Posts
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\12\23\story_23-12-2009_pg3_3
Investors were avoiding Pakistan even before the Taliban threat and they will remain so even after the Taliban are gone. Pakistan has multiple problems that repulse the foreigners, whether they are investors or tourists
I ran into Mr Eric Lawson, an investor, in a conference organised by a Pakistani group. My unusual take on Pakistan’s troubles intrigued him quite a bit and he asked me to get together sometime. After six months, out of the blue he called me and invited me over for dinner in a downtown Spanish restaurant.
I have passed from that street hundreds of times but I never noticed the Restaurant Hispania where a bottle of wine can cost up to $ 500 or above. Mr Lawson, noticing my shocked state of mind, laughed and told me that most of the people around us were from the World Bank and IMF being dined-wined and wowed by developing world governments. This restaurant runs on the loan/aid money given to developing countries or people like me who make money in those countries in other ways, he added.
After we were settled, he asked me as to what was going on in Pakistan and if the military could eliminate the Taliban insurgency. I told him that I was reasonably optimistic that the military will prevail because it was their creation. In the past, the military was not confronting them sincerely because of their misplaced fairytale policy of getting strategic depth in Afghanistan. Now, the military has learnt the lesson as suicide bombings kill people near the capital of Islamabad. I further added that I hope investors like you can return to Pakistan, and ended my explanation with a smile.
“No, you are wrong here. I hope your optimism is realistic as far as the Taliban are concerned. But the Western investors are not going to return to Pakistan even then. Investors were avoiding Pakistan even before the Taliban threat and they will remain so even after the Taliban are gone. Pakistan has multiple problems that repulse the foreigners, whether they are investors or tourists,” he told me.
“I know there is immense corruption in Pakistan and foreigners do not know how to deal with it. But so are most of the developing countries where the US and European investors and tourists readily go. What is special about Pakistan other than this?” I asked.
He became a little frustrated and impatient and promptly busted out “No, this is where Pakistanis do not get it. We all know about corruption in the developing world and we know how to deal with it and make money. But Pakistan’s problem is Islamisation and restrictions on personal liberties and most aspects of entertainment that we consider a necessary part of life. Why would we go to a prison-like country to make money when we have better choices all around? Why not to go to India or China where we can make money and enjoy life as we like to.”
I could not fully appreciate his highly negative characterisation of Pakistan and could not resist rebutting in pointing out: “If you are talking about unavailability of alcohol, you as foreigners can buy it from any five-star hotel. Oh, and if you are talking about other entertainment, that is also arranged easily.” To keep the atmosphere pleasant, I joked, “By creating some hurdles in your way, we provide you the chance to save some money.”
He was more upset now and almost yelling “You guys will never understand us. We make money to spend it not like you guys who earn to horde. This is why we progressed and you did not.” He went on, “To answer your take on alcohol and so-called other entertainment by which you probably meant prostitutes, I will say we are neither addicted to alcohol or prostitutes. We enjoy these things as you enjoy tea and company. The difference may be that we have female friends along with males, which is rare in your societies. Buying alcohol from five-star hotels feels just like stealing and drinking like thieves. We want to go out to bars of different kinds where we can see and meet different types of people and enjoy their company for a while.”
I was more perplexed than ever and did not know how to respond to him. After having lived three decades in the West I knew what he was talking about. But for face saving I threw my last argument, “Pakistan is not the only ideological state. Israel, Saudi Arabia and some others are ideological too and you do business in those countries.”
He laughed whole-heartedly and said, “Thank you. I was expecting this excuse much earlier. This is a favourite excuse Pakistanis use. But let me tell you that Israel may be too cruel for Palestinians, but it is an open society like any European nation. Saudi Arabia can afford any ideology because of its oil wealth and tribal society. Furthermore, not many investors go there except oil companies and the Saudis have created free zones for foreigners that Pakistan cannot. Your society is very poor but relatively open-minded. You can neither feed them like Saudi Arabia nor create islands for foreigners because society is very vocal. You are stuck by imposing an ideology that you cannot afford. Therefore, you will remain stuck even after the Taliban are gone. And, the worst part is that even intelligent people like you do not appreciate the gravity of the problem.”
I did not know what to say and decided to move the conversation to Obama’s healthcare plan instead.
The writer can be reached at manzurejaz@yahoo.com
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Friday, December 11, 2009
Afghanistan and Pakistan: Anatomy of a Proxy War
Obama's Afghan surge and new strategy attempt sophistication and nuance, but fail to grasp the terrible complexities of the Afghan war. In his speech the President noted two key issues: Afghanistan's rampant corruption and the problematic role of Pakistan. But these problems are more vexing than he admits.
I know the depth of these problems from study and from years of -- sometimes bitter and disappointing -- experience working in Afghanistan. From 2001 until very recently I was intimately involved with Afghan security and intelligence agencies; helped to create the Afghan National Security Council; did reconstruction work; trained NATO forces for deployment; and traveled across much of the country by road, in the process coming to know many of its local and regional leaders.
First, the issue of a "credible" Afghan partner. Obama wants Karzai to fight corruption and he wants to sidestep Karzai to effectively deliver aid. Good luck with that.
But what about the heart of the strategy, the Afghan National Army? This force is supposed to "stand up as we stand down." Sadly this is a phantom Army. Made up from the recombined remnants of Northern Alliance militias, held together by British and American money and training, it has nowhere near the numbers needed nor claimed. Drug addiction and demoralization are rampant among its soldiers.
Most importantly, the ANA is a largely Tajik army. Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and are based in the north of the country. The Pashtun are the largest group and dominate the south. The Taliban draws its support from the Pashtun. Tajik and Pashtuns are bitter rivals.
In the eyes of Tajik leaders, Karzai (a Pashtun) isn't "their" president, and this isn't "their" war, nor are Tajiks too keen on getting killed in it, as many US soldiers have noticed.
Even if Tajik forces were willing to fight and replace NATO soldiers, sending the Tajik dominated ANA into the south to control the Pashtun would not amount to a "national army" fighting "its own" war. The Pashtun would and do see these Tajiks as invaders.
In short, this is not the force that will beat the Taliban.
What about our other ally, Pakistan? Regardless of what they tell you, the Pakistani military is not on America's side. They pretend to be because they enjoy receiving billions and billions of dollars in aid every year, but in the end the Pakistani Army is obsessed with India. Their fear of India means they want a weak Islamic Afghanistan behind them.
The Pakistani officer class sees the current Afghan government as allied to India and thus hostile to Islamabad -- which it is. India supported the communist government of Afghanistan and then the northern Alliance and now the Karzai government. It is heavily involved in Afghanistan. But Pakistan is determined that it will dominate Afghanistan once we, the foreigners, leave.
Despite its weakness, Afghanistan's political leaders have always coveted large areas of Pakistan: the Pashtun inhabited North West Frontier Province, (the NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (the FATA). Afghanistan lost these regions to what was British India in 1893 when it accepted the so-called "Durand line" which is now the border with Pakistan.
In the 1950s and early 60s, Afghanistan did its best to destabilise Pakistani control in these regions, and actually sent armed tribal groups to invade them. This did much to encourage Islamabad's later enthusiastic support of the US-back Mujahadeen in the late 1970s and 1980s.
In the Pakistani military's view, the international community will leave Afghanistan, as they did after the Soviets left, and indeed as Obama has promised to do. When that happens Pakistan feels that it must be in position to install a friendly regime in Kabul, one that will expel the Indian advisors, spies, diplomats, contactors, etc and provide a potentially friendly area to the rear of Pakistan in the event of another major war with India. This is the Pakistani idea of "strategic depth."
Who would be that friendly government: most likely, the Taliban.
And if they cannot get a friendly government in Kabul, an ungoverned Afghanistan is better than the present Indian dominated one.
This pro-Taliban stance remains the Pakistani position, despite the blow back from their encouragement of extremist Islamic groups. Pakistan uses radical jihadist groups as proxies in Indian-administered Kashmir.
Sometime it looks different, because the Pakistanis do just enough by way of arresting Arabs and other Islamic extremists to keep the US happy. Bluntly speaking, the Pakistanis desperately need the US money (billions every year, year on year) to equip themselves in the build up against India.
And the Pakistan military is being forced to push back the various newly formed Pakistani Taliban groups. So it can look like the Pakistani's really are US allies. But that is an illusion.
Whilst the Pakistani Taliban maintain strong connections with the Afghan Taliban and other Islamic rebels and extremists, the Pakistani military regards the two forces as entirely separate. In their eyes, the Pakistani Taliban are dangerous rebels, whereas the Afghan Taliban are the next government of Afghanistan; and must be kept on good terms and assisted at every juncture.
It has taken US intelligence, military and diplomats years to see this and they still don't quite know what to do about it.
The Afghan Taliban created themselves almost spontaneously in 1994, with the intention of improving justice and security, and removing illegal checkpoints and local warlords. But the Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, soon began supporting them. And soon this vigilante force became a religious army of Pashtun nationalists, believing that they have a god-given right to rule.
