reside in Pakistan, and a fair number of them have been kidnapped or killed in the last few years. Additionally, Pakistan's northwest frontier has provided a sanctuary for Uighur separatist militants from China's Xinjiang province, some of whom have trained in Pakistani camps before returning to China. In April, Chinese officials alleged that the Uighur East Turkestan Islamic Movement -- the likely perpetrator of a deadly attack on Chinese border police before last year's Beijing Olympics -- had established its military headquarters in Pakistan.
Meanwhile, China has provided much of the funding and labor for the construction of a port in the southern Pakistani city of Gwadar. This port, which became operational earlier this year, gives China a strategic foothold near the Persian Gulf, facilitating the transit of Chinese energy resources from the Gulf back to China. However, Gwadar lies in the combustible province of Baluchistan, home to a separatist insurgency and alleged refuge for the Afghan Taliban's leadership.
In short, Pakistan's instability threatens the security of China's citizens, its government, and its energy imports -- a trifecta of threats that Beijing can ill-afford to ignore.
Beijing's high credibility in Pakistan ensures that its concerns will be taken seriously. The two governments have enjoyed warm relations since the 1960s, and Beijing has invested billions of dollars in economic aid, dam construction, energy development, and other infrastructure projects across Pakistan. One 2009 survey reveals that 80 percent of Pakistanis view China as a partner. And in a 2009 public opinion poll assessing perceptions of world leaders, 80 percent of Pakistanis expressed confidence in Hu -- the highest level of Pakistani support for any world leader mentioned.
Unsurprisingly, whenever China has demanded something of Islamabad, the latter has often complied. Many observers believe former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf launched his 2007 offensive against radicals holed up in Islamabad's Red Mosque after Beijing, angered by the kidnapping of Chinese engineers in Pakistan, pressured him to do so.
Today, however, China has much more at stake. Beijing must quietly yet forcefully impress upon Islamabad the fact that Pakistan's problems threaten the critical interests of its chief benefactor and ally.
Ultimately, Washington's greatest concern should be neither Beijing's willingness to nudge Islamabad, nor the receptiveness of Islamabad's civilian leadership to Beijing's entreaties.
Rather, the big question is how Pakistan's undisputed powerbroker -- the military -- chooses to respond to Chinese pressure. The army has already demonstrated in Swat, and more recently in the tribal area of South Waziristan, that it is determined to crush Pakistan-based Taliban forces that target Islamabad. However, other militants based in Pakistan cross the porous border with Afghanistan to fight American troops and the government of Hamid Karzai in that country. Certain elements within Pakistan's security institutions consider these anti-Kabul forces a strategic asset, regarding them as a hedge should international forces one day withdraw from Afghanistan.
If such sentiments carry the day, the effectiveness of Chinese cajoling could be limited -- and achieving Beijing's and Washington's shared goal of a stable Pakistan will grow ever more challenging. Nonetheless, enlisting China's help will go a long way toward promoting better stability in Pakistan -- and, by extension, in Afghanistan.
Michael Kugelman is program associate with the Asia Program at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he specializes in South Asia. He can be reached at michael.kugelman@wilsoncenter.org.
However, few factors loom larger than Pakistan.
Indeed, the Obama administration has conceded that unless Islamabad intensifies its efforts against Taliban and al-Qaida forces based in Pakistan, the Afghanistan plan will likely fail. Predictably, the U.S. government has renewed pressure on Pakistan to launch a more aggressive campaign against militancy within its borders.
However, Washington has little credibility and leverage in Pakistan, and Pakistani mistrust of the United States runs high. According to one poll from earlier this year, 64 percent of Pakistanis regard America as an enemy, and only 9 percent see it as a partner. Such sentiments pose a major challenge to the development of an expanded strategic partnership with Pakistan, which Obama reportedly offered to Islamabad in recent weeks.
Given these unsavory views of the United States, Washington's appeals for stronger Pakistani action against extremism could easily fall flat -- unless they are accompanied by similar pleas from nations with more credibility in Pakistan.
Enter China. Since this spring -- and presumably during Obama's discussions with his Chinese counterpart, President Hu Jintao, last month in Beijing -- Washington has been asking China to help stabilize Pakistan. This makes good sense. Pakistan's instability jeopardizes critical Chinese interests (.pdf), and the time has never been more ripe for Beijing to lean on its longstanding ally.
Ten thousand Chinese workers reside in Pakistan, and a fair number of them have been kidnapped or killed in the last few years. Additionally, Pakistan's northwest frontier has provided a sanctuary for Uighur separatist militants from China's Xinjiang province, some of whom have trained in Pakistani camps before returning to China. In April, Chinese officials alleged that the Uighur East Turkestan Islamic Movement -- the likely perpetrator of a deadly attack on Chinese border police before last year's Beijing Olympics -- had established its military headquarters in Pakistan.
Meanwhile, China has provided much of the funding and labor for the construction of a port in the southern Pakistani city of Gwadar. This port, which became operational earlier this year, gives China a strategic foothold near the Persian Gulf, facilitating the transit of Chinese energy resources from the Gulf back to China. However, Gwadar lies in the combustible province of Baluchistan, home to a separatist insurgency and alleged refuge for the Afghan Taliban's leadership.
In short, Pakistan's instability threatens the security of China's citizens, its government, and its energy imports -- a trifecta of threats that Beijing can ill-afford to ignore.
Beijing's high credibility in Pakistan ensures that its concerns will be taken seriously. The two governments have enjoyed warm relations since the 1960s, and Beijing has invested billions of dollars in economic aid, dam construction, energy development, and other infrastructure projects across Pakistan. One 2009 survey reveals that 80 percent of Pakistanis view China as a partner. And in a 2009 public opinion poll assessing perceptions of world leaders, 80 percent of Pakistanis expressed confidence in Hu -- the highest level of Pakistani support for any world leader mentioned.
Unsurprisingly, whenever China has demanded something of Islamabad, the latter has often complied. Many observers believe former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf launched his 2007 offensive against radicals holed up in Islamabad's Red Mosque after Beijing, angered by the kidnapping of Chinese engineers in Pakistan, pressured him to do so.
Today, however, China has much more at stake. Beijing must quietly yet forcefully impress upon Islamabad the fact that Pakistan's problems threaten the critical interests of its chief benefactor and ally.
Ultimately, Washington's greatest concern should be neither Beijing's willingness to nudge Islamabad, nor the receptiveness of Islamabad's civilian leadership to Beijing's entreaties.
Rather, the big question is how Pakistan's undisputed powerbroker -- the military -- chooses to respond to Chinese pressure. The army has already demonstrated in Swat, and more recently in the tribal area of South Waziristan, that it is determined to crush Pakistan-based Taliban forces that target Islamabad. However, other militants based in Pakistan cross the porous border with Afghanistan to fight American troops and the government of Hamid Karzai in that country. Certain elements within Pakistan's security institutions consider these anti-Kabul forces a strategic asset, regarding them as a hedge should international forces one day withdraw from Afghanistan.
If such sentiments carry the day, the effectiveness of Chinese cajoling could be limited -- and achieving Beijing's and Washington's shared goal of a stable Pakistan will grow ever more challenging. Nonetheless, enlisting China's help will go a long way toward promoting better stability in Pakistan -- and, by extension, in Afghanistan.
Michael Kugelman is program associate with the Asia Program at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he specializes in South Asia. He can be reached at michael.kugelman@wilsoncenter.org.
Contingency
Thursday, December 03, 2009
Parvez Iqbal
More surprising than the recent statement of British prime minister Gordon Brown asking Pakistan to "do more" is the surprise that our Foreign Office has shown on this statement. Similar statements have simultaneously emanated from Britain's first cousin, the United States.
In a letter addressed to our president, personally delivered by Obama's national security advisor James L Jones, the US president has asked for Pakistan to take action against five extremist outfits: Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani group. He went on to say that ambiguity in Pakistan's relationship with any of them could no longer be ignored. This might well have been a ploy to becalm those in his own country who want to see an end to the Afghan conflict and were opposing deployment of additional forces. But the tone is too serious to be taken lightly. Jones has been quoted as saying bluntly that if Pakistan cannot deliver, the United States may be impelled to use any means at its disposal to rout insurgents based along Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan. "Any means" could obviously include movement of US troops across the border into Pakistan's tribal areas, or beyond if need be.
Add to all this the announcement by Obama about additional US troops for Afghanistan, and one does not then have to ask the US to define its future strategy for that country. Every piece of that strategy is falling into place. Remain ready to move into Pakistan if needed. Obama had just not being alluding to this possibility in his election campaign speeches and interviews, he had referred to it directly time and again. His broad smiles appear deceptive now.
Before our Foreign Office gets "surprised" again, we should have our own strategy and contingency plans ready for any eventuality that might develop with US forces moving across the border if Pakistan "fails to deliver." Our forces are already taking care of the TTP in South Waziristan. The other two groups, Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba, are underground and other than covert actions like physical capture or targeted killings through drone attacks, overt large-scale conventional military action against them is not possible.
So if the US military planners have been tasked to keep contingency plans ready for a ground offensive into Pakistani territory, it would most likely be initiated first into North Waziristan against the Haqqani group, which is being blamed for the attacks on US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. What would the options be for Pakistan's response, other than a statement of surprise from the Foreign Office, of course?
Protest statements, like those for the drone attacks, would be futile. Even school kids can by now tell us that. Military response? The army, already committed against the TTP, would be compelled to seek direction from the government to commit forces for deploying forces to stop the Americans. This would not be a matter which any sovereign country could gulp sitting back. Drone attacks are one matter, territory and sovereignty are another. To divert the attention of our military, even the smallest of misadventures by India on our eastern borders, with or without American elbowing, would really complicate matters. The dilemma, or call it a catch -22 situation, if you will, would be whether to continue the support to the US in its war effort, or openly tell them they are on their own. If the Haqqani group gives them a bloody nose, will we say "so be it"? The possibilities are more complex and more in number than a dice with six sides can cope with.
The writer is a retired commodore. Email: greenfields48 @yahoo.com
Parvez Iqbal
More surprising than the recent statement of British prime minister Gordon Brown asking Pakistan to "do more" is the surprise that our Foreign Office has shown on this statement. Similar statements have simultaneously emanated from Britain's first cousin, the United States.
In a letter addressed to our president, personally delivered by Obama's national security advisor James L Jones, the US president has asked for Pakistan to take action against five extremist outfits: Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani group. He went on to say that ambiguity in Pakistan's relationship with any of them could no longer be ignored. This might well have been a ploy to becalm those in his own country who want to see an end to the Afghan conflict and were opposing deployment of additional forces. But the tone is too serious to be taken lightly. Jones has been quoted as saying bluntly that if Pakistan cannot deliver, the United States may be impelled to use any means at its disposal to rout insurgents based along Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan. "Any means" could obviously include movement of US troops across the border into Pakistan's tribal areas, or beyond if need be.
Add to all this the announcement by Obama about additional US troops for Afghanistan, and one does not then have to ask the US to define its future strategy for that country. Every piece of that strategy is falling into place. Remain ready to move into Pakistan if needed. Obama had just not being alluding to this possibility in his election campaign speeches and interviews, he had referred to it directly time and again. His broad smiles appear deceptive now.
Before our Foreign Office gets "surprised" again, we should have our own strategy and contingency plans ready for any eventuality that might develop with US forces moving across the border if Pakistan "fails to deliver." Our forces are already taking care of the TTP in South Waziristan. The other two groups, Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba, are underground and other than covert actions like physical capture or targeted killings through drone attacks, overt large-scale conventional military action against them is not possible.
So if the US military planners have been tasked to keep contingency plans ready for a ground offensive into Pakistani territory, it would most likely be initiated first into North Waziristan against the Haqqani group, which is being blamed for the attacks on US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. What would the options be for Pakistan's response, other than a statement of surprise from the Foreign Office, of course?
Protest statements, like those for the drone attacks, would be futile. Even school kids can by now tell us that. Military response? The army, already committed against the TTP, would be compelled to seek direction from the government to commit forces for deploying forces to stop the Americans. This would not be a matter which any sovereign country could gulp sitting back. Drone attacks are one matter, territory and sovereignty are another. To divert the attention of our military, even the smallest of misadventures by India on our eastern borders, with or without American elbowing, would really complicate matters. The dilemma, or call it a catch -22 situation, if you will, would be whether to continue the support to the US in its war effort, or openly tell them they are on their own. If the Haqqani group gives them a bloody nose, will we say "so be it"? The possibilities are more complex and more in number than a dice with six sides can cope with.
The writer is a retired commodore. Email: greenfields48 @yahoo.com
Obama's Afghanistan mis-speech
When Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton pulled the Al Qaeda card on Pakistanis during her visit to the Islamic Republic, many thought it was classic Clintonian rage unfettered. Last week, Prime Minister Gordon Brown first congratulated President Zardari on his country's successful jihad against terrorists and then hung up the phone and told the BBC that Pakistan needs to do more against Al Qaeda. That was chalked up immediately by followers of British politics to Brown's now legendary incompetence. Perhaps, he read the briefing notes all wrong, or forgot to take his medication, we all thought. After all, this is the man that has single-handedly brought the greatest era of Labour politics and its dominance in Britain to a pathetic end.
But of course, Secretary Clinton (being the Obama administration's sharp-toothed diplomatic supremo) and PM Brown (continuing Tony Blair's legacy of being the US government's poodle) were just setting up the ball for Obama to smash. Unlike what we've come to expect from President Obama, however, this was no smash. A less thunderous or less effective Obama speech is hard to conceive of.
If President Obama is the Muhammad Ali of political oratory, then his much-anticipated Afghan strategy speech was, at least to his admirers (even those from faraway places like Islamabad) as bitter as Ali's 1971 loss to Joe Frazier at Madison Square Garden. It was his first grand failure. In the past, Obama's oratory skills have helped him do the things he was looking to get done (Reverend Wright, Election Night, healthcare). His effectiveness is borne of the clarity he creates and the trust he engenders.
At West Point on Tuesday, President Obama was least like himself than we've ever known him. He was guarded, defensive, and less than entirely convincing. The biggest reason for the speech's failure is that it deliberately skirted around the central issue that plagues the American war in Afghanistan.
If there is one overwhelming area of consensus among pundits that think about these things for a living, it is concerning where the epicenter of America's problem in Afghanistan lies. That place is Pakistan. More specifically, it is Pakistan's willingness and its ability to take on and defeat, decisively, those terrorists that would either themselves, or through proxies, seek to harm the United States.
President Obama's speech almost entirely ignored this aspect of his country's Afghanistan strategy. Where he didn't ignore it, he fudged the issues so grandly that his talking points were eerily similar to some of the most emphatically unrealistic analysis of what is going on in Pakistan these days. In the most distressing part of Obama's speech, he repeated the spurious link between extremism and the security problems in Pakistan, saying "…as innocents have been killed from Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by extremism. Public opinion has turned. The Pakistani Army has waged an offensive in Swat and South Waziristan. And there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy."
Pakistani public opinion is decidedly against extremist groups and extremism -- but even a cursory look at the data and the news would disabuse anyone of the notion that Pakistan and the United States face a common enemy.
For Pakistani decision makers (and cynics are welcome to insert all the acronyms here that they like, but the fact is that the military and politics of this country are ultimately inextricable) Pakistan's enemies are those terrorists that are killing Pakistanis. America's enemies are those that are killing Americans.
It is true that Pakistanis are getting killed at the hands of FATA-based terrorists, and that Americans (soldiers) are getting killed at the hands of the same militants. That is about where the similarities end.
The FATA-based terrorists that attack Pakistan have been, and will continue to be, hunted down by the Pakistani military because it makes eminent political and strategic sense to do that. But the terrorists that operate in Afghanistan (from FATA), seeking to kill American soldiers in Afghanistan do not pose a threat to Pakistan. At least, that is what the calculus of Pakistani decision makers has been, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Pakistan might take action against them, off and on, but will do so purely as a secondary proxy for American military power. The Pakistani military, in that case, will represent a better investment for US power than either the US military or the mercenaries that it uses, where it can. But the motivation for such piecemeal action against terrorists targeting Afghanistan will always be material. That's not how wars are won.
The Kandahari Taliban represent an even more complex creature, and I deliberately categorise them separately from the FATA-based terrorists that are killing American soldiers. Many within the Kandahari Taliban are ready to embrace their Poppalzai brother in Kabul, and snub both the hardcore elements within their ranks, as well as the Dostum and Masood proxies that have had an uncontested run of Afghanistan's spoils since 2001-2002. Pragmatists in the Karzai camp, as well as among both US military and diplomatic circles, know that the end-game in Kabul will require accommodation with such Taliban.
President Obama could have tried to outline these broad strokes to his audience at West Point and around the world in his speech. Instead, he chose to continue a dangerous tradition of dealing with Pakistan clandestinely. This is a deeply fascinating choice of strategy. Constant efforts to buy, coerce or cajole Pakistan's military and political elite into doing things that they consider suicidal simply has not worked. Pakistan's government will take the money, but it will not deliver the product.