This Pakistani encouragement of radical Islam in Afghanistan and in Kashmir has seriously "blown back." Much of the Pashtun areas of Pakistan are now in rebellion and the Pakistani Taliban does not answer to the ISI. From here it may seem like one single movement and threat however, it is essential to understand that Pakistani military and intelligence officers regard the two Taleban organizations (or clusters of organizations) as separate.
The present action against the Pakistani Taliban is just that. The Pakistan has, definitively, not moved against the Afghan Taliban. In fact, the Afghan Taliban leadership remains secure in Pakistan. Indeed they are widely thought to have moved the Quetta Shura (Mullah Omar's command structure) to Karachi, to protect it from possible air strikes.
Powerful elements in Pakistan will continue to support the Pashtun insurgency in Afghanistan no matter what Islamabad's government says or does. This is only one of many problems affecting Afghanistan, but it is the core problem.
Unless the international community can address the proxy fight between Pakistan and India at a political level -- through a settlement on the line of control through Kashmir and a guarantee of security for Pakistan -- it is unlikely that Pakistan's support of the Afghan Taliban can be stopped. And without that stabilizing Afghanistan is very unlikely.
Bob Churcher is a former British Army Officer with a degree in history. He served in Northern Ireland and Africa and has spent the last 20 years in conflict or post-conflict environments, including, the Balkans, East Timor and Afghanistan.
I know the depth of these problems from study and from years of -- sometimes bitter and disappointing -- experience working in Afghanistan. From 2001 until very recently I was intimately involved with Afghan security and intelligence agencies; helped to create the Afghan National Security Council; did reconstruction work; trained NATO forces for deployment; and traveled across much of the country by road, in the process coming to know many of its local and regional leaders.
First, the issue of a "credible" Afghan partner. Obama wants Karzai to fight corruption and he wants to sidestep Karzai to effectively deliver aid. Good luck with that.
But what about the heart of the strategy, the Afghan National Army? This force is supposed to "stand up as we stand down." Sadly this is a phantom Army. Made up from the recombined remnants of Northern Alliance militias, held together by British and American money and training, it has nowhere near the numbers needed nor claimed. Drug addiction and demoralization are rampant among its soldiers.
Most importantly, the ANA is a largely Tajik army. Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and are based in the north of the country. The Pashtun are the largest group and dominate the south. The Taliban draws its support from the Pashtun. Tajik and Pashtuns are bitter rivals.
In the eyes of Tajik leaders, Karzai (a Pashtun) isn't "their" president, and this isn't "their" war, nor are Tajiks too keen on getting killed in it, as many US soldiers have noticed.
Even if Tajik forces were willing to fight and replace NATO soldiers, sending the Tajik dominated ANA into the south to control the Pashtun would not amount to a "national army" fighting "its own" war. The Pashtun would and do see these Tajiks as invaders.
In short, this is not the force that will beat the Taliban.
What about our other ally, Pakistan? Regardless of what they tell you, the Pakistani military is not on America's side. They pretend to be because they enjoy receiving billions and billions of dollars in aid every year, but in the end the Pakistani Army is obsessed with India. Their fear of India means they want a weak Islamic Afghanistan behind them.
The Pakistani officer class sees the current Afghan government as allied to India and thus hostile to Islamabad -- which it is. India supported the communist government of Afghanistan and then the northern Alliance and now the Karzai government. It is heavily involved in Afghanistan. But Pakistan is determined that it will dominate Afghanistan once we, the foreigners, leave.
Despite its weakness, Afghanistan's political leaders have always coveted large areas of Pakistan: the Pashtun inhabited North West Frontier Province, (the NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (the FATA). Afghanistan lost these regions to what was British India in 1893 when it accepted the so-called "Durand line" which is now the border with Pakistan.
In the 1950s and early 60s, Afghanistan did its best to destabilise Pakistani control in these regions, and actually sent armed tribal groups to invade them. This did much to encourage Islamabad's later enthusiastic support of the US-back Mujahadeen in the late 1970s and 1980s.
In the Pakistani military's view, the international community will leave Afghanistan, as they did after the Soviets left, and indeed as Obama has promised to do. When that happens Pakistan feels that it must be in position to install a friendly regime in Kabul, one that will expel the Indian advisors, spies, diplomats, contactors, etc and provide a potentially friendly area to the rear of Pakistan in the event of another major war with India. This is the Pakistani idea of "strategic depth."
Who would be that friendly government: most likely, the Taliban.
And if they cannot get a friendly government in Kabul, an ungoverned Afghanistan is better than the present Indian dominated one.
This pro-Taliban stance remains the Pakistani position, despite the blow back from their encouragement of extremist Islamic groups. Pakistan uses radical jihadist groups as proxies in Indian-administered Kashmir.
Sometime it looks different, because the Pakistanis do just enough by way of arresting Arabs and other Islamic extremists to keep the US happy. Bluntly speaking, the Pakistanis desperately need the US money (billions every year, year on year) to equip themselves in the build up against India.
And the Pakistan military is being forced to push back the various newly formed Pakistani Taliban groups. So it can look like the Pakistani's really are US allies. But that is an illusion.
Whilst the Pakistani Taliban maintain strong connections with the Afghan Taliban and other Islamic rebels and extremists, the Pakistani military regards the two forces as entirely separate. In their eyes, the Pakistani Taliban are dangerous rebels, whereas the Afghan Taliban are the next government of Afghanistan; and must be kept on good terms and assisted at every juncture.
It has taken US intelligence, military and diplomats years to see this and they still don't quite know what to do about it.
The Afghan Taliban created themselves almost spontaneously in 1994, with the intention of improving justice and security, and removing illegal checkpoints and local warlords. But the Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, soon began supporting them. And soon this vigilante force became a religious army of Pashtun nationalists, believing that they have a god-given right to rule.
This Pakistani encouragement of radical Islam in Afghanistan and in Kashmir has seriously "blown back." Much of the Pashtun areas of Pakistan are now in rebellion and the Pakistani Taliban does not answer to the ISI. From here it may seem like one single movement and threat however, it is essential to understand that Pakistani military and intelligence officers regard the two Taleban organizations (or clusters of organizations) as separate.
The present action against the Pakistani Taliban is just that. The Pakistan has, definitively, not moved against the Afghan Taliban. In fact, the Afghan Taliban leadership remains secure in Pakistan. Indeed they are widely thought to have moved the Quetta Shura (Mullah Omar's command structure) to Karachi, to protect it from possible air strikes.
Powerful elements in Pakistan will continue to support the Pashtun insurgency in Afghanistan no matter what Islamabad's government says or does. This is only one of many problems affecting Afghanistan, but it is the core problem.
Unless the international community can address the proxy fight between Pakistan and India at a political level -- through a settlement on the line of control through Kashmir and a guarantee of security for Pakistan -- it is unlikely that Pakistan's support of the Afghan Taliban can be stopped. And without that stabilizing Afghanistan is very unlikely.
Bob Churcher is a former British Army Officer with a degree in history. He served in Northern Ireland and Africa and has spent the last 20 years in conflict or post-conflict environments, including, the Balkans, East Timor and Afghanistan.
Thursday, December 3, 2009
Can China Deliver in Pakistan?
The success or failure of President Barack Obama's new Afghanistan strategy will depend on numerous international factors, from the contributions of Washington's NATO allies to the performance of Afghanistan's beleaguered government.
However, few factors loom larger than Pakistan.
Indeed, the Obama administration has conceded that unless Islamabad intensifies its efforts against Taliban and al-Qaida forces based in Pakistan, the Afghanistan plan will likely fail. Predictably, the U.S. government has renewed pressure on Pakistan to launch a more aggressive campaign against militancy within its borders.
However, Washington has little credibility and leverage in Pakistan, and Pakistani mistrust of the United States runs high. According to one poll from earlier this year, 64 percent of Pakistanis regard America as an enemy, and only 9 percent see it as a partner. Such sentiments pose a major challenge to the development of an expanded strategic partnership with Pakistan, which Obama reportedly offered to Islamabad in recent weeks.
Given these unsavory views of the United States, Washington's appeals for stronger Pakistani action against extremism could easily fall flat -- unless they are accompanied by similar pleas from nations with more credibility in Pakistan.
Enter China. Since this spring -- and presumably during Obama's discussions with his Chinese counterpart, President Hu Jintao, last month in Beijing -- Washington has been asking China to help stabilize Pakistan. This makes good sense. Pakistan's instability jeopardizes critical Chinese interests (.pdf), and the time has never been more ripe for Beijing to lean on its longstanding ally.
Ten thousand Chinese workers reside in Pakistan, and a fair number of them have been kidnapped or killed in the last few years. Additionally, Pakistan's northwest frontier has provided a sanctuary for Uighur separatist militants from China's Xinjiang province, some of whom have trained in Pakistani camps before returning to China. In April, Chinese officials alleged that the Uighur East Turkestan Islamic Movement -- the likely perpetrator of a deadly attack on Chinese border police before last year's Beijing Olympics -- had established its military headquarters in Pakistan.