It did not work for eight years under the Bush and Mush tag team. It was never going to work with a PPP government whose strongest instrument is a dislocated former Islamist Pakistani intellectual who has as keen an understanding of Pakistani politics, as Sarah Palin does of Russian geography. Now, with the PPP government buckling under the weight of its own broken promises, it seems Richard Holbrooke has convinced people that a hybrid diplomatic relationship, with six toes in the General Headquarters of the Pakistani military, and four in service of the president and prime minister -- whoever wins the skirmish -- is going to somehow yield success in getting Pakistan to take on the Taliban of Afghanistan.
This would not make for a very good suspense thriller. The ending is the same as the beginning. Pakistan will not abandon the Kandahari Taliban or any other proxies of Pakistani power that will be useful in Kabul. The regional imbalances that drive existential fears in Pakistan don't make Pakistan less committed to having influence in Kabul; they make Pakistan more committed to it.
Of course, Pakistan enjoys no moral authority whatsoever in Afghanistan. But it does enjoy being the only other country that Pakhtuns call home. It does enjoy an extremely long border with Afghanistan. It does enjoy clandestine services that have 30 years of experience in cultivating and leveraging assets in Afghanistan that have a demonstrated record of strategic success. Ethnically, geopolitically and in terms of intelligence, Pakistan has an insurmountable advantage in Afghanistan.
The seven-week victory of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001 was an illusion that was aided by General Musharraf's sleight of hand, and the kind of firepower that America is unlikely to use again in the near future. As an alternative to the Kandahari Taliban, despite the presence of 100,000 US and NATO troops, billions of dollars and the support of 43 countries, the Northern Alliance has failed its sponsors.
Continued reliance on the Northern Alliance to provide good governance, on the US military and NATO to hold territory, and on Pakistan to take on the Kandahari Taliban are all delusions. President Obama's refusal to recognise the immobility of America's position in his speech is his greatest failure to date.
The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy. He can be reached through his website www.mosharrafzaidi.com
But of course, Secretary Clinton (being the Obama administration's sharp-toothed diplomatic supremo) and PM Brown (continuing Tony Blair's legacy of being the US government's poodle) were just setting up the ball for Obama to smash. Unlike what we've come to expect from President Obama, however, this was no smash. A less thunderous or less effective Obama speech is hard to conceive of.
If President Obama is the Muhammad Ali of political oratory, then his much-anticipated Afghan strategy speech was, at least to his admirers (even those from faraway places like Islamabad) as bitter as Ali's 1971 loss to Joe Frazier at Madison Square Garden. It was his first grand failure. In the past, Obama's oratory skills have helped him do the things he was looking to get done (Reverend Wright, Election Night, healthcare). His effectiveness is borne of the clarity he creates and the trust he engenders.
At West Point on Tuesday, President Obama was least like himself than we've ever known him. He was guarded, defensive, and less than entirely convincing. The biggest reason for the speech's failure is that it deliberately skirted around the central issue that plagues the American war in Afghanistan.
If there is one overwhelming area of consensus among pundits that think about these things for a living, it is concerning where the epicenter of America's problem in Afghanistan lies. That place is Pakistan. More specifically, it is Pakistan's willingness and its ability to take on and defeat, decisively, those terrorists that would either themselves, or through proxies, seek to harm the United States.
President Obama's speech almost entirely ignored this aspect of his country's Afghanistan strategy. Where he didn't ignore it, he fudged the issues so grandly that his talking points were eerily similar to some of the most emphatically unrealistic analysis of what is going on in Pakistan these days. In the most distressing part of Obama's speech, he repeated the spurious link between extremism and the security problems in Pakistan, saying "…as innocents have been killed from Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by extremism. Public opinion has turned. The Pakistani Army has waged an offensive in Swat and South Waziristan. And there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy."
Pakistani public opinion is decidedly against extremist groups and extremism -- but even a cursory look at the data and the news would disabuse anyone of the notion that Pakistan and the United States face a common enemy.
For Pakistani decision makers (and cynics are welcome to insert all the acronyms here that they like, but the fact is that the military and politics of this country are ultimately inextricable) Pakistan's enemies are those terrorists that are killing Pakistanis. America's enemies are those that are killing Americans.
It is true that Pakistanis are getting killed at the hands of FATA-based terrorists, and that Americans (soldiers) are getting killed at the hands of the same militants. That is about where the similarities end.
The FATA-based terrorists that attack Pakistan have been, and will continue to be, hunted down by the Pakistani military because it makes eminent political and strategic sense to do that. But the terrorists that operate in Afghanistan (from FATA), seeking to kill American soldiers in Afghanistan do not pose a threat to Pakistan. At least, that is what the calculus of Pakistani decision makers has been, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Pakistan might take action against them, off and on, but will do so purely as a secondary proxy for American military power. The Pakistani military, in that case, will represent a better investment for US power than either the US military or the mercenaries that it uses, where it can. But the motivation for such piecemeal action against terrorists targeting Afghanistan will always be material. That's not how wars are won.
The Kandahari Taliban represent an even more complex creature, and I deliberately categorise them separately from the FATA-based terrorists that are killing American soldiers. Many within the Kandahari Taliban are ready to embrace their Poppalzai brother in Kabul, and snub both the hardcore elements within their ranks, as well as the Dostum and Masood proxies that have had an uncontested run of Afghanistan's spoils since 2001-2002. Pragmatists in the Karzai camp, as well as among both US military and diplomatic circles, know that the end-game in Kabul will require accommodation with such Taliban.
President Obama could have tried to outline these broad strokes to his audience at West Point and around the world in his speech. Instead, he chose to continue a dangerous tradition of dealing with Pakistan clandestinely. This is a deeply fascinating choice of strategy. Constant efforts to buy, coerce or cajole Pakistan's military and political elite into doing things that they consider suicidal simply has not worked. Pakistan's government will take the money, but it will not deliver the product.
It did not work for eight years under the Bush and Mush tag team. It was never going to work with a PPP government whose strongest instrument is a dislocated former Islamist Pakistani intellectual who has as keen an understanding of Pakistani politics, as Sarah Palin does of Russian geography. Now, with the PPP government buckling under the weight of its own broken promises, it seems Richard Holbrooke has convinced people that a hybrid diplomatic relationship, with six toes in the General Headquarters of the Pakistani military, and four in service of the president and prime minister -- whoever wins the skirmish -- is going to somehow yield success in getting Pakistan to take on the Taliban of Afghanistan.
This would not make for a very good suspense thriller. The ending is the same as the beginning. Pakistan will not abandon the Kandahari Taliban or any other proxies of Pakistani power that will be useful in Kabul. The regional imbalances that drive existential fears in Pakistan don't make Pakistan less committed to having influence in Kabul; they make Pakistan more committed to it.
Of course, Pakistan enjoys no moral authority whatsoever in Afghanistan. But it does enjoy being the only other country that Pakhtuns call home. It does enjoy an extremely long border with Afghanistan. It does enjoy clandestine services that have 30 years of experience in cultivating and leveraging assets in Afghanistan that have a demonstrated record of strategic success. Ethnically, geopolitically and in terms of intelligence, Pakistan has an insurmountable advantage in Afghanistan.
The seven-week victory of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001 was an illusion that was aided by General Musharraf's sleight of hand, and the kind of firepower that America is unlikely to use again in the near future. As an alternative to the Kandahari Taliban, despite the presence of 100,000 US and NATO troops, billions of dollars and the support of 43 countries, the Northern Alliance has failed its sponsors.
Continued reliance on the Northern Alliance to provide good governance, on the US military and NATO to hold territory, and on Pakistan to take on the Kandahari Taliban are all delusions. President Obama's refusal to recognise the immobility of America's position in his speech is his greatest failure to date.
The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy. He can be reached through his website www.mosharrafzaidi.com
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
The Other Face Of Pakistan
I have just returned from Pakistan where I was invited to support the efforts of women on the ground who are refusing to be terrified and silenced in the face of recent bombings and attacks. This was my fifth trip to Pakistan over the last fifteen years. I was there in 1994 when I followed a group of 500 Bosnian refugees who were promised swimming pools, bungalows and jobs, and ended up essentially stranded for five years at the Haji Complex, a barren site in Rawalpindi for pilgrims on the way to Mecca. That support offered by the Pakistani government to the Bosnian refugees was more than most were offering at the time. I went back to Pakistan in 1999 when I first met RAWA (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan) and traveled with them into Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, leaving from Peshawar, through the Khyber Pass. I have made this trip several times since then. I was there in 2003 when women activists and artists presented the first production of The Vagina Monologues, a clandestine production in Islamabad that afterwards moved to public performances in Lahore and Karachi.
I was not prepared for the new Islamabad that I met, a city essentially under siege. A maze of 50 check points. People hardly leaving their houses. Schools closed for a month at a time. The fancy Serena Hotel surrounded, a fortress. The U.S. embassy an enclave, protected by miles of stone barricades and elaborate barbed wire. Inside the embassy is another world, a getaway, a club, a café, Pilates classes, and a shopping bazaar imported for the 800 or so American employees the day I was there. No one allowed out. A resident of Islamabad told me, "There weren't barricades and now there are. We're appalled. We're under threat... Because they're targets, we're targets. There were bomb blasts near us and all the windows were blown out of my house. My sister refuses to sleep in a room alone."
There is sense of musical chairs. If you move fast enough and are clever enough, the suicide bomber will not land on you. Every place is a target. One woman told me that she has come to make arbitrary decisions. She doesn't go to the Jinnah market. It feels central. This constant guessing and not knowing makes for terrible and constant anxiety. Everyone seems traumatized in one way or another.
I did a survey, asking people who they thought was doing the bombing and I got many answers. Most people said they had no idea. They did not know the political intentions of the bombings, didn't know who the bombers were or what they wanted. One person told me "...with the Contras [in Nicaragua] and the Tamils [in Sri Lanka], their intent was clear. Here it is an invisible evil. No one is claming it." Many thought it was the work of the Pakistani Taliban although no one thought all the bombings were done by them (the Taliban itself has only claimed responsibility for some of the bombings). There were many rumors and conspiracy theories. Since there is now talk of Blackwater operating in Pakistan, there are those who believe the U.S. is in cahoots with the Taliban (the theory is that if the U.S. has a deliberate foreign policy to keep the streets destabilized, they would have an excuse to intervene and occupy), or that the ISI (the Pakistani intelligence agency) is in cahoots with the U.S. and they are behind the bombings to turn the population against the Taliban. Some thought it was the Pakistani army, or the Taliban within the army. Several people talked about the fact they when they arrest people for the bombings, the stories die quickly and when there is a bomb blast police hose down the area and erase the evidence. Some thought the violence was sponsored by the Indian government. One woman from Swat told me, "We, the common people don't know what's going on. We are pawns. We are suffering at their hands. Whatever their plan is we wish they would get on with it."
I traveled to Rawalpindi, a bustling and madly crowded town right next to the capital. Once outside Islamabad, where the international groups and embassies are stationed and where western hotels exist, there is hardly a checkpoint. No security, no protection for the majority of the population who seem to be on the frontlines of the killing. It is very reminiscent of Iraq and the Green Zone. I go to visit a safe house run by a long time activist Shahnaz Bukhari. The house provides support and refuge for women who have been acid burned -- usually by their husbands. I meet Fauzia*, a 48-year-old woman, who is fully covered in a black chador. After we talk for a while and she begins to trust me, she removes the black veil and her face is a monstrous vision, melted and swollen, no ears, no eyes, she is completely blind. When she was young she married a man who did not like to work. She was working many jobs to support him and their family. She discovered he secretly got married to another women using her money. Eventually she asked for a divorce. After six years of being separated, he started blackmailing her to give him their kids or money. She had bought a plot of land. He was after it. She finally gave it to him, thinking he would leave her alone. She brought him the documents for the land. He said he was satisfied and wouldn't take the kids. He sent them out to have sodas to celebrate. Then he burnt her with acid. Threw it in her face. She told me, "When I say my prayers, I pray that he has been crippled. I don't want him to die. I want him to suffer." She brought her case to court. Her husband came once and then he vanished. She is now speaking out, standing up, showing her face. She wants other women to punish these perpetrators. There are 2,000 burn cases a year. The government is not supporting these cases or women. She is trying to create a network to pressure hospitals and everyone involved to support the women.
At the shelter, I am surprised to find a very handsome young man, Naeem*, and his very adorable son. They are dressed in matching gray cotton suits. It is only a few minutes into the interview that I realize Naeem is really Abaaz*, a 24-year-old woman. Abaaz was married off when she was 13 to a man who was 26. He abused her, tortured her mentally. He threw her out when she was 17 because he took another woman. Abaaz was left on her own with a child on the streets. She had to find a way to survive. She went to a men's barber and had her hair cut. Then she found suitable clothing, lowered her voice and changed her name. She got a vending stand and sells fruits and vegetables. She has achieved success with her business and her identity and is able to support herself and son. I asked her if she is happy living like this. "No, I do not like living as a man. My heart knows how I feel. But I am more secure. No one harasses me. I have learned street slang like the boys use. I mainly have male friends." I ask her son how he feels. "I call my mother brother Naeem in the streets, but I do not like that she can't be a woman. I want her to be in the house. At home she is different. She can be my mother." I ask if she will get married again. She says, "I can't be that fool again." She worries about money. She wants her son to go to school. She tells me it's embarrassing to be a boy. "When things are favorable, I'll be a girl again. The shawl, the symbol of my pride, I had to leave. I'll be happy when my son grows up and I can sit at home in my chair and wear my shawl. I will be happy then when I can live my last years as a woman."
I return that evening to Islamabad and am joined by a group of very powerful women. We talk for hours. I meet Samar Minallah -- an activist lawyer. She focuses primarily on highlighting problems of women in the Northwest Province of Pakistan. She has been fighting a practice called "retribution" where girls are traded to resolve conflict between men. Recently she was involved in a case where a man killed another man's dog and instead of a fight ensuing, the man who killed the dog gave the aggrieved man 15 girls between the ages of six months to seven years old. These girls then became the aggrieved man's possessions, to be raped, enslaved, treated in any way the man desired. Fifteen girls for one dead dog. This is a common practice. A practice Samar has been fighting against. In the case of the dog, she called the father of the girls and asked if it was true. She recorded the conversation. The father proudly announced that he had traded his daughters. Samar went to the human rights commission of Pakistan. She reported the case to a policeman. The father called Samar's son and told him "Your mother is going to die very soon." Fortunately, Samar was able to prosecute the case and the man went to jail. She then told me of the story that has put her life in much bigger jeopardy.
"I live in Swat. In April, I was told that a 16-year-old girl had been flogged by the Taliban. Beating women has nothing to do with our culture or religion. The girl had come from a far off village in Swat. She had refused a marriage proposal from a good for nothing Taliban boy. The boy then claimed the girl had an illicit relationship with her father-in-law. The woman was flogged publicly. Many photographed and videoed the flogging on their mobile phones and sent it around." Samar took the video and posted it on Facebook. She posted it with her name and email. She attached a message, "If you don't wake up today, this will happen to you." Because she identified herself, her life was immediately endangered. When I asked her why she took such a risk, she said "No one is taking responsibility for anything. There is no credibility or impact if you do not sign your name or take responsibility." The Taliban told Samar they were sending five suicide bombers to her house. This did not stop her. They tried to discredit her. They said it was a 14 year old video, said she manufactured it in her house. They said she was a known mad woman. Certain people stopped taking her phone calls. Some people removed her from their Facebook. She went on Pakistani TV. Samar did not use a drone or an AK-47, but she put the Taliban on the defensive. They demanded she be handed over, (like the 15 girls) but her actions spurred a revulsion and Pakistan people mobilized in the streets to protest. The Taliban claimed Samar had damaged their reputation in the international press. They put a fatwa against her. "I was shattered because of my children. I cried on the phone afraid for my children. I had the option of leaving Pakistan. To leave for me would have been death. I have a role to play in the theater against women's rights violations. A few embassies called and asked if I wanted asylum. I would never leave Pakistan. My daughter was crying because she couldn't leave her cats. I felt guilty I had done this to my kids. My friends gave us refuge." Samar stopped talking publicly for three months. Now she is back at it, fighting the cases. "I'm in a make shift home now. No landline. It's not just the Taliban I am afraid of. It is the Taliban mind set. Most suicide bombers are clean-shaven, look just like us. I am still getting horrible emails from people I don't know. People will get brownie points in heaven for killing me. Of course I am afraid of getting picked up, abused, raped, tortured. That is the most terrifying, not death. There are hundreds of missing people in Pakistan. But how can I stop. How can I let them win?"
The condition of women has never been elevated in Pakistan (I do not single Pakistan out as I have yet to find a country where the status of women is elevated), but the current climate of terror, militarism, and Talibanization has escalated and licensed a brutal gender oppression, inhumanity and violence. A male leader from Chitral, a formerly progressive town in the frontier told me, "The Taliban hasn't arrived yet physically, but they have mentally. Already women are not going out of the house, leaving jobs, covering themselves when they have never been covered."
Religious extremism is a kind of plague. It seizes the mind, body and soul. It creates a kind of slow terror that invades cell by cell and feeds off the preexisting patriarchal traditions and conditioning in women. Then, there are the various practices that enforce that conditioning: acid burning, retribution, honor killing, flogging, burying women alive, etc. Some of these stories get out to the West from time to time; but, what rarely gets out are the stories of women who are resisting this violence and fighting with their lives for human rights.
After listening to many women's stories, I am struck with their brilliance in constructing strategies that are not rooted in war or violence, but rather in courage, enabling justice, transformation and real security. There is another Pakistan -- the Pakistan of women academics running women studies programs, women demonstrating in front of the judiciary, speaking out on television, fighting law suits in protection of women's rights, harboring and giving refuge to women who are acid burned. There is the mother obsessively seeking justice for her daughter who she believes was poisoned by a Mullah after he raped her, the woman fighting off the Taliban after they murdered her husband in Swat. Activists like Tahira Addullan, who has been in the human rights and women's movement 30 years, always threatened, arrested twice, fiercely fighting for the restoration of an independent judiciary. And, Nighat Rizvi, who produced a sold out event to raise awareness about violence against women in the middle of a paralyzed city, and who screened her documentary on the inhumane conditions for women in the recent IDP camps.
These women understand that the major threat to Pakistan is not terrorism but poverty, malnutrition, (60 percent of the children are now born moderately stunted) lack of education, HIV, violence against women, and corruption of the government. Women who know that the U.S. war in Afghanistan escalates violence in Pakistan, that computer driven drones killing hundreds of innocent people enrages those who lose their loved ones and that creates more terrorists. They know their lives are being manipulated, that the millions of dollars the U.S. sends never reaches them or the people (but goes to the corrupt leaders and elites). That the future of their country is essentially in their hands, as the government, the army, the security forces are not focused on the struggles that occupy their daily existence.
As I leave Pakistan, I think of Fauzia, Abaaz and Samar. One reveals her destroyed face to stop the burning of others, one disguises her face to support her child and protect her security, one uploads an explosive video on Facebook to expose and stop a hideous practice. Each one of these strategies involved creativity, originality, bravery and very little money. I think the U.S. government and the military, the Pakistani government and army could all take heed from the vision and bravery and work of women like these. The change needs to come from the ground. Religious extremism is a virus. It feeds on poverty, malnutrition, humiliation, sexism and fear. As President Obama gets ready to formally announce his plans for a troop increase in Afghanistan, we must recognize that putting more US troops on the ground will only increase the violence, bombings and terror in the region. Our strongest methods of inoculation are to feed, help educate and honor the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan and to support the women, providing them with resources to do what they need to do, what they know how to do.
*Names have been changed to protect their identity.
Eve Ensler, a playwright and activist, is the founder of V-Day, a global movement to end violence against women and girls.
I was not prepared for the new Islamabad that I met, a city essentially under siege. A maze of 50 check points. People hardly leaving their houses. Schools closed for a month at a time. The fancy Serena Hotel surrounded, a fortress. The U.S. embassy an enclave, protected by miles of stone barricades and elaborate barbed wire. Inside the embassy is another world, a getaway, a club, a café, Pilates classes, and a shopping bazaar imported for the 800 or so American employees the day I was there. No one allowed out. A resident of Islamabad told me, "There weren't barricades and now there are. We're appalled. We're under threat... Because they're targets, we're targets. There were bomb blasts near us and all the windows were blown out of my house. My sister refuses to sleep in a room alone."
There is sense of musical chairs. If you move fast enough and are clever enough, the suicide bomber will not land on you. Every place is a target. One woman told me that she has come to make arbitrary decisions. She doesn't go to the Jinnah market. It feels central. This constant guessing and not knowing makes for terrible and constant anxiety. Everyone seems traumatized in one way or another.
I did a survey, asking people who they thought was doing the bombing and I got many answers. Most people said they had no idea. They did not know the political intentions of the bombings, didn't know who the bombers were or what they wanted. One person told me "...with the Contras [in Nicaragua] and the Tamils [in Sri Lanka], their intent was clear. Here it is an invisible evil. No one is claming it." Many thought it was the work of the Pakistani Taliban although no one thought all the bombings were done by them (the Taliban itself has only claimed responsibility for some of the bombings). There were many rumors and conspiracy theories. Since there is now talk of Blackwater operating in Pakistan, there are those who believe the U.S. is in cahoots with the Taliban (the theory is that if the U.S. has a deliberate foreign policy to keep the streets destabilized, they would have an excuse to intervene and occupy), or that the ISI (the Pakistani intelligence agency) is in cahoots with the U.S. and they are behind the bombings to turn the population against the Taliban. Some thought it was the Pakistani army, or the Taliban within the army. Several people talked about the fact they when they arrest people for the bombings, the stories die quickly and when there is a bomb blast police hose down the area and erase the evidence. Some thought the violence was sponsored by the Indian government. One woman from Swat told me, "We, the common people don't know what's going on. We are pawns. We are suffering at their hands. Whatever their plan is we wish they would get on with it."
I traveled to Rawalpindi, a bustling and madly crowded town right next to the capital. Once outside Islamabad, where the international groups and embassies are stationed and where western hotels exist, there is hardly a checkpoint. No security, no protection for the majority of the population who seem to be on the frontlines of the killing. It is very reminiscent of Iraq and the Green Zone. I go to visit a safe house run by a long time activist Shahnaz Bukhari. The house provides support and refuge for women who have been acid burned -- usually by their husbands. I meet Fauzia*, a 48-year-old woman, who is fully covered in a black chador. After we talk for a while and she begins to trust me, she removes the black veil and her face is a monstrous vision, melted and swollen, no ears, no eyes, she is completely blind. When she was young she married a man who did not like to work. She was working many jobs to support him and their family. She discovered he secretly got married to another women using her money. Eventually she asked for a divorce. After six years of being separated, he started blackmailing her to give him their kids or money. She had bought a plot of land. He was after it. She finally gave it to him, thinking he would leave her alone. She brought him the documents for the land. He said he was satisfied and wouldn't take the kids. He sent them out to have sodas to celebrate. Then he burnt her with acid. Threw it in her face. She told me, "When I say my prayers, I pray that he has been crippled. I don't want him to die. I want him to suffer." She brought her case to court. Her husband came once and then he vanished. She is now speaking out, standing up, showing her face. She wants other women to punish these perpetrators. There are 2,000 burn cases a year. The government is not supporting these cases or women. She is trying to create a network to pressure hospitals and everyone involved to support the women.
At the shelter, I am surprised to find a very handsome young man, Naeem*, and his very adorable son. They are dressed in matching gray cotton suits. It is only a few minutes into the interview that I realize Naeem is really Abaaz*, a 24-year-old woman. Abaaz was married off when she was 13 to a man who was 26. He abused her, tortured her mentally. He threw her out when she was 17 because he took another woman. Abaaz was left on her own with a child on the streets. She had to find a way to survive. She went to a men's barber and had her hair cut. Then she found suitable clothing, lowered her voice and changed her name. She got a vending stand and sells fruits and vegetables. She has achieved success with her business and her identity and is able to support herself and son. I asked her if she is happy living like this. "No, I do not like living as a man. My heart knows how I feel. But I am more secure. No one harasses me. I have learned street slang like the boys use. I mainly have male friends." I ask her son how he feels. "I call my mother brother Naeem in the streets, but I do not like that she can't be a woman. I want her to be in the house. At home she is different. She can be my mother." I ask if she will get married again. She says, "I can't be that fool again." She worries about money. She wants her son to go to school. She tells me it's embarrassing to be a boy. "When things are favorable, I'll be a girl again. The shawl, the symbol of my pride, I had to leave. I'll be happy when my son grows up and I can sit at home in my chair and wear my shawl. I will be happy then when I can live my last years as a woman."
I return that evening to Islamabad and am joined by a group of very powerful women. We talk for hours. I meet Samar Minallah -- an activist lawyer. She focuses primarily on highlighting problems of women in the Northwest Province of Pakistan. She has been fighting a practice called "retribution" where girls are traded to resolve conflict between men. Recently she was involved in a case where a man killed another man's dog and instead of a fight ensuing, the man who killed the dog gave the aggrieved man 15 girls between the ages of six months to seven years old. These girls then became the aggrieved man's possessions, to be raped, enslaved, treated in any way the man desired. Fifteen girls for one dead dog. This is a common practice. A practice Samar has been fighting against. In the case of the dog, she called the father of the girls and asked if it was true. She recorded the conversation. The father proudly announced that he had traded his daughters. Samar went to the human rights commission of Pakistan. She reported the case to a policeman. The father called Samar's son and told him "Your mother is going to die very soon." Fortunately, Samar was able to prosecute the case and the man went to jail. She then told me of the story that has put her life in much bigger jeopardy.
"I live in Swat. In April, I was told that a 16-year-old girl had been flogged by the Taliban. Beating women has nothing to do with our culture or religion. The girl had come from a far off village in Swat. She had refused a marriage proposal from a good for nothing Taliban boy. The boy then claimed the girl had an illicit relationship with her father-in-law. The woman was flogged publicly. Many photographed and videoed the flogging on their mobile phones and sent it around." Samar took the video and posted it on Facebook. She posted it with her name and email. She attached a message, "If you don't wake up today, this will happen to you." Because she identified herself, her life was immediately endangered. When I asked her why she took such a risk, she said "No one is taking responsibility for anything. There is no credibility or impact if you do not sign your name or take responsibility." The Taliban told Samar they were sending five suicide bombers to her house. This did not stop her. They tried to discredit her. They said it was a 14 year old video, said she manufactured it in her house. They said she was a known mad woman. Certain people stopped taking her phone calls. Some people removed her from their Facebook. She went on Pakistani TV. Samar did not use a drone or an AK-47, but she put the Taliban on the defensive. They demanded she be handed over, (like the 15 girls) but her actions spurred a revulsion and Pakistan people mobilized in the streets to protest. The Taliban claimed Samar had damaged their reputation in the international press. They put a fatwa against her. "I was shattered because of my children. I cried on the phone afraid for my children. I had the option of leaving Pakistan. To leave for me would have been death. I have a role to play in the theater against women's rights violations. A few embassies called and asked if I wanted asylum. I would never leave Pakistan. My daughter was crying because she couldn't leave her cats. I felt guilty I had done this to my kids. My friends gave us refuge." Samar stopped talking publicly for three months. Now she is back at it, fighting the cases. "I'm in a make shift home now. No landline. It's not just the Taliban I am afraid of. It is the Taliban mind set. Most suicide bombers are clean-shaven, look just like us. I am still getting horrible emails from people I don't know. People will get brownie points in heaven for killing me. Of course I am afraid of getting picked up, abused, raped, tortured. That is the most terrifying, not death. There are hundreds of missing people in Pakistan. But how can I stop. How can I let them win?"
The condition of women has never been elevated in Pakistan (I do not single Pakistan out as I have yet to find a country where the status of women is elevated), but the current climate of terror, militarism, and Talibanization has escalated and licensed a brutal gender oppression, inhumanity and violence. A male leader from Chitral, a formerly progressive town in the frontier told me, "The Taliban hasn't arrived yet physically, but they have mentally. Already women are not going out of the house, leaving jobs, covering themselves when they have never been covered."
Religious extremism is a kind of plague. It seizes the mind, body and soul. It creates a kind of slow terror that invades cell by cell and feeds off the preexisting patriarchal traditions and conditioning in women. Then, there are the various practices that enforce that conditioning: acid burning, retribution, honor killing, flogging, burying women alive, etc. Some of these stories get out to the West from time to time; but, what rarely gets out are the stories of women who are resisting this violence and fighting with their lives for human rights.
After listening to many women's stories, I am struck with their brilliance in constructing strategies that are not rooted in war or violence, but rather in courage, enabling justice, transformation and real security. There is another Pakistan -- the Pakistan of women academics running women studies programs, women demonstrating in front of the judiciary, speaking out on television, fighting law suits in protection of women's rights, harboring and giving refuge to women who are acid burned. There is the mother obsessively seeking justice for her daughter who she believes was poisoned by a Mullah after he raped her, the woman fighting off the Taliban after they murdered her husband in Swat. Activists like Tahira Addullan, who has been in the human rights and women's movement 30 years, always threatened, arrested twice, fiercely fighting for the restoration of an independent judiciary. And, Nighat Rizvi, who produced a sold out event to raise awareness about violence against women in the middle of a paralyzed city, and who screened her documentary on the inhumane conditions for women in the recent IDP camps.
These women understand that the major threat to Pakistan is not terrorism but poverty, malnutrition, (60 percent of the children are now born moderately stunted) lack of education, HIV, violence against women, and corruption of the government. Women who know that the U.S. war in Afghanistan escalates violence in Pakistan, that computer driven drones killing hundreds of innocent people enrages those who lose their loved ones and that creates more terrorists. They know their lives are being manipulated, that the millions of dollars the U.S. sends never reaches them or the people (but goes to the corrupt leaders and elites). That the future of their country is essentially in their hands, as the government, the army, the security forces are not focused on the struggles that occupy their daily existence.
As I leave Pakistan, I think of Fauzia, Abaaz and Samar. One reveals her destroyed face to stop the burning of others, one disguises her face to support her child and protect her security, one uploads an explosive video on Facebook to expose and stop a hideous practice. Each one of these strategies involved creativity, originality, bravery and very little money. I think the U.S. government and the military, the Pakistani government and army could all take heed from the vision and bravery and work of women like these. The change needs to come from the ground. Religious extremism is a virus. It feeds on poverty, malnutrition, humiliation, sexism and fear. As President Obama gets ready to formally announce his plans for a troop increase in Afghanistan, we must recognize that putting more US troops on the ground will only increase the violence, bombings and terror in the region. Our strongest methods of inoculation are to feed, help educate and honor the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan and to support the women, providing them with resources to do what they need to do, what they know how to do.
*Names have been changed to protect their identity.
Eve Ensler, a playwright and activist, is the founder of V-Day, a global movement to end violence against women and girls.
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
The Taliban mindset —By Dr Khalil Ahmad
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\12\02\story_2-12-2009_pg3_2
The fundamental rights of the citizens, which found a mention as far back as in 1928 in the Nehru Report, remained a chimera in Pakistan until the lawyers’ movement brought them to the streets in 2007
In order to secure constitutional protection for the Muslims of the subcontinent, the Muslim League argued for a homeland in a separatist language, on the basis of a different religious identity. However, since the Congress would not budge on the issue, the Muslim League went ahead with its demand for Pakistan.
Thus the constitutional issue was merged into a religious one. Naturally when Pakistan came into being, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah found himself facing a dilemma: the Muslim League had been using the rhetoric of separate religious identity and now he wanted to make the new homeland a religiously neutral state as is evident from his speech of August 11, 1947. That it could not happen, and the controversy lives to this day, is evident. Also, that a constitution could not be framed until 1973, or while a few were framed and enforced, whatever their merit was, they could not survive, is sufficient to demonstrate the point that transforming the constitutional issue (especially the right to religious freedom) into a religious one proved disastrous for the new homeland.
It provided various elites, including the military and religious groups, with an excuse to exploit the absence of a constitution to their benefit. It was they who tried their best to ensure that no constitution should prevail in Pakistan.
The fundamental rights of the citizens, which found a mention as far back as in 1928 in the Nehru Report, remained a chimera in Pakistan until the lawyers’ movement brought them to the streets in 2007. Socialism, populism, religion, ‘enlightened moderation’ and a mixture of parasitism and welfare state completely eclipsed the issue of fundamental rights in the country.
All the politics through the last six decades can be summarised as thus: from the very beginning, a constitutional issue, i.e. the issue of fundamental rights of individual citizens was confused with the issue of the state’s control of individual citizens’ lives, i.e. the State’s right to determine what is best for its citizens, including their religion.
Principally, the only point of a constitution is its ability to protect the life, property and other fundamental rights of individual citizens. Also, the state’s control of its individual citizens is a relic of the monarchical past where the ruler was the law, and acted like a father or mother taking care of his subjects. When the rule of law is supreme, it means the laws and the state give equal protection to every citizen’s life, property and other rights. That is why all attacks on the constitution first require the suspension of these fundamental rights.
That brings us to two beliefs: first, that it is right to deprive others of their natural freedom, and second, that it is not. Whether those who deprive others of their freedom also try to control their lives or not is beside the point; what is important is whether this deprivation is achieved by force or by (false) law. That such rule of law, ensuring the fundamental rights of each citizen to live life as they wish, was missing in Pakistan, created a vacuum which many groups and parties — religious, sectarian, ethnic and otherwise — and conglomerations of intellectual, political, business and military elites rushed to fill. It is obvious that this vacuum was deliberately kept intact and even prolonged.