Meanwhile, China has provided much of the funding and labor for the construction of a port in the southern Pakistani city of Gwadar. This port, which became operational earlier this year, gives China a strategic foothold near the Persian Gulf, facilitating the transit of Chinese energy resources from the Gulf back to China. However, Gwadar lies in the combustible province of Baluchistan, home to a separatist insurgency and alleged refuge for the Afghan Taliban's leadership.
In short, Pakistan's instability threatens the security of China's citizens, its government, and its energy imports -- a trifecta of threats that Beijing can ill-afford to ignore.
Beijing's high credibility in Pakistan ensures that its concerns will be taken seriously. The two governments have enjoyed warm relations since the 1960s, and Beijing has invested billions of dollars in economic aid, dam construction, energy development, and other infrastructure projects across Pakistan. One 2009 survey reveals that 80 percent of Pakistanis view China as a partner. And in a 2009 public opinion poll assessing perceptions of world leaders, 80 percent of Pakistanis expressed confidence in Hu -- the highest level of Pakistani support for any world leader mentioned.
Unsurprisingly, whenever China has demanded something of Islamabad, the latter has often complied. Many observers believe former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf launched his 2007 offensive against radicals holed up in Islamabad's Red Mosque after Beijing, angered by the kidnapping of Chinese engineers in Pakistan, pressured him to do so.
Today, however, China has much more at stake. Beijing must quietly yet forcefully impress upon Islamabad the fact that Pakistan's problems threaten the critical interests of its chief benefactor and ally.
Ultimately, Washington's greatest concern should be neither Beijing's willingness to nudge Islamabad, nor the receptiveness of Islamabad's civilian leadership to Beijing's entreaties.
Rather, the big question is how Pakistan's undisputed powerbroker -- the military -- chooses to respond to Chinese pressure. The army has already demonstrated in Swat, and more recently in the tribal area of South Waziristan, that it is determined to crush Pakistan-based Taliban forces that target Islamabad. However, other militants based in Pakistan cross the porous border with Afghanistan to fight American troops and the government of Hamid Karzai in that country. Certain elements within Pakistan's security institutions consider these anti-Kabul forces a strategic asset, regarding them as a hedge should international forces one day withdraw from Afghanistan.
If such sentiments carry the day, the effectiveness of Chinese cajoling could be limited -- and achieving Beijing's and Washington's shared goal of a stable Pakistan will grow ever more challenging. Nonetheless, enlisting China's help will go a long way toward promoting better stability in Pakistan -- and, by extension, in Afghanistan.
Michael Kugelman is program associate with the Asia Program at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he specializes in South Asia. He can be reached at michael.kugelman@wilsoncenter.org.
However, few factors loom larger than Pakistan.
Indeed, the Obama administration has conceded that unless Islamabad intensifies its efforts against Taliban and al-Qaida forces based in Pakistan, the Afghanistan plan will likely fail. Predictably, the U.S. government has renewed pressure on Pakistan to launch a more aggressive campaign against militancy within its borders.
However, Washington has little credibility and leverage in Pakistan, and Pakistani mistrust of the United States runs high. According to one poll from earlier this year, 64 percent of Pakistanis regard America as an enemy, and only 9 percent see it as a partner. Such sentiments pose a major challenge to the development of an expanded strategic partnership with Pakistan, which Obama reportedly offered to Islamabad in recent weeks.
Given these unsavory views of the United States, Washington's appeals for stronger Pakistani action against extremism could easily fall flat -- unless they are accompanied by similar pleas from nations with more credibility in Pakistan.
Enter China. Since this spring -- and presumably during Obama's discussions with his Chinese counterpart, President Hu Jintao, last month in Beijing -- Washington has been asking China to help stabilize Pakistan. This makes good sense. Pakistan's instability jeopardizes critical Chinese interests (.pdf), and the time has never been more ripe for Beijing to lean on its longstanding ally.
Ten thousand Chinese workers reside in Pakistan, and a fair number of them have been kidnapped or killed in the last few years. Additionally, Pakistan's northwest frontier has provided a sanctuary for Uighur separatist militants from China's Xinjiang province, some of whom have trained in Pakistani camps before returning to China. In April, Chinese officials alleged that the Uighur East Turkestan Islamic Movement -- the likely perpetrator of a deadly attack on Chinese border police before last year's Beijing Olympics -- had established its military headquarters in Pakistan.
Meanwhile, China has provided much of the funding and labor for the construction of a port in the southern Pakistani city of Gwadar. This port, which became operational earlier this year, gives China a strategic foothold near the Persian Gulf, facilitating the transit of Chinese energy resources from the Gulf back to China. However, Gwadar lies in the combustible province of Baluchistan, home to a separatist insurgency and alleged refuge for the Afghan Taliban's leadership.
In short, Pakistan's instability threatens the security of China's citizens, its government, and its energy imports -- a trifecta of threats that Beijing can ill-afford to ignore.
Beijing's high credibility in Pakistan ensures that its concerns will be taken seriously. The two governments have enjoyed warm relations since the 1960s, and Beijing has invested billions of dollars in economic aid, dam construction, energy development, and other infrastructure projects across Pakistan. One 2009 survey reveals that 80 percent of Pakistanis view China as a partner. And in a 2009 public opinion poll assessing perceptions of world leaders, 80 percent of Pakistanis expressed confidence in Hu -- the highest level of Pakistani support for any world leader mentioned.
Unsurprisingly, whenever China has demanded something of Islamabad, the latter has often complied. Many observers believe former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf launched his 2007 offensive against radicals holed up in Islamabad's Red Mosque after Beijing, angered by the kidnapping of Chinese engineers in Pakistan, pressured him to do so.
Today, however, China has much more at stake. Beijing must quietly yet forcefully impress upon Islamabad the fact that Pakistan's problems threaten the critical interests of its chief benefactor and ally.
Ultimately, Washington's greatest concern should be neither Beijing's willingness to nudge Islamabad, nor the receptiveness of Islamabad's civilian leadership to Beijing's entreaties.
Rather, the big question is how Pakistan's undisputed powerbroker -- the military -- chooses to respond to Chinese pressure. The army has already demonstrated in Swat, and more recently in the tribal area of South Waziristan, that it is determined to crush Pakistan-based Taliban forces that target Islamabad. However, other militants based in Pakistan cross the porous border with Afghanistan to fight American troops and the government of Hamid Karzai in that country. Certain elements within Pakistan's security institutions consider these anti-Kabul forces a strategic asset, regarding them as a hedge should international forces one day withdraw from Afghanistan.
If such sentiments carry the day, the effectiveness of Chinese cajoling could be limited -- and achieving Beijing's and Washington's shared goal of a stable Pakistan will grow ever more challenging. Nonetheless, enlisting China's help will go a long way toward promoting better stability in Pakistan -- and, by extension, in Afghanistan.
Michael Kugelman is program associate with the Asia Program at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he specializes in South Asia. He can be reached at michael.kugelman@wilsoncenter.org.
Contingency
Thursday, December 03, 2009
Parvez Iqbal
More surprising than the recent statement of British prime minister Gordon Brown asking Pakistan to "do more" is the surprise that our Foreign Office has shown on this statement. Similar statements have simultaneously emanated from Britain's first cousin, the United States.
In a letter addressed to our president, personally delivered by Obama's national security advisor James L Jones, the US president has asked for Pakistan to take action against five extremist outfits: Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani group. He went on to say that ambiguity in Pakistan's relationship with any of them could no longer be ignored. This might well have been a ploy to becalm those in his own country who want to see an end to the Afghan conflict and were opposing deployment of additional forces. But the tone is too serious to be taken lightly. Jones has been quoted as saying bluntly that if Pakistan cannot deliver, the United States may be impelled to use any means at its disposal to rout insurgents based along Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan. "Any means" could obviously include movement of US troops across the border into Pakistan's tribal areas, or beyond if need be.
Add to all this the announcement by Obama about additional US troops for Afghanistan, and one does not then have to ask the US to define its future strategy for that country. Every piece of that strategy is falling into place. Remain ready to move into Pakistan if needed. Obama had just not being alluding to this possibility in his election campaign speeches and interviews, he had referred to it directly time and again. His broad smiles appear deceptive now.
Before our Foreign Office gets "surprised" again, we should have our own strategy and contingency plans ready for any eventuality that might develop with US forces moving across the border if Pakistan "fails to deliver." Our forces are already taking care of the TTP in South Waziristan. The other two groups, Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba, are underground and other than covert actions like physical capture or targeted killings through drone attacks, overt large-scale conventional military action against them is not possible.
So if the US military planners have been tasked to keep contingency plans ready for a ground offensive into Pakistani territory, it would most likely be initiated first into North Waziristan against the Haqqani group, which is being blamed for the attacks on US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. What would the options be for Pakistan's response, other than a statement of surprise from the Foreign Office, of course?