In fact, what is happening around us in Pakistan today again proves that the nature of the crisis is constitutional. It explains the onslaught of the Taliban as a violent resurrection of that mindset, which was never dealt with constitutionally. The absence of a constitution and, when we had one, its sheer violation by all elites — intellectual, religious, political, business, and military — strengthened that mindset.
Additionally, this mindset was deliberately strengthened by all the elites to perpetuate their rule and hegemony, and to protect their parasitism. It was nourished, nurtured, and trained at the cost of constitutional provisions relating especially to fundamental rights and religious freedom.
What was sowed by the intellectual, political, religious, business, and military elites is today beginning to rear its ugly head and its consequences are affecting ordinary citizens in the form of absolute insecurity that threatens their very existence without any reprieve in sight. This tragedy is deeper than our imagination can fathom. The number of hardcore Taliban in Pakistan may well be smaller than is repeatedly being claimed these days by the political and military elites — hundreds or thousands who will be wiped out in months. But who can enumerate the number of “soft” Taliban living amongst us?
This “soft” category can be divided into active and passive. Religious groups and parties fall into the active, while the passive are those ordinary citizens who are unaware of their own Taliban mindset. This passive category openly believes in depriving others of their freedom and controlling their lives according to its own scheme of thought. That may be why we see no mass agitation against the Taliban in spite of them killing fellow Pakistanis indiscriminately.
To fight this war we first have to admit that we are in the midst of an intellectual as well as a real war. The constitution of 1973 should be the rallying point for all who do not believe in depriving others of their freedoms and who believe in the fundamental human rights ensured in the constitution. Not only will that help us fight both the hardcore and soft Taliban but will also help to bring harmony, peace, stability and happiness to Pakistan.
The writer is founder/head of the Alternate Solutions Institute, http://asinstitute.org a think tank dedicated to the cause of personal freedom and rule of law. He can be contacted at: khalil@asinstitute.org
The fundamental rights of the citizens, which found a mention as far back as in 1928 in the Nehru Report, remained a chimera in Pakistan until the lawyers’ movement brought them to the streets in 2007
In order to secure constitutional protection for the Muslims of the subcontinent, the Muslim League argued for a homeland in a separatist language, on the basis of a different religious identity. However, since the Congress would not budge on the issue, the Muslim League went ahead with its demand for Pakistan.
Thus the constitutional issue was merged into a religious one. Naturally when Pakistan came into being, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah found himself facing a dilemma: the Muslim League had been using the rhetoric of separate religious identity and now he wanted to make the new homeland a religiously neutral state as is evident from his speech of August 11, 1947. That it could not happen, and the controversy lives to this day, is evident. Also, that a constitution could not be framed until 1973, or while a few were framed and enforced, whatever their merit was, they could not survive, is sufficient to demonstrate the point that transforming the constitutional issue (especially the right to religious freedom) into a religious one proved disastrous for the new homeland.
It provided various elites, including the military and religious groups, with an excuse to exploit the absence of a constitution to their benefit. It was they who tried their best to ensure that no constitution should prevail in Pakistan.
The fundamental rights of the citizens, which found a mention as far back as in 1928 in the Nehru Report, remained a chimera in Pakistan until the lawyers’ movement brought them to the streets in 2007. Socialism, populism, religion, ‘enlightened moderation’ and a mixture of parasitism and welfare state completely eclipsed the issue of fundamental rights in the country.
All the politics through the last six decades can be summarised as thus: from the very beginning, a constitutional issue, i.e. the issue of fundamental rights of individual citizens was confused with the issue of the state’s control of individual citizens’ lives, i.e. the State’s right to determine what is best for its citizens, including their religion.
Principally, the only point of a constitution is its ability to protect the life, property and other fundamental rights of individual citizens. Also, the state’s control of its individual citizens is a relic of the monarchical past where the ruler was the law, and acted like a father or mother taking care of his subjects. When the rule of law is supreme, it means the laws and the state give equal protection to every citizen’s life, property and other rights. That is why all attacks on the constitution first require the suspension of these fundamental rights.
That brings us to two beliefs: first, that it is right to deprive others of their natural freedom, and second, that it is not. Whether those who deprive others of their freedom also try to control their lives or not is beside the point; what is important is whether this deprivation is achieved by force or by (false) law. That such rule of law, ensuring the fundamental rights of each citizen to live life as they wish, was missing in Pakistan, created a vacuum which many groups and parties — religious, sectarian, ethnic and otherwise — and conglomerations of intellectual, political, business and military elites rushed to fill. It is obvious that this vacuum was deliberately kept intact and even prolonged.
In fact, what is happening around us in Pakistan today again proves that the nature of the crisis is constitutional. It explains the onslaught of the Taliban as a violent resurrection of that mindset, which was never dealt with constitutionally. The absence of a constitution and, when we had one, its sheer violation by all elites — intellectual, religious, political, business, and military — strengthened that mindset.
Additionally, this mindset was deliberately strengthened by all the elites to perpetuate their rule and hegemony, and to protect their parasitism. It was nourished, nurtured, and trained at the cost of constitutional provisions relating especially to fundamental rights and religious freedom.
What was sowed by the intellectual, political, religious, business, and military elites is today beginning to rear its ugly head and its consequences are affecting ordinary citizens in the form of absolute insecurity that threatens their very existence without any reprieve in sight. This tragedy is deeper than our imagination can fathom. The number of hardcore Taliban in Pakistan may well be smaller than is repeatedly being claimed these days by the political and military elites — hundreds or thousands who will be wiped out in months. But who can enumerate the number of “soft” Taliban living amongst us?
This “soft” category can be divided into active and passive. Religious groups and parties fall into the active, while the passive are those ordinary citizens who are unaware of their own Taliban mindset. This passive category openly believes in depriving others of their freedom and controlling their lives according to its own scheme of thought. That may be why we see no mass agitation against the Taliban in spite of them killing fellow Pakistanis indiscriminately.
To fight this war we first have to admit that we are in the midst of an intellectual as well as a real war. The constitution of 1973 should be the rallying point for all who do not believe in depriving others of their freedoms and who believe in the fundamental human rights ensured in the constitution. Not only will that help us fight both the hardcore and soft Taliban but will also help to bring harmony, peace, stability and happiness to Pakistan.
The writer is founder/head of the Alternate Solutions Institute, http://asinstitute.org a think tank dedicated to the cause of personal freedom and rule of law. He can be contacted at: khalil@asinstitute.org
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Breaking America's Silence on Pakistan
Hillary Clinton's truth-telling is necessary and overdue.
By SUMIT GANGULY
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered an especially blunt, if long overdue, message to Pakistan last week. Talking to reporters in Lahore, she said she found it "hard to believe" that local authorities did not know where key members of al Qaeda had taken refuge. Her message set off another firestorm of criticism from both the government and the Pakistani press.
Though belated, Mrs. Clinton's remarks were entirely apt and, one hopes, mark a departure from U.S. policy under former President George W. Bush, and more recently, under President Barack Obama. Apologists for Pakistan in both administrations argued it was necessary to overlook the country's unwillingness to be more forthcoming on counterterrorism operations because of the U.S. dependence on Pakistan's goodwill to supply the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Though superficially correct, this reasoning overlooks the fact that Pakistan extracts significant rents for the use of its territory for this purpose and has also been the beneficiary of some $11 billion in American largesse over the past eight years.
Pakistan has helped the U.S. seize a number of key al Qaeda operatives on its soil, including Abu Zubaidyah, Ramzi Bin al Shibh, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu-Faraj-al-Libi, among others. Nevertheless, the Pakistani security establishment, especially in recent days, has done little to place the remnants of al Qaeda under a military anvil. Nor has it shown any willingness to disrupt and dismantle Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, two anti-Indian terrorist organizations known to have significant ties to al Qaeda. Instead Islamabad has relied on every possible subterfuge to protect them, such as asserting that evidence against the two groups is inadequate and placing Lashkar-e-Taiba's leader under arrests and then releasing him. These organizations have been allowed to thrive despite Indian, American and international pressure.
The security establishment's dalliance with these terrorist groups and unwillingness to hunt down the remnants of al Qaeda might seem to be a puzzle. The Pakistani Taliban, which has close links with al Qaeda, has been wreaking havoc across the country and has attacked key civilian and military targets with impunity in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Peshawar. These attacks have shaken many ordinary Pakistanis from their complacency and have contributed to a growing sense of urgency in addressing the country's domestic security.
But the security establishment's terrorist links are also logical. For several decades Pakistan's security apparatus has cultivated and worked with a host of Islamist militants to pursue its perceived strategic interests in Afghanistan and in Indian-controlled Kashmir. It remains unwilling to end this partnership. While it has finally mounted a military campaign against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, a loose umbrella group of tribal factions in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the security force still believes it is capable of distinguishing among these various Islamist terrorist organizations as friends and foes of the state. More to the point, it remains unwilling to stop using these entities to pursue its goals of installing a pliant regime in Afghanistan and sapping Indian resources in Kashmir.
Officials within the Bush and Obama administrations have been aware of these long-standing goals. Nevertheless, to elicit the Pakistani security establishment's cooperation, however limited, they refrained from blunt, unequivocal public criticism. Now that Mrs. Clinton has finally broken the deafening silence on the subject, the U.S. needs to sustain the pressure. A high-level American official's carefully crafted and deftly delivered speech can serve as a much-needed wake-up call. However, it would be irresponsible on the part of the administration not to follow up this verbal volley with firm actions.
The U.S. needs to hold the Pakistani security establishment to account. Despite the fanfare surrounding the current military operations in the tribal regions, foreign media coverage has been severely restricted. It is thus difficult to assess the vigor with which these operations are being conducted and to measure their effectiveness. Washington could insist on greater transparency to ensure that these operations are yielding meaningful results. This would include arresting and charging key leaders and shutting down their camps at Muridke, just outside Lahore. The administration should simultaneously insist that the Pakistani security forces finally launch an offensive against Lashkar-e-Taiba and not resort to sophistry to downplay its ties to al Qaeda and its involvement with terror in Kashmir and other parts of India.
A failure to sustain pressure on the Pakistani security establishment would have widespread adverse consequences for the country, for the region and for the U.S. The costs of homegrown terrorism to Pakistan's society have been more than apparent the past several weeks. The attack on the United Nations Mission in Kabul last week while Mrs. Clinton was in Islamabad underscored the dangers that these Pakistan-based groups pose for the region. Unless the sanctuaries these entities have long enjoyed in west Pakistan are finally denied, the U.S.-led effort to stabilize Afghanistan could be in serious jeopardy.
Mr. Ganguly is a professor of political science and director of research of the Center on American and Global Security at Indiana University.
By SUMIT GANGULY
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered an especially blunt, if long overdue, message to Pakistan last week. Talking to reporters in Lahore, she said she found it "hard to believe" that local authorities did not know where key members of al Qaeda had taken refuge. Her message set off another firestorm of criticism from both the government and the Pakistani press.
Though belated, Mrs. Clinton's remarks were entirely apt and, one hopes, mark a departure from U.S. policy under former President George W. Bush, and more recently, under President Barack Obama. Apologists for Pakistan in both administrations argued it was necessary to overlook the country's unwillingness to be more forthcoming on counterterrorism operations because of the U.S. dependence on Pakistan's goodwill to supply the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Though superficially correct, this reasoning overlooks the fact that Pakistan extracts significant rents for the use of its territory for this purpose and has also been the beneficiary of some $11 billion in American largesse over the past eight years.
Pakistan has helped the U.S. seize a number of key al Qaeda operatives on its soil, including Abu Zubaidyah, Ramzi Bin al Shibh, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu-Faraj-al-Libi, among others. Nevertheless, the Pakistani security establishment, especially in recent days, has done little to place the remnants of al Qaeda under a military anvil. Nor has it shown any willingness to disrupt and dismantle Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, two anti-Indian terrorist organizations known to have significant ties to al Qaeda. Instead Islamabad has relied on every possible subterfuge to protect them, such as asserting that evidence against the two groups is inadequate and placing Lashkar-e-Taiba's leader under arrests and then releasing him. These organizations have been allowed to thrive despite Indian, American and international pressure.
The security establishment's dalliance with these terrorist groups and unwillingness to hunt down the remnants of al Qaeda might seem to be a puzzle. The Pakistani Taliban, which has close links with al Qaeda, has been wreaking havoc across the country and has attacked key civilian and military targets with impunity in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Peshawar. These attacks have shaken many ordinary Pakistanis from their complacency and have contributed to a growing sense of urgency in addressing the country's domestic security.
But the security establishment's terrorist links are also logical. For several decades Pakistan's security apparatus has cultivated and worked with a host of Islamist militants to pursue its perceived strategic interests in Afghanistan and in Indian-controlled Kashmir. It remains unwilling to end this partnership. While it has finally mounted a military campaign against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, a loose umbrella group of tribal factions in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the security force still believes it is capable of distinguishing among these various Islamist terrorist organizations as friends and foes of the state. More to the point, it remains unwilling to stop using these entities to pursue its goals of installing a pliant regime in Afghanistan and sapping Indian resources in Kashmir.
Officials within the Bush and Obama administrations have been aware of these long-standing goals. Nevertheless, to elicit the Pakistani security establishment's cooperation, however limited, they refrained from blunt, unequivocal public criticism. Now that Mrs. Clinton has finally broken the deafening silence on the subject, the U.S. needs to sustain the pressure. A high-level American official's carefully crafted and deftly delivered speech can serve as a much-needed wake-up call. However, it would be irresponsible on the part of the administration not to follow up this verbal volley with firm actions.
The U.S. needs to hold the Pakistani security establishment to account. Despite the fanfare surrounding the current military operations in the tribal regions, foreign media coverage has been severely restricted. It is thus difficult to assess the vigor with which these operations are being conducted and to measure their effectiveness. Washington could insist on greater transparency to ensure that these operations are yielding meaningful results. This would include arresting and charging key leaders and shutting down their camps at Muridke, just outside Lahore. The administration should simultaneously insist that the Pakistani security forces finally launch an offensive against Lashkar-e-Taiba and not resort to sophistry to downplay its ties to al Qaeda and its involvement with terror in Kashmir and other parts of India.
A failure to sustain pressure on the Pakistani security establishment would have widespread adverse consequences for the country, for the region and for the U.S. The costs of homegrown terrorism to Pakistan's society have been more than apparent the past several weeks. The attack on the United Nations Mission in Kabul last week while Mrs. Clinton was in Islamabad underscored the dangers that these Pakistan-based groups pose for the region. Unless the sanctuaries these entities have long enjoyed in west Pakistan are finally denied, the U.S.-led effort to stabilize Afghanistan could be in serious jeopardy.
Mr. Ganguly is a professor of political science and director of research of the Center on American and Global Security at Indiana University.
By MATTHEW ROSENBERG
ISLAMABAD -- The Islamist militant group behind the deadly attack in Mumbai one year ago remains a potent force determined to strike India and the West, and a source of acrimony between South Asia's nuclear-armed rivals, say officials and members of the militant faction.
Indian officials and experts say at least six new plots against Mumbai by the Pakistan-based group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, have been disrupted in the 12 months since 10 gunmen wrought three days of havoc on India's financial capital, killing 166 people.
Lashkar's infiltration of India's part of Kashmir is again on the upswing, the officials say; and a U.S. citizen with alleged ties to Lashkar was recently arrested in Chicago, evidence of the group's reach, U.S. officials say.
"Our aims are the same today as they were 10 years ago," said a man who identified himself as a former Lashkar militant now working with its charity arm. "We are waging war on the enemies of Islam."
U.S. officials and experts say hitting India remains the primary focus for Lashkar, which was nurtured in the 1990s by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency for use as a proxy against Indian forces in the divided Himalayan region of Kashmir. Pakistan banned the group in 2002 and officials here say they cut ties with it at the time.
But no one disputes that Lashkar continued to operate from Pakistan, repeatedly striking Indian targets in recent years. Another Mumbai-style attack, say officials from both countries, risks sparking a fourth war between the neighbors.
At the very least, Lashkar's continued existence presents a major obstacle to peace between the rivals. The tension also jeopardizes U.S. efforts in Afghanistan by keeping the bulk of Pakistan's sizable army focused on India, not the Taliban, say U.S. officials.
Yet Lashkar endures today because Pakistan's pledges to dismantle it in the wake of the Mumbai attack remain largely unfulfilled, say U.S., Indian and some Pakistani officials.
The group's long ties to Pakistan's powerful security establishment and the deep roots it has put down in towns and villages through its charity arm leave the government with a difficult challenge. Many Pakistanis still doubt Lashkar's role in the attack, and officials here privately say they fear a popular backlash if they move too forcefully against the group.
Timeline
* Nov. 26, 2008: 10 men from the Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba begin a gun-and-grenade assault on targets in Mumbai, lasting nearly three days and leaving at least 174 people dead.