Protest statements, like those for the drone attacks, would be futile. Even school kids can by now tell us that. Military response? The army, already committed against the TTP, would be compelled to seek direction from the government to commit forces for deploying forces to stop the Americans. This would not be a matter which any sovereign country could gulp sitting back. Drone attacks are one matter, territory and sovereignty are another. To divert the attention of our military, even the smallest of misadventures by India on our eastern borders, with or without American elbowing, would really complicate matters. The dilemma, or call it a catch -22 situation, if you will, would be whether to continue the support to the US in its war effort, or openly tell them they are on their own. If the Haqqani group gives them a bloody nose, will we say "so be it"? The possibilities are more complex and more in number than a dice with six sides can cope with.
The writer is a retired commodore. Email: greenfields48 @yahoo.com
Parvez Iqbal
More surprising than the recent statement of British prime minister Gordon Brown asking Pakistan to "do more" is the surprise that our Foreign Office has shown on this statement. Similar statements have simultaneously emanated from Britain's first cousin, the United States.
In a letter addressed to our president, personally delivered by Obama's national security advisor James L Jones, the US president has asked for Pakistan to take action against five extremist outfits: Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani group. He went on to say that ambiguity in Pakistan's relationship with any of them could no longer be ignored. This might well have been a ploy to becalm those in his own country who want to see an end to the Afghan conflict and were opposing deployment of additional forces. But the tone is too serious to be taken lightly. Jones has been quoted as saying bluntly that if Pakistan cannot deliver, the United States may be impelled to use any means at its disposal to rout insurgents based along Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan. "Any means" could obviously include movement of US troops across the border into Pakistan's tribal areas, or beyond if need be.
Add to all this the announcement by Obama about additional US troops for Afghanistan, and one does not then have to ask the US to define its future strategy for that country. Every piece of that strategy is falling into place. Remain ready to move into Pakistan if needed. Obama had just not being alluding to this possibility in his election campaign speeches and interviews, he had referred to it directly time and again. His broad smiles appear deceptive now.
Before our Foreign Office gets "surprised" again, we should have our own strategy and contingency plans ready for any eventuality that might develop with US forces moving across the border if Pakistan "fails to deliver." Our forces are already taking care of the TTP in South Waziristan. The other two groups, Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba, are underground and other than covert actions like physical capture or targeted killings through drone attacks, overt large-scale conventional military action against them is not possible.
So if the US military planners have been tasked to keep contingency plans ready for a ground offensive into Pakistani territory, it would most likely be initiated first into North Waziristan against the Haqqani group, which is being blamed for the attacks on US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. What would the options be for Pakistan's response, other than a statement of surprise from the Foreign Office, of course?
Protest statements, like those for the drone attacks, would be futile. Even school kids can by now tell us that. Military response? The army, already committed against the TTP, would be compelled to seek direction from the government to commit forces for deploying forces to stop the Americans. This would not be a matter which any sovereign country could gulp sitting back. Drone attacks are one matter, territory and sovereignty are another. To divert the attention of our military, even the smallest of misadventures by India on our eastern borders, with or without American elbowing, would really complicate matters. The dilemma, or call it a catch -22 situation, if you will, would be whether to continue the support to the US in its war effort, or openly tell them they are on their own. If the Haqqani group gives them a bloody nose, will we say "so be it"? The possibilities are more complex and more in number than a dice with six sides can cope with.
The writer is a retired commodore. Email: greenfields48 @yahoo.com
Obama's Afghanistan mis-speech
When Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton pulled the Al Qaeda card on Pakistanis during her visit to the Islamic Republic, many thought it was classic Clintonian rage unfettered. Last week, Prime Minister Gordon Brown first congratulated President Zardari on his country's successful jihad against terrorists and then hung up the phone and told the BBC that Pakistan needs to do more against Al Qaeda. That was chalked up immediately by followers of British politics to Brown's now legendary incompetence. Perhaps, he read the briefing notes all wrong, or forgot to take his medication, we all thought. After all, this is the man that has single-handedly brought the greatest era of Labour politics and its dominance in Britain to a pathetic end.
But of course, Secretary Clinton (being the Obama administration's sharp-toothed diplomatic supremo) and PM Brown (continuing Tony Blair's legacy of being the US government's poodle) were just setting up the ball for Obama to smash. Unlike what we've come to expect from President Obama, however, this was no smash. A less thunderous or less effective Obama speech is hard to conceive of.
If President Obama is the Muhammad Ali of political oratory, then his much-anticipated Afghan strategy speech was, at least to his admirers (even those from faraway places like Islamabad) as bitter as Ali's 1971 loss to Joe Frazier at Madison Square Garden. It was his first grand failure. In the past, Obama's oratory skills have helped him do the things he was looking to get done (Reverend Wright, Election Night, healthcare). His effectiveness is borne of the clarity he creates and the trust he engenders.
At West Point on Tuesday, President Obama was least like himself than we've ever known him. He was guarded, defensive, and less than entirely convincing. The biggest reason for the speech's failure is that it deliberately skirted around the central issue that plagues the American war in Afghanistan.
If there is one overwhelming area of consensus among pundits that think about these things for a living, it is concerning where the epicenter of America's problem in Afghanistan lies. That place is Pakistan. More specifically, it is Pakistan's willingness and its ability to take on and defeat, decisively, those terrorists that would either themselves, or through proxies, seek to harm the United States.
President Obama's speech almost entirely ignored this aspect of his country's Afghanistan strategy. Where he didn't ignore it, he fudged the issues so grandly that his talking points were eerily similar to some of the most emphatically unrealistic analysis of what is going on in Pakistan these days. In the most distressing part of Obama's speech, he repeated the spurious link between extremism and the security problems in Pakistan, saying "…as innocents have been killed from Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by extremism. Public opinion has turned. The Pakistani Army has waged an offensive in Swat and South Waziristan. And there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy."
Pakistani public opinion is decidedly against extremist groups and extremism -- but even a cursory look at the data and the news would disabuse anyone of the notion that Pakistan and the United States face a common enemy.
For Pakistani decision makers (and cynics are welcome to insert all the acronyms here that they like, but the fact is that the military and politics of this country are ultimately inextricable) Pakistan's enemies are those terrorists that are killing Pakistanis. America's enemies are those that are killing Americans.
It is true that Pakistanis are getting killed at the hands of FATA-based terrorists, and that Americans (soldiers) are getting killed at the hands of the same militants. That is about where the similarities end.
The FATA-based terrorists that attack Pakistan have been, and will continue to be, hunted down by the Pakistani military because it makes eminent political and strategic sense to do that. But the terrorists that operate in Afghanistan (from FATA), seeking to kill American soldiers in Afghanistan do not pose a threat to Pakistan. At least, that is what the calculus of Pakistani decision makers has been, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Pakistan might take action against them, off and on, but will do so purely as a secondary proxy for American military power. The Pakistani military, in that case, will represent a better investment for US power than either the US military or the mercenaries that it uses, where it can. But the motivation for such piecemeal action against terrorists targeting Afghanistan will always be material. That's not how wars are won.
The Kandahari Taliban represent an even more complex creature, and I deliberately categorise them separately from the FATA-based terrorists that are killing American soldiers. Many within the Kandahari Taliban are ready to embrace their Poppalzai brother in Kabul, and snub both the hardcore elements within their ranks, as well as the Dostum and Masood proxies that have had an uncontested run of Afghanistan's spoils since 2001-2002. Pragmatists in the Karzai camp, as well as among both US military and diplomatic circles, know that the end-game in Kabul will require accommodation with such Taliban.
President Obama could have tried to outline these broad strokes to his audience at West Point and around the world in his speech. Instead, he chose to continue a dangerous tradition of dealing with Pakistan clandestinely. This is a deeply fascinating choice of strategy. Constant efforts to buy, coerce or cajole Pakistan's military and political elite into doing things that they consider suicidal simply has not worked. Pakistan's government will take the money, but it will not deliver the product.
It did not work for eight years under the Bush and Mush tag team. It was never going to work with a PPP government whose strongest instrument is a dislocated former Islamist Pakistani intellectual who has as keen an understanding of Pakistani politics, as Sarah Palin does of Russian geography. Now, with the PPP government buckling under the weight of its own broken promises, it seems Richard Holbrooke has convinced people that a hybrid diplomatic relationship, with six toes in the General Headquarters of the Pakistani military, and four in service of the president and prime minister -- whoever wins the skirmish -- is going to somehow yield success in getting Pakistan to take on the Taliban of Afghanistan.
This would not make for a very good suspense thriller. The ending is the same as the beginning. Pakistan will not abandon the Kandahari Taliban or any other proxies of Pakistani power that will be useful in Kabul. The regional imbalances that drive existential fears in Pakistan don't make Pakistan less committed to having influence in Kabul; they make Pakistan more committed to it.
Of course, Pakistan enjoys no moral authority whatsoever in Afghanistan. But it does enjoy being the only other country that Pakhtuns call home. It does enjoy an extremely long border with Afghanistan. It does enjoy clandestine services that have 30 years of experience in cultivating and leveraging assets in Afghanistan that have a demonstrated record of strategic success. Ethnically, geopolitically and in terms of intelligence, Pakistan has an insurmountable advantage in Afghanistan.
The seven-week victory of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001 was an illusion that was aided by General Musharraf's sleight of hand, and the kind of firepower that America is unlikely to use again in the near future. As an alternative to the Kandahari Taliban, despite the presence of 100,000 US and NATO troops, billions of dollars and the support of 43 countries, the Northern Alliance has failed its sponsors.
Continued reliance on the Northern Alliance to provide good governance, on the US military and NATO to hold territory, and on Pakistan to take on the Kandahari Taliban are all delusions. President Obama's refusal to recognise the immobility of America's position in his speech is his greatest failure to date.
The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy. He can be reached through his website www.mosharrafzaidi.com
But of course, Secretary Clinton (being the Obama administration's sharp-toothed diplomatic supremo) and PM Brown (continuing Tony Blair's legacy of being the US government's poodle) were just setting up the ball for Obama to smash. Unlike what we've come to expect from President Obama, however, this was no smash. A less thunderous or less effective Obama speech is hard to conceive of.
If President Obama is the Muhammad Ali of political oratory, then his much-anticipated Afghan strategy speech was, at least to his admirers (even those from faraway places like Islamabad) as bitter as Ali's 1971 loss to Joe Frazier at Madison Square Garden. It was his first grand failure. In the past, Obama's oratory skills have helped him do the things he was looking to get done (Reverend Wright, Election Night, healthcare). His effectiveness is borne of the clarity he creates and the trust he engenders.
At West Point on Tuesday, President Obama was least like himself than we've ever known him. He was guarded, defensive, and less than entirely convincing. The biggest reason for the speech's failure is that it deliberately skirted around the central issue that plagues the American war in Afghanistan.
If there is one overwhelming area of consensus among pundits that think about these things for a living, it is concerning where the epicenter of America's problem in Afghanistan lies. That place is Pakistan. More specifically, it is Pakistan's willingness and its ability to take on and defeat, decisively, those terrorists that would either themselves, or through proxies, seek to harm the United States.
President Obama's speech almost entirely ignored this aspect of his country's Afghanistan strategy. Where he didn't ignore it, he fudged the issues so grandly that his talking points were eerily similar to some of the most emphatically unrealistic analysis of what is going on in Pakistan these days. In the most distressing part of Obama's speech, he repeated the spurious link between extremism and the security problems in Pakistan, saying "…as innocents have been killed from Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by extremism. Public opinion has turned. The Pakistani Army has waged an offensive in Swat and South Waziristan. And there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy."
Pakistani public opinion is decidedly against extremist groups and extremism -- but even a cursory look at the data and the news would disabuse anyone of the notion that Pakistan and the United States face a common enemy.
For Pakistani decision makers (and cynics are welcome to insert all the acronyms here that they like, but the fact is that the military and politics of this country are ultimately inextricable) Pakistan's enemies are those terrorists that are killing Pakistanis. America's enemies are those that are killing Americans.
It is true that Pakistanis are getting killed at the hands of FATA-based terrorists, and that Americans (soldiers) are getting killed at the hands of the same militants. That is about where the similarities end.
The FATA-based terrorists that attack Pakistan have been, and will continue to be, hunted down by the Pakistani military because it makes eminent political and strategic sense to do that. But the terrorists that operate in Afghanistan (from FATA), seeking to kill American soldiers in Afghanistan do not pose a threat to Pakistan. At least, that is what the calculus of Pakistani decision makers has been, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Pakistan might take action against them, off and on, but will do so purely as a secondary proxy for American military power. The Pakistani military, in that case, will represent a better investment for US power than either the US military or the mercenaries that it uses, where it can. But the motivation for such piecemeal action against terrorists targeting Afghanistan will always be material. That's not how wars are won.
The Kandahari Taliban represent an even more complex creature, and I deliberately categorise them separately from the FATA-based terrorists that are killing American soldiers. Many within the Kandahari Taliban are ready to embrace their Poppalzai brother in Kabul, and snub both the hardcore elements within their ranks, as well as the Dostum and Masood proxies that have had an uncontested run of Afghanistan's spoils since 2001-2002. Pragmatists in the Karzai camp, as well as among both US military and diplomatic circles, know that the end-game in Kabul will require accommodation with such Taliban.
President Obama could have tried to outline these broad strokes to his audience at West Point and around the world in his speech. Instead, he chose to continue a dangerous tradition of dealing with Pakistan clandestinely. This is a deeply fascinating choice of strategy. Constant efforts to buy, coerce or cajole Pakistan's military and political elite into doing things that they consider suicidal simply has not worked. Pakistan's government will take the money, but it will not deliver the product.
It did not work for eight years under the Bush and Mush tag team. It was never going to work with a PPP government whose strongest instrument is a dislocated former Islamist Pakistani intellectual who has as keen an understanding of Pakistani politics, as Sarah Palin does of Russian geography. Now, with the PPP government buckling under the weight of its own broken promises, it seems Richard Holbrooke has convinced people that a hybrid diplomatic relationship, with six toes in the General Headquarters of the Pakistani military, and four in service of the president and prime minister -- whoever wins the skirmish -- is going to somehow yield success in getting Pakistan to take on the Taliban of Afghanistan.
This would not make for a very good suspense thriller. The ending is the same as the beginning. Pakistan will not abandon the Kandahari Taliban or any other proxies of Pakistani power that will be useful in Kabul. The regional imbalances that drive existential fears in Pakistan don't make Pakistan less committed to having influence in Kabul; they make Pakistan more committed to it.
Of course, Pakistan enjoys no moral authority whatsoever in Afghanistan. But it does enjoy being the only other country that Pakhtuns call home. It does enjoy an extremely long border with Afghanistan. It does enjoy clandestine services that have 30 years of experience in cultivating and leveraging assets in Afghanistan that have a demonstrated record of strategic success. Ethnically, geopolitically and in terms of intelligence, Pakistan has an insurmountable advantage in Afghanistan.
The seven-week victory of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001 was an illusion that was aided by General Musharraf's sleight of hand, and the kind of firepower that America is unlikely to use again in the near future. As an alternative to the Kandahari Taliban, despite the presence of 100,000 US and NATO troops, billions of dollars and the support of 43 countries, the Northern Alliance has failed its sponsors.
Continued reliance on the Northern Alliance to provide good governance, on the US military and NATO to hold territory, and on Pakistan to take on the Kandahari Taliban are all delusions. President Obama's refusal to recognise the immobility of America's position in his speech is his greatest failure to date.
The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy. He can be reached through his website www.mosharrafzaidi.com
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
The Other Face Of Pakistan
I have just returned from Pakistan where I was invited to support the efforts of women on the ground who are refusing to be terrified and silenced in the face of recent bombings and attacks. This was my fifth trip to Pakistan over the last fifteen years. I was there in 1994 when I followed a group of 500 Bosnian refugees who were promised swimming pools, bungalows and jobs, and ended up essentially stranded for five years at the Haji Complex, a barren site in Rawalpindi for pilgrims on the way to Mecca. That support offered by the Pakistani government to the Bosnian refugees was more than most were offering at the time. I went back to Pakistan in 1999 when I first met RAWA (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan) and traveled with them into Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, leaving from Peshawar, through the Khyber Pass. I have made this trip several times since then. I was there in 2003 when women activists and artists presented the first production of The Vagina Monologues, a clandestine production in Islamabad that afterwards moved to public performances in Lahore and Karachi.
I was not prepared for the new Islamabad that I met, a city essentially under siege. A maze of 50 check points. People hardly leaving their houses. Schools closed for a month at a time. The fancy Serena Hotel surrounded, a fortress. The U.S. embassy an enclave, protected by miles of stone barricades and elaborate barbed wire. Inside the embassy is another world, a getaway, a club, a café, Pilates classes, and a shopping bazaar imported for the 800 or so American employees the day I was there. No one allowed out. A resident of Islamabad told me, "There weren't barricades and now there are. We're appalled. We're under threat... Because they're targets, we're targets. There were bomb blasts near us and all the windows were blown out of my house. My sister refuses to sleep in a room alone."
There is sense of musical chairs. If you move fast enough and are clever enough, the suicide bomber will not land on you. Every place is a target. One woman told me that she has come to make arbitrary decisions. She doesn't go to the Jinnah market. It feels central. This constant guessing and not knowing makes for terrible and constant anxiety. Everyone seems traumatized in one way or another.
I did a survey, asking people who they thought was doing the bombing and I got many answers. Most people said they had no idea. They did not know the political intentions of the bombings, didn't know who the bombers were or what they wanted. One person told me "...with the Contras [in Nicaragua] and the Tamils [in Sri Lanka], their intent was clear. Here it is an invisible evil. No one is claming it." Many thought it was the work of the Pakistani Taliban although no one thought all the bombings were done by them (the Taliban itself has only claimed responsibility for some of the bombings). There were many rumors and conspiracy theories. Since there is now talk of Blackwater operating in Pakistan, there are those who believe the U.S. is in cahoots with the Taliban (the theory is that if the U.S. has a deliberate foreign policy to keep the streets destabilized, they would have an excuse to intervene and occupy), or that the ISI (the Pakistani intelligence agency) is in cahoots with the U.S. and they are behind the bombings to turn the population against the Taliban. Some thought it was the Pakistani army, or the Taliban within the army. Several people talked about the fact they when they arrest people for the bombings, the stories die quickly and when there is a bomb blast police hose down the area and erase the evidence. Some thought the violence was sponsored by the Indian government. One woman from Swat told me, "We, the common people don't know what's going on. We are pawns. We are suffering at their hands. Whatever their plan is we wish they would get on with it."