* Dec. 11, 2008: Pakistan moves against Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the charity front of Lashkar, arresting the group's leaders and shuttering its offices a day after the U.N. sanctioned the group. Days earlier, Pakistan also began arresting suspected members of Lashkar.
* Jan. 5, 2009: India gives Pakistan its first dossier of what it says is evidence that Lashkar orchestrated the Mumbai attack. The two countries have since repeatedly exchanged additional dossiers, although each side has complained about the information provided by the other.
* Jan. 6, 2009: After weeks of denials, Pakistan acknowledges that the single gunmen captured by Indian police in Mumbai, Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, is a Pakistani citizen.
* Feb. 12, 2009: Pakistan publicly acknowledges for the first time that the Mumbai attack was partly planned on its soil and says it has arrested most of the key plotters, including the alleged operations chief of Lashkar, Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi.
* June 2, 2009: A Pakistani court orders the founder of Lashkar, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, released from house arrest, finding that the government does not have enough evidence to hold him. Mr. Saeed maintains that he runs a charity, nothing more.
* July 20, 2009: The single attacker captured by Indian police, Mohammaed Ajmal Kasab, confesses in open court that he took part in the assault. He says he was trained by Lashkar in Pakistan.
Pakistani officials also worry about taking on a potent enemy as they are trying to beat back the Taliban, which has killed hundreds of people in terrorist attacks in Pakistan since early October.
U.S. officials and analysts also say factions within Pakistan's military still see Lashkar as a potential weapon to be used in any future conflicts with India. Lashkar "has historically been Pakistan's most reliable proxy against India and elements within the military clearly wish to maintain this capability," according to a report this week by security analyst Stephen Tankel in the CTC Sentinel, published by the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
Pakistan, following India and the U.S., concluded in the weeks after the Mumbai attack that it was carried out by Lashkar. Islamabad moved against the group, arresting dozens of people and banning its charity wing, Jamaat-ud-Dawa.
But most of those arrested have since been released and the trial of seven still-jailed Lashkar suspects, including the group's alleged chief of operations, has been repeatedly delayed.
U.S. officials, experts and Lashkar members say the group's few thousand fighters are still training at camps and safe houses, many of them in Pakistan's part of Kashmir.
Money is still flowing into its charity arm, which is now operating under a new name, Falah-i-Insaniat, according to Western officials and members of the group. The charity is best known for aiding victims of the 2005 earthquake and refugees from a Pakistani army offensive against the Taliban in the Swat Valley this year.
India and Pakistan have exchanged a series of dossiers detailing what they know about the attack's planning and execution, but each side complains the information provided by the other is insufficient.
Pakistani officials, for example, say India hasn't given them enough evidence to try Lashkar's founder, Hafiz Mohammaed Saeed, who has been in and out of house arrest since the attack. On Friday, Mr. Saeed preached a sermon to thousands of followers at the Jamia al Qadisa Mosque in the eastern city of Lahore.
"No power on the earth can defeat Muslims if they follow the God's path," preached Mr. Saeed, who says he runs a charity, and nothing more. "You can see what has happened to the American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan."
Pakistani officials say the men awaiting trial are the key players in the group, especially the alleged operations chief, Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi.
"Pakistan's political and military leadership endeavors to bring all terrorists, including those involved in Mumbai attack, to justice.... Any reports to the contrary are false and misleading," said Farahnaz Ispahani, a spokeswoman for Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari. "The least we seek from the international community is recognition of our struggles."
U.S. officials say Pakistan's civilian leadership -- especially President Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani -- remains committed to dismantling Lashkar. They are far less certain about Pakistan's military and its spy agency, the ISI. Both deny aiding Lashkar.
An ISI officer said "maybe a handful" of retired officers work with Lashkar. The officer said the agency maintains informal contacts needed to monitor the group.
The officer added that Pakistan is facing multiple Taliban attacks every week and has to prioritize when it comes to moving against militants. "Which choice do you think we should make? Defend ourselves or defend India?" he said.
—Zahid Hussain in Lahore contributed to this article.
ISLAMABAD -- The Islamist militant group behind the deadly attack in Mumbai one year ago remains a potent force determined to strike India and the West, and a source of acrimony between South Asia's nuclear-armed rivals, say officials and members of the militant faction.
Indian officials and experts say at least six new plots against Mumbai by the Pakistan-based group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, have been disrupted in the 12 months since 10 gunmen wrought three days of havoc on India's financial capital, killing 166 people.
Lashkar's infiltration of India's part of Kashmir is again on the upswing, the officials say; and a U.S. citizen with alleged ties to Lashkar was recently arrested in Chicago, evidence of the group's reach, U.S. officials say.
"Our aims are the same today as they were 10 years ago," said a man who identified himself as a former Lashkar militant now working with its charity arm. "We are waging war on the enemies of Islam."
U.S. officials and experts say hitting India remains the primary focus for Lashkar, which was nurtured in the 1990s by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency for use as a proxy against Indian forces in the divided Himalayan region of Kashmir. Pakistan banned the group in 2002 and officials here say they cut ties with it at the time.
But no one disputes that Lashkar continued to operate from Pakistan, repeatedly striking Indian targets in recent years. Another Mumbai-style attack, say officials from both countries, risks sparking a fourth war between the neighbors.
At the very least, Lashkar's continued existence presents a major obstacle to peace between the rivals. The tension also jeopardizes U.S. efforts in Afghanistan by keeping the bulk of Pakistan's sizable army focused on India, not the Taliban, say U.S. officials.
Yet Lashkar endures today because Pakistan's pledges to dismantle it in the wake of the Mumbai attack remain largely unfulfilled, say U.S., Indian and some Pakistani officials.
The group's long ties to Pakistan's powerful security establishment and the deep roots it has put down in towns and villages through its charity arm leave the government with a difficult challenge. Many Pakistanis still doubt Lashkar's role in the attack, and officials here privately say they fear a popular backlash if they move too forcefully against the group.
Timeline
* Nov. 26, 2008: 10 men from the Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba begin a gun-and-grenade assault on targets in Mumbai, lasting nearly three days and leaving at least 174 people dead.
* Dec. 11, 2008: Pakistan moves against Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the charity front of Lashkar, arresting the group's leaders and shuttering its offices a day after the U.N. sanctioned the group. Days earlier, Pakistan also began arresting suspected members of Lashkar.
* Jan. 5, 2009: India gives Pakistan its first dossier of what it says is evidence that Lashkar orchestrated the Mumbai attack. The two countries have since repeatedly exchanged additional dossiers, although each side has complained about the information provided by the other.
* Jan. 6, 2009: After weeks of denials, Pakistan acknowledges that the single gunmen captured by Indian police in Mumbai, Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, is a Pakistani citizen.
* Feb. 12, 2009: Pakistan publicly acknowledges for the first time that the Mumbai attack was partly planned on its soil and says it has arrested most of the key plotters, including the alleged operations chief of Lashkar, Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi.
* June 2, 2009: A Pakistani court orders the founder of Lashkar, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, released from house arrest, finding that the government does not have enough evidence to hold him. Mr. Saeed maintains that he runs a charity, nothing more.
* July 20, 2009: The single attacker captured by Indian police, Mohammaed Ajmal Kasab, confesses in open court that he took part in the assault. He says he was trained by Lashkar in Pakistan.
Pakistani officials also worry about taking on a potent enemy as they are trying to beat back the Taliban, which has killed hundreds of people in terrorist attacks in Pakistan since early October.
U.S. officials and analysts also say factions within Pakistan's military still see Lashkar as a potential weapon to be used in any future conflicts with India. Lashkar "has historically been Pakistan's most reliable proxy against India and elements within the military clearly wish to maintain this capability," according to a report this week by security analyst Stephen Tankel in the CTC Sentinel, published by the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
Pakistan, following India and the U.S., concluded in the weeks after the Mumbai attack that it was carried out by Lashkar. Islamabad moved against the group, arresting dozens of people and banning its charity wing, Jamaat-ud-Dawa.
But most of those arrested have since been released and the trial of seven still-jailed Lashkar suspects, including the group's alleged chief of operations, has been repeatedly delayed.
U.S. officials, experts and Lashkar members say the group's few thousand fighters are still training at camps and safe houses, many of them in Pakistan's part of Kashmir.
Money is still flowing into its charity arm, which is now operating under a new name, Falah-i-Insaniat, according to Western officials and members of the group. The charity is best known for aiding victims of the 2005 earthquake and refugees from a Pakistani army offensive against the Taliban in the Swat Valley this year.
India and Pakistan have exchanged a series of dossiers detailing what they know about the attack's planning and execution, but each side complains the information provided by the other is insufficient.
Pakistani officials, for example, say India hasn't given them enough evidence to try Lashkar's founder, Hafiz Mohammaed Saeed, who has been in and out of house arrest since the attack. On Friday, Mr. Saeed preached a sermon to thousands of followers at the Jamia al Qadisa Mosque in the eastern city of Lahore.
"No power on the earth can defeat Muslims if they follow the God's path," preached Mr. Saeed, who says he runs a charity, and nothing more. "You can see what has happened to the American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan."
Pakistani officials say the men awaiting trial are the key players in the group, especially the alleged operations chief, Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi.
"Pakistan's political and military leadership endeavors to bring all terrorists, including those involved in Mumbai attack, to justice.... Any reports to the contrary are false and misleading," said Farahnaz Ispahani, a spokeswoman for Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari. "The least we seek from the international community is recognition of our struggles."
U.S. officials say Pakistan's civilian leadership -- especially President Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani -- remains committed to dismantling Lashkar. They are far less certain about Pakistan's military and its spy agency, the ISI. Both deny aiding Lashkar.
An ISI officer said "maybe a handful" of retired officers work with Lashkar. The officer said the agency maintains informal contacts needed to monitor the group.
The officer added that Pakistan is facing multiple Taliban attacks every week and has to prioritize when it comes to moving against militants. "Which choice do you think we should make? Defend ourselves or defend India?" he said.
—Zahid Hussain in Lahore contributed to this article.
Speaking of Pakistan
The U.S. and India must take steps to deepen their cooperation against South Asian terrorism.
By C. CHRISTINE FAIR
Pakistan is likely to loom large in the meetings between President Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh this week. Partly that's because Thursday is the first anniversary of the Mumbai hotel attacks that claimed 173 lives, including four Americans—attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups based in Pakistan. More broadly, there is a growing realization that Washington and New Delhi have many common security interests in Pakistan, which is a key country both to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and to the fight against Islamist terrorism.
So amid the fanfare of the Obama administration's first state visit, both sides will quietly focus on how they can best protect each other from the terrorist threats emanating from Pakistan. Americans are now more aware than ever of the threats India faces. Before the "11/26" assault, few Americans had ever heard of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based terrorist group operating largely, but not exclusively, in India. Though the attack was not India's deadliest—that was the 1993 attack on Mumbai's stock exchange—it changed the world's understanding of terrorism in India as real-time television footage streamed into American and European living rooms. It catalyzed discussions in Washington and Delhi about Lashkar-e-Taiba and the danger that group and its fellow travelers pose not just to India but to other countries.
India and the U.S. share a common vision of a stable, democratic, civilian-controlled Pakistan at peace with itself and its neighbors. But they have often disagreed on how best to achieve this end. It is unlikely that Mr. Singh's visit will yield an immediate consensus, but will likely continue to focus on law enforcement and counterintelligence cooperation.
Since 9/11, Delhi has watched warily as Washington enlisted Pakistan's help against al Qaeda by providing conventional military assistance and other allurements such as such as aid for Pakistan's participation on the war on terrorism. In total Pakistan has received more than $15 billion since 9/11. Washington had applied only episodic pressure on Pakistan to shut down militants operating in and against India and the disputed border region of Kashmir. Washington has wanted to encourage Pakistan to fight those militants that it can and will fight, even if Islamabad opposes actions against groups like Lashkar and the Afghan Taliban. And Washington needs Pakistan's support to fight the war in Afghanistan. Washington used to see Lashkar and other "Kashmiri groups" as India's problem, caring about these militant outfits only if they directly threatened U.S. interests. The United States and India have for too long been fighting their own, parallel wars on terror.
The 11/26 attack has changed regional and international dynamics, ultimately to Pakistan's disadvantage. First, Pakistan's inaction toward Lashkar and its front organization Jamaat-ul-Dawa puts to rest any doubt about Pakistan's commitment to retaining the organization as a strategic reserve to do the state's bidding in the region. Pakistan's failure to take meaningful action against Lashkar came to the fore in April 2009 when the organization, with the tacit assent of the government, provided high-visibility assistance to Pakistanis displaced by military action in Swat. It is now obvious, despite Islamabad's recent efforts to pursue the Pakistan Taliban and the sanctuaries it provides to al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, that the Pakistan government is part of the problem of international terrorism.
Second, whereas Lashkar was previously a "niche specialty" for counterterrorism experts within the U.S. government, now nearly every policy, law-enforcement, intelligence and military agency has dedicated resources to protect the U.S., its friends and its assets from Lashkar. The Mumbai attack lent increased urgency to deepening U.S.-India cooperation centered on joint law enforcement and counterterrorism concerns. While less "sexy" than military-to-military engagements, this kind of Indo-U.S cooperation is vital to securing both nations against future terrorist threats.
Third, the proximity of Lashkar to Pakistan's intelligence and security services, along with continued revelations about those services' assistance to the Afghan Taliban, remind the U.S. and others that the Pakistan government continues to fight a selective war on terror, preserving those militant groups that serve the state's foreign policy goals. This has forced many analysts and policy makers to acknowledge that Pakistan is unlikely ever to abandon terrorism as a tool of foreign policy even while domestic terrorists tear at the fabric of the state.
India has taken important steps under the leadership of Home Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram, who is keen to make sweeping changes in India's domestic security arrangements. He wants to learn from India's past mistakes and from other countries, including the U.S. This is an opportunity for Washington and Delhi to explore ways to deepen intelligence sharing, to continue developing contacts between local and federal law enforcement agencies, expand government and non-governmental engagement on the nature of the terrorist threat and best practices to counter it, and to deepen the focus on maritime security cooperation to limit the maritime opportunities for a variety of illegal actors.
Mr. Singh's visit reminds us all that while India and the U.S. have come a long way since 2000, there is much work to be done in jointly securing the safety of their citizens from groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba. Whether both states will rally to the challenge remains to be seen.
Ms. Fair is an assistant professor in the security studies program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
By C. CHRISTINE FAIR
Pakistan is likely to loom large in the meetings between President Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh this week. Partly that's because Thursday is the first anniversary of the Mumbai hotel attacks that claimed 173 lives, including four Americans—attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups based in Pakistan. More broadly, there is a growing realization that Washington and New Delhi have many common security interests in Pakistan, which is a key country both to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and to the fight against Islamist terrorism.
So amid the fanfare of the Obama administration's first state visit, both sides will quietly focus on how they can best protect each other from the terrorist threats emanating from Pakistan. Americans are now more aware than ever of the threats India faces. Before the "11/26" assault, few Americans had ever heard of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based terrorist group operating largely, but not exclusively, in India. Though the attack was not India's deadliest—that was the 1993 attack on Mumbai's stock exchange—it changed the world's understanding of terrorism in India as real-time television footage streamed into American and European living rooms. It catalyzed discussions in Washington and Delhi about Lashkar-e-Taiba and the danger that group and its fellow travelers pose not just to India but to other countries.
India and the U.S. share a common vision of a stable, democratic, civilian-controlled Pakistan at peace with itself and its neighbors. But they have often disagreed on how best to achieve this end. It is unlikely that Mr. Singh's visit will yield an immediate consensus, but will likely continue to focus on law enforcement and counterintelligence cooperation.
Since 9/11, Delhi has watched warily as Washington enlisted Pakistan's help against al Qaeda by providing conventional military assistance and other allurements such as such as aid for Pakistan's participation on the war on terrorism. In total Pakistan has received more than $15 billion since 9/11. Washington had applied only episodic pressure on Pakistan to shut down militants operating in and against India and the disputed border region of Kashmir. Washington has wanted to encourage Pakistan to fight those militants that it can and will fight, even if Islamabad opposes actions against groups like Lashkar and the Afghan Taliban. And Washington needs Pakistan's support to fight the war in Afghanistan. Washington used to see Lashkar and other "Kashmiri groups" as India's problem, caring about these militant outfits only if they directly threatened U.S. interests. The United States and India have for too long been fighting their own, parallel wars on terror.
The 11/26 attack has changed regional and international dynamics, ultimately to Pakistan's disadvantage. First, Pakistan's inaction toward Lashkar and its front organization Jamaat-ul-Dawa puts to rest any doubt about Pakistan's commitment to retaining the organization as a strategic reserve to do the state's bidding in the region. Pakistan's failure to take meaningful action against Lashkar came to the fore in April 2009 when the organization, with the tacit assent of the government, provided high-visibility assistance to Pakistanis displaced by military action in Swat. It is now obvious, despite Islamabad's recent efforts to pursue the Pakistan Taliban and the sanctuaries it provides to al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, that the Pakistan government is part of the problem of international terrorism.