I traveled to Rawalpindi, a bustling and madly crowded town right next to the capital. Once outside Islamabad, where the international groups and embassies are stationed and where western hotels exist, there is hardly a checkpoint. No security, no protection for the majority of the population who seem to be on the frontlines of the killing. It is very reminiscent of Iraq and the Green Zone. I go to visit a safe house run by a long time activist Shahnaz Bukhari. The house provides support and refuge for women who have been acid burned -- usually by their husbands. I meet Fauzia*, a 48-year-old woman, who is fully covered in a black chador. After we talk for a while and she begins to trust me, she removes the black veil and her face is a monstrous vision, melted and swollen, no ears, no eyes, she is completely blind. When she was young she married a man who did not like to work. She was working many jobs to support him and their family. She discovered he secretly got married to another women using her money. Eventually she asked for a divorce. After six years of being separated, he started blackmailing her to give him their kids or money. She had bought a plot of land. He was after it. She finally gave it to him, thinking he would leave her alone. She brought him the documents for the land. He said he was satisfied and wouldn't take the kids. He sent them out to have sodas to celebrate. Then he burnt her with acid. Threw it in her face. She told me, "When I say my prayers, I pray that he has been crippled. I don't want him to die. I want him to suffer." She brought her case to court. Her husband came once and then he vanished. She is now speaking out, standing up, showing her face. She wants other women to punish these perpetrators. There are 2,000 burn cases a year. The government is not supporting these cases or women. She is trying to create a network to pressure hospitals and everyone involved to support the women.
At the shelter, I am surprised to find a very handsome young man, Naeem*, and his very adorable son. They are dressed in matching gray cotton suits. It is only a few minutes into the interview that I realize Naeem is really Abaaz*, a 24-year-old woman. Abaaz was married off when she was 13 to a man who was 26. He abused her, tortured her mentally. He threw her out when she was 17 because he took another woman. Abaaz was left on her own with a child on the streets. She had to find a way to survive. She went to a men's barber and had her hair cut. Then she found suitable clothing, lowered her voice and changed her name. She got a vending stand and sells fruits and vegetables. She has achieved success with her business and her identity and is able to support herself and son. I asked her if she is happy living like this. "No, I do not like living as a man. My heart knows how I feel. But I am more secure. No one harasses me. I have learned street slang like the boys use. I mainly have male friends." I ask her son how he feels. "I call my mother brother Naeem in the streets, but I do not like that she can't be a woman. I want her to be in the house. At home she is different. She can be my mother." I ask if she will get married again. She says, "I can't be that fool again." She worries about money. She wants her son to go to school. She tells me it's embarrassing to be a boy. "When things are favorable, I'll be a girl again. The shawl, the symbol of my pride, I had to leave. I'll be happy when my son grows up and I can sit at home in my chair and wear my shawl. I will be happy then when I can live my last years as a woman."
I return that evening to Islamabad and am joined by a group of very powerful women. We talk for hours. I meet Samar Minallah -- an activist lawyer. She focuses primarily on highlighting problems of women in the Northwest Province of Pakistan. She has been fighting a practice called "retribution" where girls are traded to resolve conflict between men. Recently she was involved in a case where a man killed another man's dog and instead of a fight ensuing, the man who killed the dog gave the aggrieved man 15 girls between the ages of six months to seven years old. These girls then became the aggrieved man's possessions, to be raped, enslaved, treated in any way the man desired. Fifteen girls for one dead dog. This is a common practice. A practice Samar has been fighting against. In the case of the dog, she called the father of the girls and asked if it was true. She recorded the conversation. The father proudly announced that he had traded his daughters. Samar went to the human rights commission of Pakistan. She reported the case to a policeman. The father called Samar's son and told him "Your mother is going to die very soon." Fortunately, Samar was able to prosecute the case and the man went to jail. She then told me of the story that has put her life in much bigger jeopardy.
"I live in Swat. In April, I was told that a 16-year-old girl had been flogged by the Taliban. Beating women has nothing to do with our culture or religion. The girl had come from a far off village in Swat. She had refused a marriage proposal from a good for nothing Taliban boy. The boy then claimed the girl had an illicit relationship with her father-in-law. The woman was flogged publicly. Many photographed and videoed the flogging on their mobile phones and sent it around." Samar took the video and posted it on Facebook. She posted it with her name and email. She attached a message, "If you don't wake up today, this will happen to you." Because she identified herself, her life was immediately endangered. When I asked her why she took such a risk, she said "No one is taking responsibility for anything. There is no credibility or impact if you do not sign your name or take responsibility." The Taliban told Samar they were sending five suicide bombers to her house. This did not stop her. They tried to discredit her. They said it was a 14 year old video, said she manufactured it in her house. They said she was a known mad woman. Certain people stopped taking her phone calls. Some people removed her from their Facebook. She went on Pakistani TV. Samar did not use a drone or an AK-47, but she put the Taliban on the defensive. They demanded she be handed over, (like the 15 girls) but her actions spurred a revulsion and Pakistan people mobilized in the streets to protest. The Taliban claimed Samar had damaged their reputation in the international press. They put a fatwa against her. "I was shattered because of my children. I cried on the phone afraid for my children. I had the option of leaving Pakistan. To leave for me would have been death. I have a role to play in the theater against women's rights violations. A few embassies called and asked if I wanted asylum. I would never leave Pakistan. My daughter was crying because she couldn't leave her cats. I felt guilty I had done this to my kids. My friends gave us refuge." Samar stopped talking publicly for three months. Now she is back at it, fighting the cases. "I'm in a make shift home now. No landline. It's not just the Taliban I am afraid of. It is the Taliban mind set. Most suicide bombers are clean-shaven, look just like us. I am still getting horrible emails from people I don't know. People will get brownie points in heaven for killing me. Of course I am afraid of getting picked up, abused, raped, tortured. That is the most terrifying, not death. There are hundreds of missing people in Pakistan. But how can I stop. How can I let them win?"
The condition of women has never been elevated in Pakistan (I do not single Pakistan out as I have yet to find a country where the status of women is elevated), but the current climate of terror, militarism, and Talibanization has escalated and licensed a brutal gender oppression, inhumanity and violence. A male leader from Chitral, a formerly progressive town in the frontier told me, "The Taliban hasn't arrived yet physically, but they have mentally. Already women are not going out of the house, leaving jobs, covering themselves when they have never been covered."
Religious extremism is a kind of plague. It seizes the mind, body and soul. It creates a kind of slow terror that invades cell by cell and feeds off the preexisting patriarchal traditions and conditioning in women. Then, there are the various practices that enforce that conditioning: acid burning, retribution, honor killing, flogging, burying women alive, etc. Some of these stories get out to the West from time to time; but, what rarely gets out are the stories of women who are resisting this violence and fighting with their lives for human rights.
After listening to many women's stories, I am struck with their brilliance in constructing strategies that are not rooted in war or violence, but rather in courage, enabling justice, transformation and real security. There is another Pakistan -- the Pakistan of women academics running women studies programs, women demonstrating in front of the judiciary, speaking out on television, fighting law suits in protection of women's rights, harboring and giving refuge to women who are acid burned. There is the mother obsessively seeking justice for her daughter who she believes was poisoned by a Mullah after he raped her, the woman fighting off the Taliban after they murdered her husband in Swat. Activists like Tahira Addullan, who has been in the human rights and women's movement 30 years, always threatened, arrested twice, fiercely fighting for the restoration of an independent judiciary. And, Nighat Rizvi, who produced a sold out event to raise awareness about violence against women in the middle of a paralyzed city, and who screened her documentary on the inhumane conditions for women in the recent IDP camps.
These women understand that the major threat to Pakistan is not terrorism but poverty, malnutrition, (60 percent of the children are now born moderately stunted) lack of education, HIV, violence against women, and corruption of the government. Women who know that the U.S. war in Afghanistan escalates violence in Pakistan, that computer driven drones killing hundreds of innocent people enrages those who lose their loved ones and that creates more terrorists. They know their lives are being manipulated, that the millions of dollars the U.S. sends never reaches them or the people (but goes to the corrupt leaders and elites). That the future of their country is essentially in their hands, as the government, the army, the security forces are not focused on the struggles that occupy their daily existence.
As I leave Pakistan, I think of Fauzia, Abaaz and Samar. One reveals her destroyed face to stop the burning of others, one disguises her face to support her child and protect her security, one uploads an explosive video on Facebook to expose and stop a hideous practice. Each one of these strategies involved creativity, originality, bravery and very little money. I think the U.S. government and the military, the Pakistani government and army could all take heed from the vision and bravery and work of women like these. The change needs to come from the ground. Religious extremism is a virus. It feeds on poverty, malnutrition, humiliation, sexism and fear. As President Obama gets ready to formally announce his plans for a troop increase in Afghanistan, we must recognize that putting more US troops on the ground will only increase the violence, bombings and terror in the region. Our strongest methods of inoculation are to feed, help educate and honor the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan and to support the women, providing them with resources to do what they need to do, what they know how to do.
*Names have been changed to protect their identity.
Eve Ensler, a playwright and activist, is the founder of V-Day, a global movement to end violence against women and girls.
I was not prepared for the new Islamabad that I met, a city essentially under siege. A maze of 50 check points. People hardly leaving their houses. Schools closed for a month at a time. The fancy Serena Hotel surrounded, a fortress. The U.S. embassy an enclave, protected by miles of stone barricades and elaborate barbed wire. Inside the embassy is another world, a getaway, a club, a café, Pilates classes, and a shopping bazaar imported for the 800 or so American employees the day I was there. No one allowed out. A resident of Islamabad told me, "There weren't barricades and now there are. We're appalled. We're under threat... Because they're targets, we're targets. There were bomb blasts near us and all the windows were blown out of my house. My sister refuses to sleep in a room alone."
There is sense of musical chairs. If you move fast enough and are clever enough, the suicide bomber will not land on you. Every place is a target. One woman told me that she has come to make arbitrary decisions. She doesn't go to the Jinnah market. It feels central. This constant guessing and not knowing makes for terrible and constant anxiety. Everyone seems traumatized in one way or another.
I did a survey, asking people who they thought was doing the bombing and I got many answers. Most people said they had no idea. They did not know the political intentions of the bombings, didn't know who the bombers were or what they wanted. One person told me "...with the Contras [in Nicaragua] and the Tamils [in Sri Lanka], their intent was clear. Here it is an invisible evil. No one is claming it." Many thought it was the work of the Pakistani Taliban although no one thought all the bombings were done by them (the Taliban itself has only claimed responsibility for some of the bombings). There were many rumors and conspiracy theories. Since there is now talk of Blackwater operating in Pakistan, there are those who believe the U.S. is in cahoots with the Taliban (the theory is that if the U.S. has a deliberate foreign policy to keep the streets destabilized, they would have an excuse to intervene and occupy), or that the ISI (the Pakistani intelligence agency) is in cahoots with the U.S. and they are behind the bombings to turn the population against the Taliban. Some thought it was the Pakistani army, or the Taliban within the army. Several people talked about the fact they when they arrest people for the bombings, the stories die quickly and when there is a bomb blast police hose down the area and erase the evidence. Some thought the violence was sponsored by the Indian government. One woman from Swat told me, "We, the common people don't know what's going on. We are pawns. We are suffering at their hands. Whatever their plan is we wish they would get on with it."
I traveled to Rawalpindi, a bustling and madly crowded town right next to the capital. Once outside Islamabad, where the international groups and embassies are stationed and where western hotels exist, there is hardly a checkpoint. No security, no protection for the majority of the population who seem to be on the frontlines of the killing. It is very reminiscent of Iraq and the Green Zone. I go to visit a safe house run by a long time activist Shahnaz Bukhari. The house provides support and refuge for women who have been acid burned -- usually by their husbands. I meet Fauzia*, a 48-year-old woman, who is fully covered in a black chador. After we talk for a while and she begins to trust me, she removes the black veil and her face is a monstrous vision, melted and swollen, no ears, no eyes, she is completely blind. When she was young she married a man who did not like to work. She was working many jobs to support him and their family. She discovered he secretly got married to another women using her money. Eventually she asked for a divorce. After six years of being separated, he started blackmailing her to give him their kids or money. She had bought a plot of land. He was after it. She finally gave it to him, thinking he would leave her alone. She brought him the documents for the land. He said he was satisfied and wouldn't take the kids. He sent them out to have sodas to celebrate. Then he burnt her with acid. Threw it in her face. She told me, "When I say my prayers, I pray that he has been crippled. I don't want him to die. I want him to suffer." She brought her case to court. Her husband came once and then he vanished. She is now speaking out, standing up, showing her face. She wants other women to punish these perpetrators. There are 2,000 burn cases a year. The government is not supporting these cases or women. She is trying to create a network to pressure hospitals and everyone involved to support the women.
At the shelter, I am surprised to find a very handsome young man, Naeem*, and his very adorable son. They are dressed in matching gray cotton suits. It is only a few minutes into the interview that I realize Naeem is really Abaaz*, a 24-year-old woman. Abaaz was married off when she was 13 to a man who was 26. He abused her, tortured her mentally. He threw her out when she was 17 because he took another woman. Abaaz was left on her own with a child on the streets. She had to find a way to survive. She went to a men's barber and had her hair cut. Then she found suitable clothing, lowered her voice and changed her name. She got a vending stand and sells fruits and vegetables. She has achieved success with her business and her identity and is able to support herself and son. I asked her if she is happy living like this. "No, I do not like living as a man. My heart knows how I feel. But I am more secure. No one harasses me. I have learned street slang like the boys use. I mainly have male friends." I ask her son how he feels. "I call my mother brother Naeem in the streets, but I do not like that she can't be a woman. I want her to be in the house. At home she is different. She can be my mother." I ask if she will get married again. She says, "I can't be that fool again." She worries about money. She wants her son to go to school. She tells me it's embarrassing to be a boy. "When things are favorable, I'll be a girl again. The shawl, the symbol of my pride, I had to leave. I'll be happy when my son grows up and I can sit at home in my chair and wear my shawl. I will be happy then when I can live my last years as a woman."
I return that evening to Islamabad and am joined by a group of very powerful women. We talk for hours. I meet Samar Minallah -- an activist lawyer. She focuses primarily on highlighting problems of women in the Northwest Province of Pakistan. She has been fighting a practice called "retribution" where girls are traded to resolve conflict between men. Recently she was involved in a case where a man killed another man's dog and instead of a fight ensuing, the man who killed the dog gave the aggrieved man 15 girls between the ages of six months to seven years old. These girls then became the aggrieved man's possessions, to be raped, enslaved, treated in any way the man desired. Fifteen girls for one dead dog. This is a common practice. A practice Samar has been fighting against. In the case of the dog, she called the father of the girls and asked if it was true. She recorded the conversation. The father proudly announced that he had traded his daughters. Samar went to the human rights commission of Pakistan. She reported the case to a policeman. The father called Samar's son and told him "Your mother is going to die very soon." Fortunately, Samar was able to prosecute the case and the man went to jail. She then told me of the story that has put her life in much bigger jeopardy.
"I live in Swat. In April, I was told that a 16-year-old girl had been flogged by the Taliban. Beating women has nothing to do with our culture or religion. The girl had come from a far off village in Swat. She had refused a marriage proposal from a good for nothing Taliban boy. The boy then claimed the girl had an illicit relationship with her father-in-law. The woman was flogged publicly. Many photographed and videoed the flogging on their mobile phones and sent it around." Samar took the video and posted it on Facebook. She posted it with her name and email. She attached a message, "If you don't wake up today, this will happen to you." Because she identified herself, her life was immediately endangered. When I asked her why she took such a risk, she said "No one is taking responsibility for anything. There is no credibility or impact if you do not sign your name or take responsibility." The Taliban told Samar they were sending five suicide bombers to her house. This did not stop her. They tried to discredit her. They said it was a 14 year old video, said she manufactured it in her house. They said she was a known mad woman. Certain people stopped taking her phone calls. Some people removed her from their Facebook. She went on Pakistani TV. Samar did not use a drone or an AK-47, but she put the Taliban on the defensive. They demanded she be handed over, (like the 15 girls) but her actions spurred a revulsion and Pakistan people mobilized in the streets to protest. The Taliban claimed Samar had damaged their reputation in the international press. They put a fatwa against her. "I was shattered because of my children. I cried on the phone afraid for my children. I had the option of leaving Pakistan. To leave for me would have been death. I have a role to play in the theater against women's rights violations. A few embassies called and asked if I wanted asylum. I would never leave Pakistan. My daughter was crying because she couldn't leave her cats. I felt guilty I had done this to my kids. My friends gave us refuge." Samar stopped talking publicly for three months. Now she is back at it, fighting the cases. "I'm in a make shift home now. No landline. It's not just the Taliban I am afraid of. It is the Taliban mind set. Most suicide bombers are clean-shaven, look just like us. I am still getting horrible emails from people I don't know. People will get brownie points in heaven for killing me. Of course I am afraid of getting picked up, abused, raped, tortured. That is the most terrifying, not death. There are hundreds of missing people in Pakistan. But how can I stop. How can I let them win?"
The condition of women has never been elevated in Pakistan (I do not single Pakistan out as I have yet to find a country where the status of women is elevated), but the current climate of terror, militarism, and Talibanization has escalated and licensed a brutal gender oppression, inhumanity and violence. A male leader from Chitral, a formerly progressive town in the frontier told me, "The Taliban hasn't arrived yet physically, but they have mentally. Already women are not going out of the house, leaving jobs, covering themselves when they have never been covered."