Second, whereas Lashkar was previously a "niche specialty" for counterterrorism experts within the U.S. government, now nearly every policy, law-enforcement, intelligence and military agency has dedicated resources to protect the U.S., its friends and its assets from Lashkar. The Mumbai attack lent increased urgency to deepening U.S.-India cooperation centered on joint law enforcement and counterterrorism concerns. While less "sexy" than military-to-military engagements, this kind of Indo-U.S cooperation is vital to securing both nations against future terrorist threats.
Third, the proximity of Lashkar to Pakistan's intelligence and security services, along with continued revelations about those services' assistance to the Afghan Taliban, remind the U.S. and others that the Pakistan government continues to fight a selective war on terror, preserving those militant groups that serve the state's foreign policy goals. This has forced many analysts and policy makers to acknowledge that Pakistan is unlikely ever to abandon terrorism as a tool of foreign policy even while domestic terrorists tear at the fabric of the state.
India has taken important steps under the leadership of Home Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram, who is keen to make sweeping changes in India's domestic security arrangements. He wants to learn from India's past mistakes and from other countries, including the U.S. This is an opportunity for Washington and Delhi to explore ways to deepen intelligence sharing, to continue developing contacts between local and federal law enforcement agencies, expand government and non-governmental engagement on the nature of the terrorist threat and best practices to counter it, and to deepen the focus on maritime security cooperation to limit the maritime opportunities for a variety of illegal actors.
Mr. Singh's visit reminds us all that while India and the U.S. have come a long way since 2000, there is much work to be done in jointly securing the safety of their citizens from groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba. Whether both states will rally to the challenge remains to be seen.
Ms. Fair is an assistant professor in the security studies program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
How Azad is `Azad Kashmir'
If you want to study the situation in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and cannot go to even the minuscule part of this region designated as `Azad Kashmir', the best place to go to is England. Bradford, Birmingham, Nottingham, Luton, Slough and Southall are perhaps even better sources of information about the POK than Muzaffarabad, Mirpur, Bagh Rawalakot and Kotli. For the Kashmiris living in Britain breathe free air that it not much available in the so-called Azad Kashmir. Even if you so much as apply for a job you have to sign an affidavit saying you believe in the ideology of "Kashmir banega Pakistan" (Kashmir will become Pakistan).
I happened to be in England on the eve of recent election in `Azad Kashmir'. Meeting `Azad' Kashmiris in Britain proved revealing. The politically active among them have organised themselves on the lines of politics back home. Nearly all political organisations and ideologies are represented. They all appear to be working against India and, except JKLF, pro-Pakistan. Their activities range from the ridiculous to the more sober. I come across some Tehrik-e-Kashmir activists in Birmingham attempting to impose a boycott of Tilda rice supposedly imported from India. They are aware that India is far too big and powerful a country with a vast capacity to take losses to be bothered with such nonsense. But they think this helps them spread hatred against India. On the other hand they are making a serious and somewhat successful attempt at lobbying political parties, media and bureaucracy to convince them of the genuineness of their case against what they call Indian occupation of Kashmir and serious human rights violations.
But this is a superficial impression. Beneath the surface, most of them are disgusted with Pakistan and many of them find India's handling of its part of Kashmir, despited the obvious difficulties and current hostilities, more commendable. Several people, for instance, mentioned that while India has respected Kashmir's age-old practice of not allowing outsiders to settle down in the valley, Pakistan has allowed over 28,000 Afghan families to settle down and fleece the local populace in the name of Jihad. These Afghans are even more exploitative that the Hindu baniya ever was, they point out.
The comparisons are endless. Kashmiris in the valley are better educated and better skilled. They have their own university with medical and engineering colleges. Some of us, particularly Mirpuris may be more prosperous, they say, but that is only because we managed to come to England when we were virtually thrown out of Pakistan as we lost our livelihood in the wake of the construction of Mangla Dam. The reference to Mangla Dam always brings out either complete silence in pro-Pakistan circles or vociferous protest from those who are not so particular about living with Pakistan. This Dam is said to supply 65% of the electricity needs of Pakistan, but the so-called Azad Kashmir does not get any royalty. Pakistan's Water and Power Development Agency (WAPDA) is estimated to be earning over Rs. 50 crores from the electricity produced at Mangla, thought the total budget of the Azad Kashmir is in the vicinity of Rs. 10 crores.
The most talked about issue, of course, is that of Northern Areas which has been virtually swallowed by Pakistan Army. It comes in the news periodically only when there are Shia-Sunni clashes in the area of firing by the Army to quell anti-government demonstrations. In a historic judgment when a Kashmiri chief justice of the High Court dared to say a couple of years ago that the area was a part of Kashmir and had been illegally occupied by Pakistan Army, he instantly became a hero. Similar enthusiasm was shown by the Kashmiris towards Raja Mumtaz Hussain Rathore, the last PPP `Prime Minister' of the so-called Azad Kashmir, who started taking up the issue of Northern Areas followed his dismissal and detention by the last Nawaz Sharif government.
This leads any discussion in the direction of almost complete denial of democracy to the so-called Azad Kashmir. While India has at least one or two free and fair elections in the valley, notably in 1977 and 1983, the Pakistani Establishment has dismissed and installed governments of `Azad Kashmir' at will. The only party that has not been able to do so is Ms. Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People Party as it is not considered a part of Establishment even when in power.
It is hardly surprising in view of such perceptions of the Pakistani Kashmiris that they throw out Sardar Qayyoom's obscurantist Muslim Conference which has ruled them for most of the last half a century at the first available opportunity. They did that in 1990 and they have done that now. Sardar Qayyoom's protestations of massive rigging by the PPP government in Islamabad is unbelievable. All that she had to do to win elections there was not to concede Sardar Qayyoom's demand of allowing the Army to conduct elections.
ELECTION EXPOSE SIMMERING DISCONTENT IN POK OBSCURANTIST INDIA-BAITERS FACE MASSIVE DEFEAT
Sardar Abdul Qayyoom Khan's ruling Muslim Conference has been virtually wiped out in the small part of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) designated as "Azad Kashmir" where generally farcical elections are held intermittently to buttress the fiction of its Azadi. He has blamed massive rigging for his defeat. This is predictably music to Indian ears. We have ourselves faced similar allegations in international as well as sections of national media in regard to recent elections in our part of Kashmir. But by playing up Sardar Qayyoom's incredible claims in our media and in the diplomatic circuit, we are simply playing in the hands of Pakistan's right wing obscurantists, Army and the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI).
Indian media pundits and bureaucrats may have valid reasons to regard the ruling Pakistan People Party headed by Ms Benazir Bhutto and even its so-called Azad Kashmir branch as communal or obscurantist and anti-India. Obviously they must have more impeccable sources of information and intelligence. But the people of the so-called Azad Kashmir have been consistently told since the formation of PPP itself that it is secular, anti-Islam, anti-Pakistan and pro-India. The Pakistani media, the Sardar Qayyoom government, indeed the entire Pakistani Establishment has indulged in this propaganda on the largest possible scale for years. And yet they have chosen to give a massive mandate to this supposedly secular, progressive, pro-India party. Whether or not the PPP is secular and pro-India is not the issue. The fact that despite this widespread perception, the people of this piece of POK have chosen to elect it again must mean something to us in India. There is so clearly some message in this massive PPP victory and we should try to understand and interpret it in this light. Our hatred for Pakistan seems to have blinded us and we are reacting mindlessly.
Sardar Qayyoom's party has ruled the so-called Azad Kashmir (I prefer to use this term rather that the popular POK, as this area is actually less than half of the POK) for most of the last half a century. He has himself ruled as President as well as Prime Minister for decades. he retains the love and affection of the military-bureaucratic and feudal-industrialist complex that rules Pakistan as ever. He is the darling of the obscurantist elements in the Pakistani Opposition, despite his son Sardar Ateeq's shenanigans. he had himself come to power in the present instance through a farcical election following an undemocratic and immoral, though constitutional and legal, dismissal and even detention of the last Prime Minister Raja Mumtaz Hussain Rathore who headed a duly elected People's Party government.
The rule in Pakistan is that the movement changes hands in Islamabad, the so-called Azad Kashmir government is dismissed and a new one installed through a farce of an election unless this happens to be a Muslim Conference government headed by Sardar Qayyoom. Following this glorious tradition the last Muslim league government headed by Mr. Nawaz Sharif had dismissed Mr. Mumtaz Rathore, detained him and installed Sardar Qayyoom. But Ms. Benazir Bhutto's PPP has never been allowed to follow this tradition. When she came to power a couple of years ago, she was widely expected to reinstall Mumtaz Rathore. She would not have required to rig the elections to do so. For reasons that we will discuss later the people of the so-called Azad Kashmir are fed up with the Sardar Dynasty. Indeed Ms. Bhutto is not capable of rigging elections there or anywhere else.
Ms. Bhutto came to power for the first time having won elections that followed President Zia-ul-Haq's death in August 1988, she was told that as chairperson of the Kashmir Council, she had the power to dissolve the Kashmir Assembly order fresh elections. She was considering the popular demand for dismissal of the Muzaffarabad government. But Sardar Qayyoom criticised Ms. Bhutto's policy of normalisation with India "to undo the Islamic ideology and weaken the Pakistan Army". He wrote to President Guhlam Ishaq Khan: "We will not allow a pro-India government in Azad Kashmir," He made it clear that he would not accept the electoral verdict if the PPP won. And despite all the pressure from the people of Pakistan Occupied `Azad' Kashmir and her party she could not topple the Sardar government. Sardar Qayyoom completed his tenure in 1990.
Informed people are aware that Pakistan is ruled by a troika. A Pakistan Prime Minister can only do things with the concurrence of Washington and the local Establishment which includes the Army, ISI, Bureaucracy, Business, Feudal and Obscurantist elements. Ms. Bhutto's PPP was allowed to stay in power because for a variety of reasons not germane to this discussion she was for the moment begin tolerated by the two other parts of the troika. But she had very obvious limits to her power. She had enough powers thought to ensure that elections in the so-called Azad Kashmir are not rigged by any part of the troika including the Pakistani Establishment which would have loved to see Sardar Qayyoom back in power. All that she needed to do was not to concede Sardar Qayyoom's persistent demand to allow the Army to conduct the elections.
Why did Ms. Bhutto allow Sardar Qayyoom during her second term to continue for so long and complete his full term again is thus no mystery. She was under intense pressure from the Sardar government. But she continued to be so incensed with Mr. Nawaz Sharif who had earlier dismissed and detained the PPP Prime Minister Raja Mumtaz Rathore that she was seriously considering taking them on in this case. This was when, according to my sources in PPP, a new element entered into the picture which proved decisive and finally saved the Sardar government.
President Laghari of Pakistan visited India and met a delegation of Kashmir valley's pro-Pakistan leaders. This delegation pleaded with him to persuade Ms. Bhutto not to dismiss Sardar Qayyoom. Their argument was that in the absence of Sardar Qayyoom the network supporting militancy in the valley would be disturbed. A PPP government there can obviously not be trusted to support the right wing network. Their second argument was even more important. Islamabad dismissing a duly elected Muzaffarabad government without any apparent reason, thought constitutionally valid and legal, would be clearly immoral and undemocratic that it would weaken their case that Kashmir's identity and autonomy would better protected by Pakistan that it is with India. Even though Pakistan has a history of such undemocratic dismissals, this particular dismissal at the height of militancy in the Valley would prove disastrous, so pleaded Hurriyat leaders. Despite all his sophistication and persuasive arguments, my sources tell me, it took President Laghari two and a half hours of intense pleading to dissuade Ms. Bhutto from dismissing Sardar Qayyoom's government.
One wonders if the pro-Pakistan Hurriyat leaders in the valley are now pleading with Sardar Qayyoom not to accuse PPP government in Islamabad and his own government in Muzaffarabad of massive rigging in the elections. For, this too weakens their case of Kashmir's accession with Pakistan. It brings to light the farcical nature of `Azadi' in the so-called Azad Kashmir. Of course, even this so-called Azadi is not available to the hapless people of the majority area of the Pakistan occupied Kashmir designated as Northern Areas. The vast areas of Gilgit and Baltistan have simply vanished from the face of the earth as far as the Pakistan Constitution and other legal documents are concerned, though until 1954, Pakistan used to supply maps that showed these territories as a part of Kashmir.
The Muslim Conference alleging massive rigging is indeed ridiculous. The People's Party massive mandate in Azad Kashmir represents not so much its own popularity as it articulates the disgust of the `Azad' Kashmiris with Pakistani Establishment. The Muslim Conference is seen as this Establishment's local representative despite its regional character. Ironically, the People's Party Kashmir unit is seen as more representative of the regional aspirations despite this Party's all-Pakistan character.
The plight of Azad Kashmiris calls for a separate write-up. What we can say here is that economic factors like lack of development of any industry, communication facilities, exploitation of Mangla dam for providing electricity to 65 per cent of Pakistan without any compensation, no local university, no local bank, no new bridges over the river Jhelum and so on do weight heavily on the minds of `Azad' Kashmiris, what they resent most is their virtual slave status in the Constitution, new tensions in the wake of settlement of over 28,000 Afghan families, militant training camps and the inevitable rise of obscurantism due to almost uninterrupted half-a-century rule of the Muslim Conference. They have been told for years now that the accession of Kashmir valley to Pakistan is round the corner. But neither the proud Suddhan tribals, nor the wealthy Mirpuris (most of them have relatives in England) are prepared to accept the inevitable domination of the better educated and numerically stronger `hatos' as they contemptuously refer to the Kashmiris of the valley in case Kashmir is united.
An Open Letter:
What are you doing with Hurriyat, Yasin Malik?
It is easier for an Indian to sympathise with you, regardless of the folly of your pursuit. With your emaciated body, you are the only Gandhi-like figure on the kashmir horizon. Despite your militant past, the country appeared to have accepted your protestations of peade when you renounced violence. Released from captivity, you received the best media attention any Kashmiri leader had got, perhaps with the solitary exception so Shabir Shah. But when you went on fast for three days in Delhi nevently to focus attention on human rights violations in Kashmir, there was hardly an mediaperson or realy any one else around. I wonder if you have been wondering why.
I wanted to ask you-what are doing with Hurriyat, Yasin Saheb?-when I visited you on the second day of your fast. But you were in no dondition to converse. You have been taking so much on yourslef, despite ill-health. Also, the question would have been a trifle awkward with so many Hurriyat leaders, including Chairman Mirwaiz Omar Farooq surrounding you.
You and Shabir Shah are the two prominent leaders who are associated with peaceful means of protest as well as what is called the third option, independence from both India and Pakistan. As other members of the Hurriyat Conference still stand for accession with Pakstan your association with Hurriyat has always been rather intriguing. Now this question has acquired some urgency with the recent declarations of the Hurriyat chief during his recent trip abroad. At a news conference in Washington, he said: "No Third Option exists on Kashmir. All components of All-Parties Hurriyat Conference, despite their diversity have accepted this. The Kashmiris have to decide in a plebiscite whether they should opt for India or Pakistan."
Hurriyat's total and rather desperate dependence on Pakistan become even more pronounced during the last SAARC foreign ministers' conference in Delhi. Senior Hurriyat leaders like Umar Farooq, Sayed Ali Shah Geelani adn Professor Abdul Ghani met the visiting Pakistani foreign minister Sahabazda Yaqub Khan and criticised Islamabad's efforts to improve trade relations with India. They felt Pakistna's business interests might overshadow the political aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Since Pakistan seemed keen to remove trade barriers with India under the SAARC agenda, they feared it might ultimately not give that much importance to the Kashmir issue.
That Pakistan was getting ready to dump the Kashmiris and perhaps concentrate on improving its battered economy had become clear to me, Yasin Shaeb, several months ago. You couldn't have forgotten what happened in Leicester, U.K. last August. Expartriate Kashmiri leader Dr. Ayyub Thukar had organised a conference of Kashmiri leaders from India Pakistan as well. No one turned up from Pakistan. This became particularly embarrassing for the organisers because two people arrived even from India - the present writer and Mr. Subodh Kant Sahai. Finally, Islamabad, probably after much coaxing and cajoling, instructed its deputy High Commissioner in London to attent the conference who was able to reach there only for the last session.
One can hardly blame Pakistan, though, for this state of affairs. In the case of proxy wars this is almost routine. This is what Shah of Iran did with Mulla Barzani's Kurdish secessionist movement in Iraq. This is what Saddam Hussain does with Iranian Kurdish secessionists in Iran. Support them, use them, sell them and dump them is virtually the norm.
As Pakistani pro-occupation with tis impending political and economic disintegration grows, Hurriyat is bound to grow even more desperate. It is bound to shout louder and louder from rooftops higher and higher ist protestations of loyality to Pakistan. It is for leaders like you, Yasin Saheb, to think if Hurriyat is correctly representing your point of view. Shabbir Shah has proved smarter. He has manoeuvered himself out of Hurriyat at the right time. I wonder if you would reconsider your position vis-s-vis Hurriyat before it is too late for you to extricate yourself out of the mess that Hurriyat is beginning to sense it has got itself into.
I happened to be in England on the eve of recent election in `Azad Kashmir'. Meeting `Azad' Kashmiris in Britain proved revealing. The politically active among them have organised themselves on the lines of politics back home. Nearly all political organisations and ideologies are represented. They all appear to be working against India and, except JKLF, pro-Pakistan. Their activities range from the ridiculous to the more sober. I come across some Tehrik-e-Kashmir activists in Birmingham attempting to impose a boycott of Tilda rice supposedly imported from India. They are aware that India is far too big and powerful a country with a vast capacity to take losses to be bothered with such nonsense. But they think this helps them spread hatred against India. On the other hand they are making a serious and somewhat successful attempt at lobbying political parties, media and bureaucracy to convince them of the genuineness of their case against what they call Indian occupation of Kashmir and serious human rights violations.
But this is a superficial impression. Beneath the surface, most of them are disgusted with Pakistan and many of them find India's handling of its part of Kashmir, despited the obvious difficulties and current hostilities, more commendable. Several people, for instance, mentioned that while India has respected Kashmir's age-old practice of not allowing outsiders to settle down in the valley, Pakistan has allowed over 28,000 Afghan families to settle down and fleece the local populace in the name of Jihad. These Afghans are even more exploitative that the Hindu baniya ever was, they point out.
The comparisons are endless. Kashmiris in the valley are better educated and better skilled. They have their own university with medical and engineering colleges. Some of us, particularly Mirpuris may be more prosperous, they say, but that is only because we managed to come to England when we were virtually thrown out of Pakistan as we lost our livelihood in the wake of the construction of Mangla Dam. The reference to Mangla Dam always brings out either complete silence in pro-Pakistan circles or vociferous protest from those who are not so particular about living with Pakistan. This Dam is said to supply 65% of the electricity needs of Pakistan, but the so-called Azad Kashmir does not get any royalty. Pakistan's Water and Power Development Agency (WAPDA) is estimated to be earning over Rs. 50 crores from the electricity produced at Mangla, thought the total budget of the Azad Kashmir is in the vicinity of Rs. 10 crores.
The most talked about issue, of course, is that of Northern Areas which has been virtually swallowed by Pakistan Army. It comes in the news periodically only when there are Shia-Sunni clashes in the area of firing by the Army to quell anti-government demonstrations. In a historic judgment when a Kashmiri chief justice of the High Court dared to say a couple of years ago that the area was a part of Kashmir and had been illegally occupied by Pakistan Army, he instantly became a hero. Similar enthusiasm was shown by the Kashmiris towards Raja Mumtaz Hussain Rathore, the last PPP `Prime Minister' of the so-called Azad Kashmir, who started taking up the issue of Northern Areas followed his dismissal and detention by the last Nawaz Sharif government.
This leads any discussion in the direction of almost complete denial of democracy to the so-called Azad Kashmir. While India has at least one or two free and fair elections in the valley, notably in 1977 and 1983, the Pakistani Establishment has dismissed and installed governments of `Azad Kashmir' at will. The only party that has not been able to do so is Ms. Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People Party as it is not considered a part of Establishment even when in power.
It is hardly surprising in view of such perceptions of the Pakistani Kashmiris that they throw out Sardar Qayyoom's obscurantist Muslim Conference which has ruled them for most of the last half a century at the first available opportunity. They did that in 1990 and they have done that now. Sardar Qayyoom's protestations of massive rigging by the PPP government in Islamabad is unbelievable. All that she had to do to win elections there was not to concede Sardar Qayyoom's demand of allowing the Army to conduct elections.
ELECTION EXPOSE SIMMERING DISCONTENT IN POK OBSCURANTIST INDIA-BAITERS FACE MASSIVE DEFEAT
Sardar Abdul Qayyoom Khan's ruling Muslim Conference has been virtually wiped out in the small part of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) designated as "Azad Kashmir" where generally farcical elections are held intermittently to buttress the fiction of its Azadi. He has blamed massive rigging for his defeat. This is predictably music to Indian ears. We have ourselves faced similar allegations in international as well as sections of national media in regard to recent elections in our part of Kashmir. But by playing up Sardar Qayyoom's incredible claims in our media and in the diplomatic circuit, we are simply playing in the hands of Pakistan's right wing obscurantists, Army and the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI).
Indian media pundits and bureaucrats may have valid reasons to regard the ruling Pakistan People Party headed by Ms Benazir Bhutto and even its so-called Azad Kashmir branch as communal or obscurantist and anti-India. Obviously they must have more impeccable sources of information and intelligence. But the people of the so-called Azad Kashmir have been consistently told since the formation of PPP itself that it is secular, anti-Islam, anti-Pakistan and pro-India. The Pakistani media, the Sardar Qayyoom government, indeed the entire Pakistani Establishment has indulged in this propaganda on the largest possible scale for years. And yet they have chosen to give a massive mandate to this supposedly secular, progressive, pro-India party. Whether or not the PPP is secular and pro-India is not the issue. The fact that despite this widespread perception, the people of this piece of POK have chosen to elect it again must mean something to us in India. There is so clearly some message in this massive PPP victory and we should try to understand and interpret it in this light. Our hatred for Pakistan seems to have blinded us and we are reacting mindlessly.
Sardar Qayyoom's party has ruled the so-called Azad Kashmir (I prefer to use this term rather that the popular POK, as this area is actually less than half of the POK) for most of the last half a century. He has himself ruled as President as well as Prime Minister for decades. he retains the love and affection of the military-bureaucratic and feudal-industrialist complex that rules Pakistan as ever. He is the darling of the obscurantist elements in the Pakistani Opposition, despite his son Sardar Ateeq's shenanigans. he had himself come to power in the present instance through a farcical election following an undemocratic and immoral, though constitutional and legal, dismissal and even detention of the last Prime Minister Raja Mumtaz Hussain Rathore who headed a duly elected People's Party government.
The rule in Pakistan is that the movement changes hands in Islamabad, the so-called Azad Kashmir government is dismissed and a new one installed through a farce of an election unless this happens to be a Muslim Conference government headed by Sardar Qayyoom. Following this glorious tradition the last Muslim league government headed by Mr. Nawaz Sharif had dismissed Mr. Mumtaz Rathore, detained him and installed Sardar Qayyoom. But Ms. Benazir Bhutto's PPP has never been allowed to follow this tradition. When she came to power a couple of years ago, she was widely expected to reinstall Mumtaz Rathore. She would not have required to rig the elections to do so. For reasons that we will discuss later the people of the so-called Azad Kashmir are fed up with the Sardar Dynasty. Indeed Ms. Bhutto is not capable of rigging elections there or anywhere else.
Ms. Bhutto came to power for the first time having won elections that followed President Zia-ul-Haq's death in August 1988, she was told that as chairperson of the Kashmir Council, she had the power to dissolve the Kashmir Assembly order fresh elections. She was considering the popular demand for dismissal of the Muzaffarabad government. But Sardar Qayyoom criticised Ms. Bhutto's policy of normalisation with India "to undo the Islamic ideology and weaken the Pakistan Army". He wrote to President Guhlam Ishaq Khan: "We will not allow a pro-India government in Azad Kashmir," He made it clear that he would not accept the electoral verdict if the PPP won. And despite all the pressure from the people of Pakistan Occupied `Azad' Kashmir and her party she could not topple the Sardar government. Sardar Qayyoom completed his tenure in 1990.
Informed people are aware that Pakistan is ruled by a troika. A Pakistan Prime Minister can only do things with the concurrence of Washington and the local Establishment which includes the Army, ISI, Bureaucracy, Business, Feudal and Obscurantist elements. Ms. Bhutto's PPP was allowed to stay in power because for a variety of reasons not germane to this discussion she was for the moment begin tolerated by the two other parts of the troika. But she had very obvious limits to her power. She had enough powers thought to ensure that elections in the so-called Azad Kashmir are not rigged by any part of the troika including the Pakistani Establishment which would have loved to see Sardar Qayyoom back in power. All that she needed to do was not to concede Sardar Qayyoom's persistent demand to allow the Army to conduct the elections.
Why did Ms. Bhutto allow Sardar Qayyoom during her second term to continue for so long and complete his full term again is thus no mystery. She was under intense pressure from the Sardar government. But she continued to be so incensed with Mr. Nawaz Sharif who had earlier dismissed and detained the PPP Prime Minister Raja Mumtaz Rathore that she was seriously considering taking them on in this case. This was when, according to my sources in PPP, a new element entered into the picture which proved decisive and finally saved the Sardar government.
President Laghari of Pakistan visited India and met a delegation of Kashmir valley's pro-Pakistan leaders. This delegation pleaded with him to persuade Ms. Bhutto not to dismiss Sardar Qayyoom. Their argument was that in the absence of Sardar Qayyoom the network supporting militancy in the valley would be disturbed. A PPP government there can obviously not be trusted to support the right wing network. Their second argument was even more important. Islamabad dismissing a duly elected Muzaffarabad government without any apparent reason, thought constitutionally valid and legal, would be clearly immoral and undemocratic that it would weaken their case that Kashmir's identity and autonomy would better protected by Pakistan that it is with India. Even though Pakistan has a history of such undemocratic dismissals, this particular dismissal at the height of militancy in the Valley would prove disastrous, so pleaded Hurriyat leaders. Despite all his sophistication and persuasive arguments, my sources tell me, it took President Laghari two and a half hours of intense pleading to dissuade Ms. Bhutto from dismissing Sardar Qayyoom's government.
One wonders if the pro-Pakistan Hurriyat leaders in the valley are now pleading with Sardar Qayyoom not to accuse PPP government in Islamabad and his own government in Muzaffarabad of massive rigging in the elections. For, this too weakens their case of Kashmir's accession with Pakistan. It brings to light the farcical nature of `Azadi' in the so-called Azad Kashmir. Of course, even this so-called Azadi is not available to the hapless people of the majority area of the Pakistan occupied Kashmir designated as Northern Areas. The vast areas of Gilgit and Baltistan have simply vanished from the face of the earth as far as the Pakistan Constitution and other legal documents are concerned, though until 1954, Pakistan used to supply maps that showed these territories as a part of Kashmir.
The Muslim Conference alleging massive rigging is indeed ridiculous. The People's Party massive mandate in Azad Kashmir represents not so much its own popularity as it articulates the disgust of the `Azad' Kashmiris with Pakistani Establishment. The Muslim Conference is seen as this Establishment's local representative despite its regional character. Ironically, the People's Party Kashmir unit is seen as more representative of the regional aspirations despite this Party's all-Pakistan character.
The plight of Azad Kashmiris calls for a separate write-up. What we can say here is that economic factors like lack of development of any industry, communication facilities, exploitation of Mangla dam for providing electricity to 65 per cent of Pakistan without any compensation, no local university, no local bank, no new bridges over the river Jhelum and so on do weight heavily on the minds of `Azad' Kashmiris, what they resent most is their virtual slave status in the Constitution, new tensions in the wake of settlement of over 28,000 Afghan families, militant training camps and the inevitable rise of obscurantism due to almost uninterrupted half-a-century rule of the Muslim Conference. They have been told for years now that the accession of Kashmir valley to Pakistan is round the corner. But neither the proud Suddhan tribals, nor the wealthy Mirpuris (most of them have relatives in England) are prepared to accept the inevitable domination of the better educated and numerically stronger `hatos' as they contemptuously refer to the Kashmiris of the valley in case Kashmir is united.
An Open Letter:
What are you doing with Hurriyat, Yasin Malik?
It is easier for an Indian to sympathise with you, regardless of the folly of your pursuit. With your emaciated body, you are the only Gandhi-like figure on the kashmir horizon. Despite your militant past, the country appeared to have accepted your protestations of peade when you renounced violence. Released from captivity, you received the best media attention any Kashmiri leader had got, perhaps with the solitary exception so Shabir Shah. But when you went on fast for three days in Delhi nevently to focus attention on human rights violations in Kashmir, there was hardly an mediaperson or realy any one else around. I wonder if you have been wondering why.
I wanted to ask you-what are doing with Hurriyat, Yasin Saheb?-when I visited you on the second day of your fast. But you were in no dondition to converse. You have been taking so much on yourslef, despite ill-health. Also, the question would have been a trifle awkward with so many Hurriyat leaders, including Chairman Mirwaiz Omar Farooq surrounding you.
You and Shabir Shah are the two prominent leaders who are associated with peaceful means of protest as well as what is called the third option, independence from both India and Pakistan. As other members of the Hurriyat Conference still stand for accession with Pakstan your association with Hurriyat has always been rather intriguing. Now this question has acquired some urgency with the recent declarations of the Hurriyat chief during his recent trip abroad. At a news conference in Washington, he said: "No Third Option exists on Kashmir. All components of All-Parties Hurriyat Conference, despite their diversity have accepted this. The Kashmiris have to decide in a plebiscite whether they should opt for India or Pakistan."
Hurriyat's total and rather desperate dependence on Pakistan become even more pronounced during the last SAARC foreign ministers' conference in Delhi. Senior Hurriyat leaders like Umar Farooq, Sayed Ali Shah Geelani adn Professor Abdul Ghani met the visiting Pakistani foreign minister Sahabazda Yaqub Khan and criticised Islamabad's efforts to improve trade relations with India. They felt Pakistna's business interests might overshadow the political aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Since Pakistan seemed keen to remove trade barriers with India under the SAARC agenda, they feared it might ultimately not give that much importance to the Kashmir issue.
That Pakistan was getting ready to dump the Kashmiris and perhaps concentrate on improving its battered economy had become clear to me, Yasin Shaeb, several months ago. You couldn't have forgotten what happened in Leicester, U.K. last August. Expartriate Kashmiri leader Dr. Ayyub Thukar had organised a conference of Kashmiri leaders from India Pakistan as well. No one turned up from Pakistan. This became particularly embarrassing for the organisers because two people arrived even from India - the present writer and Mr. Subodh Kant Sahai. Finally, Islamabad, probably after much coaxing and cajoling, instructed its deputy High Commissioner in London to attent the conference who was able to reach there only for the last session.
One can hardly blame Pakistan, though, for this state of affairs. In the case of proxy wars this is almost routine. This is what Shah of Iran did with Mulla Barzani's Kurdish secessionist movement in Iraq. This is what Saddam Hussain does with Iranian Kurdish secessionists in Iran. Support them, use them, sell them and dump them is virtually the norm.
As Pakistani pro-occupation with tis impending political and economic disintegration grows, Hurriyat is bound to grow even more desperate. It is bound to shout louder and louder from rooftops higher and higher ist protestations of loyality to Pakistan. It is for leaders like you, Yasin Saheb, to think if Hurriyat is correctly representing your point of view. Shabbir Shah has proved smarter. He has manoeuvered himself out of Hurriyat at the right time. I wonder if you would reconsider your position vis-s-vis Hurriyat before it is too late for you to extricate yourself out of the mess that Hurriyat is beginning to sense it has got itself into.
"What you mean 'we,' kemosabe?"; Pakistani anti-American attitudes and their implications
Howard Schweber
Associate Professor of Political Science and Law at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
Posted: November 16, 2009 08:58 PM
In a classic Mad Magazine cartoon (that I dimly recall), the Lone Ranger and Tonto are surrounded by a horde of hostile Indian warriors. The Lone Ranger says to Tonto "what do we do, now?," to which Tonto replies, "what you mean 'we,' kemosabe?"
One has the impression that the Obama administration feels like that is the response it has been getting from Pakistan, and indeed doubts about Pakistan's status as a U.S. ally are nothing new. One thing that has received renewed attention of late, however, is the extent of anti-American sentiment of Pakistanis. Awareness of hostility to America among Pakistanis received a jolt with the publication of an Al Jazeera/Gallup poll in July 2009. In that poll, Pakistanis identified the U.S. as a greater threat to Pakistan (59%) than either the Taliban (11%) or India (18%). In that same poll, an overwhelming 67% of respondents opposed U.S. operations on Pakistani soil. A Pew Research poll in August 2009 confirmed these findings, but added some interesting nuances. While no fewer than 69% of respondents expressed concern that extremist forces could seize control of the country, 64% continued to describe the U.S. as an "enemy" and only 9% described it as a "partner."
At the same time, there were elements in the Pew poll results that muddied the waters. By a margin of 53% to 29%, respondents said it was important that U.S.-Pakistani relations improve, an odd statement about an "enemy." Even more confusing, 72% support continued U.S. financial and humanitarian aid, and 63% support the U.S. continuing to provide support to the military. In a beautiful illustration of the principle that question order matters in polling design, when the question about U.S. missile strikes against extremist leaders was asked after the series of questions about U.S. support and cooperation generally, support for such strikes soars to the 47% level.
Many Americans find Pakistani anti-Americanism baffling. Americans see a nation whose military was built and is supported largely by American money, facing a threat from America's own enemies, whose government professes to be an American ally at every opportunity. Certainly the drone attacks cause resentment, but they have caused far fewer deaths than attacks by extremists or the Pakistani Army's campaigns against those forces. So how, from the American perspective, is anti-American sentiment to be explained?
There are three narratives that help Americans explain Pakistani hostility: let's call them the "secret enemy" narrative, the "two-faced government" narrative, and the "quagmire" narrative. It is important to recognize that all three of these narratives have purchase because they appear against a background of general negative American attitudes toward Pakistan. In a 2007 Gallup poll, 64% of respondents had a negative view of Pakistan, a number that is generally consistent with results dating back to before 9/11.
The Secret Enemy Narrative
The first narrative is one that posits Pakistan as nothing less than a U.S. enemy, or, at a minimum, as an ally of U.S. enemies. The key claim here is that Al Qaeda and Taliban forces fighting U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan have safe havens in Pakistan, where they are sheltered and supported by the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments. In addition, while there have always been a trickle of stories about cooperation between Pakistan's military and intelligence services and Taliban or Al Qaeda forces, lately that trickle has become a torrent. This week, French investigative magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere is going to publish a book in which he accuses Pakistani government and military officials of supporting Al Qaeda. David Rohde's account of his capture by Taliban forces cites U.S. officials statements' that Pakistani military and intelligence forces provide money, supplies, and strategic planning to Taliban groups, specifically including the group led by Mawlawi Haqqani. The Haqqani network is a special point of contention between the U.S. and Pakistan, as it is blamed for many of the attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. (For an extended report on the background of the Haqqani network and its relationship with the ISI, see this report by the Institute for the Study of War.)
One also hears a great deal of this narrative from within the U.S. military. In October Col. David Haight, the U.S,. military commander of forces in Wardak, sent an e-mail to his forces encouraging them not to lose heart after months of lethal fighting. Among other things, the commander commented "We knew that the summer months would bring increased enemy activity. Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader headquartered at the Quetta Shura in Pakistan, transmitted that Wardak would be his main effort." The Pakistani Army's unwillingness to take action in Quetta was one of the key points at issue in Pakistani opposition to the current U.S. aid bill. Similarly, the announcement that the Pakistani Army had reached a truce deal with two Taliban commanders - Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur - as part of the South Waziristand operation was greeted by both Stars and Stripes and Yahoo News with the headline "Pakistan cuts deal with anti-American militants." (The link to that story in Stars and Stripes, interestingly, no longer functions. The title can be found with an internal search result here; Yahoo!'s publication of the original AP story can be found here.
A variation on the "secret enemy" narrative is the "indifferent ally" narrative, in which Pakistan is willing to fight against Taliban and other extremist forces when it suits them, and to continue supporting those same groups when it doesn't. As Rep. Jane Harman is quoted as saying in today's New York Times, "They are focused on who they think are threats to them. Period." (This in a generally sympathetic treatment of Pakistan that emphasizes the need for the U.S. to demonstrate a long-term "commitment" in Afghanistan.) Those extremist groups who, according to this account, Pakistan's military and intelligence forces do not think of as a threat include groups that operate in Afghanistan and those that launch attacks against India. As I wrote earlier, there is some reason to believe that the Pakistani leadership has begun to rethink their relationships with these groups, but as of yet there has been no concrete action to suggest a change in what is at any rate a murky policy.
The policy implications of the secret enemy narrative are sobering. If Pakistan is dominated by an anti-American population led by pro-Taliban forces (or some variation of that theme), then prospects for the future in not only Pakistan but also Afghanistan are dim, indeed. During the campaign, candidate Obama spoke of sending troops across the Pakistani border; if one accepts the "secret enemy" narrative, we need to hear more of that talk.
The Two-Faced Government Narrative
The second narrative is the "two-faced government" narrative. In this second story, the Pakistani governments stand accused of appealing to anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani people, who would (or might) otherwise recognize that their true interests are with the Americans. The drone attacks are Exhibit A, just as they are Exhibit A for anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. For months, Pakistani government officials complained that the drone attacks constitute violations of Pakistani sovereignty. But way back in February, U.S. officials (not to mention Google Maps images released by the London Times) confirmed the fact that the drones were being flown out of Shamsi air base, a fact reported in the Pakistani press.
Yet Zardari and other government officials continue to criticize the Americans' actions. In this second narrative the Pakistani government and military leadership appear as opportunistic con artist. The argument is that the U.S. is being played for suckers in the War on Terror as it was once similarly played throughout the Cold War. The most recent piece of this story was the report by Associated Press that out of $8.6 billion in U.S. military aid given to Pakistan between 2002 and 2008 only $500 million actually went to pay for operations against the Taliban or in support of U.S., forces in Afghanistan, while the remaining $8.1 billion - a staggering 94% -- was diverted to purchase weapons systems for use against India and for domestic subsidies. This year, the U.S. has promised a 5-year $7.5 billion military aid package, with a proposal for an additional $7.5 billion for the period from 2015-2019. The new aid bill caused great controversy in that it required Pakistan to "continue to cooperate" on nuclear weapons, make "significant efforts" against terrorist groups "such as ceasing support"; and ensuring that Pakistani security forces are "not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan." From the American side, the explanation is simple: the Pakistani leadership will not accept any oversight of any kind on how it uses American money, which it has every intention of using for its own purposes that have little to do with American priorities. (This is all basic and public information, but for an extended essay treatment of this narrative, go here.)
The approach that this understanding seems to recommend is tough love: force the Pakistani leadership to acknowledge its dependence on the U.S., make them spend U.S. dollars the way they were intended to be spent rather than being diverted toward military preparations for future conflict with India. In short, compel the Pakistani leadership to become democratic, transparent, and pro-American under threat of being cut off. Then the people, or at least a lot of them, will realize that their true interests lie with America, after all.
The quagmire narrative
The third narrative is the "quagmire" narrative. This account, popular on the American Left, holds that American presence in Pakistan - and Afghanistan, for that matter -- can only cause resentment and inspire further resentment. Like the Pakistani respondents to the Pew Research poll, Americans who take this view favor humanitarian aid and intelligence cooperation, but nothing more. This is not by any means a uniquely American view. Writing in Le Monde Diplomatique, Muhammad Idrees Ahmad, Nov. 2 2009 quotes Pakistani political analyst Asif Ezdi explaining that "the wellspring of Islamic militancy in Pakistan is to be found in the alienation of the mass of the population by a ruling elite that has used the state to protect and expand its own privileges, pushing the common man into deeper and deeper poverty and hopelessness."
The quagmire narrative leads to an argument for disengagement. If the Pakistani leadership chooses not to take action against Al Qaeda and Taliban forces that operate in Afghanistan, terrorist groups that launch attacks against India, and groups that set off bombs inside Pakistan, that is their own business. Besides, goes the argument, it is only American and NATO presence in Afghanistan that provokes (some of) these attacks in the first place. If future attacks against the U.S. are launched by Al Qaeda forces within Pakistan, or if military conflict with India or a radical takeover of Pakistan become imminent threats, well, America can jump off that bridge when we come to it.
And so, kemosabe?
None of these narratives is quite persuasive, and none of the policy prescriptions I have mentioned are particularly attractive, yet both the narratives and the prescriptions have elements of truth sufficient to keep them going. Meanwhile, beyond the policy there is the politics. Obama and anyone else trying to persuade us to adopt a particular strategy has to be able to make make sense to Americans of the otherwise deeply confusing fact that an awful lot of Pakistanis seem to see the conflict in their country as America's war even as bombs go off in marketplaces in Peshawar.
Associate Professor of Political Science and Law at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
Posted: November 16, 2009 08:58 PM
In a classic Mad Magazine cartoon (that I dimly recall), the Lone Ranger and Tonto are surrounded by a horde of hostile Indian warriors. The Lone Ranger says to Tonto "what do we do, now?," to which Tonto replies, "what you mean 'we,' kemosabe?"
One has the impression that the Obama administration feels like that is the response it has been getting from Pakistan, and indeed doubts about Pakistan's status as a U.S. ally are nothing new. One thing that has received renewed attention of late, however, is the extent of anti-American sentiment of Pakistanis. Awareness of hostility to America among Pakistanis received a jolt with the publication of an Al Jazeera/Gallup poll in July 2009. In that poll, Pakistanis identified the U.S. as a greater threat to Pakistan (59%) than either the Taliban (11%) or India (18%). In that same poll, an overwhelming 67% of respondents opposed U.S. operations on Pakistani soil. A Pew Research poll in August 2009 confirmed these findings, but added some interesting nuances. While no fewer than 69% of respondents expressed concern that extremist forces could seize control of the country, 64% continued to describe the U.S. as an "enemy" and only 9% described it as a "partner."
At the same time, there were elements in the Pew poll results that muddied the waters. By a margin of 53% to 29%, respondents said it was important that U.S.-Pakistani relations improve, an odd statement about an "enemy." Even more confusing, 72% support continued U.S. financial and humanitarian aid, and 63% support the U.S. continuing to provide support to the military. In a beautiful illustration of the principle that question order matters in polling design, when the question about U.S. missile strikes against extremist leaders was asked after the series of questions about U.S. support and cooperation generally, support for such strikes soars to the 47% level.
Many Americans find Pakistani anti-Americanism baffling. Americans see a nation whose military was built and is supported largely by American money, facing a threat from America's own enemies, whose government professes to be an American ally at every opportunity. Certainly the drone attacks cause resentment, but they have caused far fewer deaths than attacks by extremists or the Pakistani Army's campaigns against those forces. So how, from the American perspective, is anti-American sentiment to be explained?
There are three narratives that help Americans explain Pakistani hostility: let's call them the "secret enemy" narrative, the "two-faced government" narrative, and the "quagmire" narrative. It is important to recognize that all three of these narratives have purchase because they appear against a background of general negative American attitudes toward Pakistan. In a 2007 Gallup poll, 64% of respondents had a negative view of Pakistan, a number that is generally consistent with results dating back to before 9/11.
The Secret Enemy Narrative
The first narrative is one that posits Pakistan as nothing less than a U.S. enemy, or, at a minimum, as an ally of U.S. enemies. The key claim here is that Al Qaeda and Taliban forces fighting U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan have safe havens in Pakistan, where they are sheltered and supported by the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments. In addition, while there have always been a trickle of stories about cooperation between Pakistan's military and intelligence services and Taliban or Al Qaeda forces, lately that trickle has become a torrent. This week, French investigative magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere is going to publish a book in which he accuses Pakistani government and military officials of supporting Al Qaeda. David Rohde's account of his capture by Taliban forces cites U.S. officials statements' that Pakistani military and intelligence forces provide money, supplies, and strategic planning to Taliban groups, specifically including the group led by Mawlawi Haqqani. The Haqqani network is a special point of contention between the U.S. and Pakistan, as it is blamed for many of the attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. (For an extended report on the background of the Haqqani network and its relationship with the ISI, see this report by the Institute for the Study of War.)
One also hears a great deal of this narrative from within the U.S. military. In October Col. David Haight, the U.S,. military commander of forces in Wardak, sent an e-mail to his forces encouraging them not to lose heart after months of lethal fighting. Among other things, the commander commented "We knew that the summer months would bring increased enemy activity. Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader headquartered at the Quetta Shura in Pakistan, transmitted that Wardak would be his main effort." The Pakistani Army's unwillingness to take action in Quetta was one of the key points at issue in Pakistani opposition to the current U.S. aid bill. Similarly, the announcement that the Pakistani Army had reached a truce deal with two Taliban commanders - Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur - as part of the South Waziristand operation was greeted by both Stars and Stripes and Yahoo News with the headline "Pakistan cuts deal with anti-American militants." (The link to that story in Stars and Stripes, interestingly, no longer functions. The title can be found with an internal search result here; Yahoo!'s publication of the original AP story can be found here.
A variation on the "secret enemy" narrative is the "indifferent ally" narrative, in which Pakistan is willing to fight against Taliban and other extremist forces when it suits them, and to continue supporting those same groups when it doesn't. As Rep. Jane Harman is quoted as saying in today's New York Times, "They are focused on who they think are threats to them. Period." (This in a generally sympathetic treatment of Pakistan that emphasizes the need for the U.S. to demonstrate a long-term "commitment" in Afghanistan.) Those extremist groups who, according to this account, Pakistan's military and intelligence forces do not think of as a threat include groups that operate in Afghanistan and those that launch attacks against India. As I wrote earlier, there is some reason to believe that the Pakistani leadership has begun to rethink their relationships with these groups, but as of yet there has been no concrete action to suggest a change in what is at any rate a murky policy.
The policy implications of the secret enemy narrative are sobering. If Pakistan is dominated by an anti-American population led by pro-Taliban forces (or some variation of that theme), then prospects for the future in not only Pakistan but also Afghanistan are dim, indeed. During the campaign, candidate Obama spoke of sending troops across the Pakistani border; if one accepts the "secret enemy" narrative, we need to hear more of that talk.
The Two-Faced Government Narrative
The second narrative is the "two-faced government" narrative. In this second story, the Pakistani governments stand accused of appealing to anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani people, who would (or might) otherwise recognize that their true interests are with the Americans. The drone attacks are Exhibit A, just as they are Exhibit A for anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. For months, Pakistani government officials complained that the drone attacks constitute violations of Pakistani sovereignty. But way back in February, U.S. officials (not to mention Google Maps images released by the London Times) confirmed the fact that the drones were being flown out of Shamsi air base, a fact reported in the Pakistani press.
Yet Zardari and other government officials continue to criticize the Americans' actions. In this second narrative the Pakistani government and military leadership appear as opportunistic con artist. The argument is that the U.S. is being played for suckers in the War on Terror as it was once similarly played throughout the Cold War. The most recent piece of this story was the report by Associated Press that out of $8.6 billion in U.S. military aid given to Pakistan between 2002 and 2008 only $500 million actually went to pay for operations against the Taliban or in support of U.S., forces in Afghanistan, while the remaining $8.1 billion - a staggering 94% -- was diverted to purchase weapons systems for use against India and for domestic subsidies. This year, the U.S. has promised a 5-year $7.5 billion military aid package, with a proposal for an additional $7.5 billion for the period from 2015-2019. The new aid bill caused great controversy in that it required Pakistan to "continue to cooperate" on nuclear weapons, make "significant efforts" against terrorist groups "such as ceasing support"; and ensuring that Pakistani security forces are "not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan." From the American side, the explanation is simple: the Pakistani leadership will not accept any oversight of any kind on how it uses American money, which it has every intention of using for its own purposes that have little to do with American priorities. (This is all basic and public information, but for an extended essay treatment of this narrative, go here.)
The approach that this understanding seems to recommend is tough love: force the Pakistani leadership to acknowledge its dependence on the U.S., make them spend U.S. dollars the way they were intended to be spent rather than being diverted toward military preparations for future conflict with India. In short, compel the Pakistani leadership to become democratic, transparent, and pro-American under threat of being cut off. Then the people, or at least a lot of them, will realize that their true interests lie with America, after all.
The quagmire narrative
The third narrative is the "quagmire" narrative. This account, popular on the American Left, holds that American presence in Pakistan - and Afghanistan, for that matter -- can only cause resentment and inspire further resentment. Like the Pakistani respondents to the Pew Research poll, Americans who take this view favor humanitarian aid and intelligence cooperation, but nothing more. This is not by any means a uniquely American view. Writing in Le Monde Diplomatique, Muhammad Idrees Ahmad, Nov. 2 2009 quotes Pakistani political analyst Asif Ezdi explaining that "the wellspring of Islamic militancy in Pakistan is to be found in the alienation of the mass of the population by a ruling elite that has used the state to protect and expand its own privileges, pushing the common man into deeper and deeper poverty and hopelessness."
The quagmire narrative leads to an argument for disengagement. If the Pakistani leadership chooses not to take action against Al Qaeda and Taliban forces that operate in Afghanistan, terrorist groups that launch attacks against India, and groups that set off bombs inside Pakistan, that is their own business. Besides, goes the argument, it is only American and NATO presence in Afghanistan that provokes (some of) these attacks in the first place. If future attacks against the U.S. are launched by Al Qaeda forces within Pakistan, or if military conflict with India or a radical takeover of Pakistan become imminent threats, well, America can jump off that bridge when we come to it.
And so, kemosabe?
None of these narratives is quite persuasive, and none of the policy prescriptions I have mentioned are particularly attractive, yet both the narratives and the prescriptions have elements of truth sufficient to keep them going. Meanwhile, beyond the policy there is the politics. Obama and anyone else trying to persuade us to adopt a particular strategy has to be able to make make sense to Americans of the otherwise deeply confusing fact that an awful lot of Pakistanis seem to see the conflict in their country as America's war even as bombs go off in marketplaces in Peshawar.
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