Religious extremism is a kind of plague. It seizes the mind, body and soul. It creates a kind of slow terror that invades cell by cell and feeds off the preexisting patriarchal traditions and conditioning in women. Then, there are the various practices that enforce that conditioning: acid burning, retribution, honor killing, flogging, burying women alive, etc. Some of these stories get out to the West from time to time; but, what rarely gets out are the stories of women who are resisting this violence and fighting with their lives for human rights.
After listening to many women's stories, I am struck with their brilliance in constructing strategies that are not rooted in war or violence, but rather in courage, enabling justice, transformation and real security. There is another Pakistan -- the Pakistan of women academics running women studies programs, women demonstrating in front of the judiciary, speaking out on television, fighting law suits in protection of women's rights, harboring and giving refuge to women who are acid burned. There is the mother obsessively seeking justice for her daughter who she believes was poisoned by a Mullah after he raped her, the woman fighting off the Taliban after they murdered her husband in Swat. Activists like Tahira Addullan, who has been in the human rights and women's movement 30 years, always threatened, arrested twice, fiercely fighting for the restoration of an independent judiciary. And, Nighat Rizvi, who produced a sold out event to raise awareness about violence against women in the middle of a paralyzed city, and who screened her documentary on the inhumane conditions for women in the recent IDP camps.
These women understand that the major threat to Pakistan is not terrorism but poverty, malnutrition, (60 percent of the children are now born moderately stunted) lack of education, HIV, violence against women, and corruption of the government. Women who know that the U.S. war in Afghanistan escalates violence in Pakistan, that computer driven drones killing hundreds of innocent people enrages those who lose their loved ones and that creates more terrorists. They know their lives are being manipulated, that the millions of dollars the U.S. sends never reaches them or the people (but goes to the corrupt leaders and elites). That the future of their country is essentially in their hands, as the government, the army, the security forces are not focused on the struggles that occupy their daily existence.
As I leave Pakistan, I think of Fauzia, Abaaz and Samar. One reveals her destroyed face to stop the burning of others, one disguises her face to support her child and protect her security, one uploads an explosive video on Facebook to expose and stop a hideous practice. Each one of these strategies involved creativity, originality, bravery and very little money. I think the U.S. government and the military, the Pakistani government and army could all take heed from the vision and bravery and work of women like these. The change needs to come from the ground. Religious extremism is a virus. It feeds on poverty, malnutrition, humiliation, sexism and fear. As President Obama gets ready to formally announce his plans for a troop increase in Afghanistan, we must recognize that putting more US troops on the ground will only increase the violence, bombings and terror in the region. Our strongest methods of inoculation are to feed, help educate and honor the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan and to support the women, providing them with resources to do what they need to do, what they know how to do.
*Names have been changed to protect their identity.
Eve Ensler, a playwright and activist, is the founder of V-Day, a global movement to end violence against women and girls.
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
The Taliban mindset —By Dr Khalil Ahmad
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\12\02\story_2-12-2009_pg3_2
The fundamental rights of the citizens, which found a mention as far back as in 1928 in the Nehru Report, remained a chimera in Pakistan until the lawyers’ movement brought them to the streets in 2007
In order to secure constitutional protection for the Muslims of the subcontinent, the Muslim League argued for a homeland in a separatist language, on the basis of a different religious identity. However, since the Congress would not budge on the issue, the Muslim League went ahead with its demand for Pakistan.
Thus the constitutional issue was merged into a religious one. Naturally when Pakistan came into being, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah found himself facing a dilemma: the Muslim League had been using the rhetoric of separate religious identity and now he wanted to make the new homeland a religiously neutral state as is evident from his speech of August 11, 1947. That it could not happen, and the controversy lives to this day, is evident. Also, that a constitution could not be framed until 1973, or while a few were framed and enforced, whatever their merit was, they could not survive, is sufficient to demonstrate the point that transforming the constitutional issue (especially the right to religious freedom) into a religious one proved disastrous for the new homeland.
It provided various elites, including the military and religious groups, with an excuse to exploit the absence of a constitution to their benefit. It was they who tried their best to ensure that no constitution should prevail in Pakistan.
The fundamental rights of the citizens, which found a mention as far back as in 1928 in the Nehru Report, remained a chimera in Pakistan until the lawyers’ movement brought them to the streets in 2007. Socialism, populism, religion, ‘enlightened moderation’ and a mixture of parasitism and welfare state completely eclipsed the issue of fundamental rights in the country.
All the politics through the last six decades can be summarised as thus: from the very beginning, a constitutional issue, i.e. the issue of fundamental rights of individual citizens was confused with the issue of the state’s control of individual citizens’ lives, i.e. the State’s right to determine what is best for its citizens, including their religion.
Principally, the only point of a constitution is its ability to protect the life, property and other fundamental rights of individual citizens. Also, the state’s control of its individual citizens is a relic of the monarchical past where the ruler was the law, and acted like a father or mother taking care of his subjects. When the rule of law is supreme, it means the laws and the state give equal protection to every citizen’s life, property and other rights. That is why all attacks on the constitution first require the suspension of these fundamental rights.
That brings us to two beliefs: first, that it is right to deprive others of their natural freedom, and second, that it is not. Whether those who deprive others of their freedom also try to control their lives or not is beside the point; what is important is whether this deprivation is achieved by force or by (false) law. That such rule of law, ensuring the fundamental rights of each citizen to live life as they wish, was missing in Pakistan, created a vacuum which many groups and parties — religious, sectarian, ethnic and otherwise — and conglomerations of intellectual, political, business and military elites rushed to fill. It is obvious that this vacuum was deliberately kept intact and even prolonged.
In fact, what is happening around us in Pakistan today again proves that the nature of the crisis is constitutional. It explains the onslaught of the Taliban as a violent resurrection of that mindset, which was never dealt with constitutionally. The absence of a constitution and, when we had one, its sheer violation by all elites — intellectual, religious, political, business, and military — strengthened that mindset.
Additionally, this mindset was deliberately strengthened by all the elites to perpetuate their rule and hegemony, and to protect their parasitism. It was nourished, nurtured, and trained at the cost of constitutional provisions relating especially to fundamental rights and religious freedom.
What was sowed by the intellectual, political, religious, business, and military elites is today beginning to rear its ugly head and its consequences are affecting ordinary citizens in the form of absolute insecurity that threatens their very existence without any reprieve in sight. This tragedy is deeper than our imagination can fathom. The number of hardcore Taliban in Pakistan may well be smaller than is repeatedly being claimed these days by the political and military elites — hundreds or thousands who will be wiped out in months. But who can enumerate the number of “soft” Taliban living amongst us?
This “soft” category can be divided into active and passive. Religious groups and parties fall into the active, while the passive are those ordinary citizens who are unaware of their own Taliban mindset. This passive category openly believes in depriving others of their freedom and controlling their lives according to its own scheme of thought. That may be why we see no mass agitation against the Taliban in spite of them killing fellow Pakistanis indiscriminately.
To fight this war we first have to admit that we are in the midst of an intellectual as well as a real war. The constitution of 1973 should be the rallying point for all who do not believe in depriving others of their freedoms and who believe in the fundamental human rights ensured in the constitution. Not only will that help us fight both the hardcore and soft Taliban but will also help to bring harmony, peace, stability and happiness to Pakistan.
The writer is founder/head of the Alternate Solutions Institute, http://asinstitute.org a think tank dedicated to the cause of personal freedom and rule of law. He can be contacted at: khalil@asinstitute.org
The fundamental rights of the citizens, which found a mention as far back as in 1928 in the Nehru Report, remained a chimera in Pakistan until the lawyers’ movement brought them to the streets in 2007
In order to secure constitutional protection for the Muslims of the subcontinent, the Muslim League argued for a homeland in a separatist language, on the basis of a different religious identity. However, since the Congress would not budge on the issue, the Muslim League went ahead with its demand for Pakistan.
Thus the constitutional issue was merged into a religious one. Naturally when Pakistan came into being, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah found himself facing a dilemma: the Muslim League had been using the rhetoric of separate religious identity and now he wanted to make the new homeland a religiously neutral state as is evident from his speech of August 11, 1947. That it could not happen, and the controversy lives to this day, is evident. Also, that a constitution could not be framed until 1973, or while a few were framed and enforced, whatever their merit was, they could not survive, is sufficient to demonstrate the point that transforming the constitutional issue (especially the right to religious freedom) into a religious one proved disastrous for the new homeland.
It provided various elites, including the military and religious groups, with an excuse to exploit the absence of a constitution to their benefit. It was they who tried their best to ensure that no constitution should prevail in Pakistan.
The fundamental rights of the citizens, which found a mention as far back as in 1928 in the Nehru Report, remained a chimera in Pakistan until the lawyers’ movement brought them to the streets in 2007. Socialism, populism, religion, ‘enlightened moderation’ and a mixture of parasitism and welfare state completely eclipsed the issue of fundamental rights in the country.
All the politics through the last six decades can be summarised as thus: from the very beginning, a constitutional issue, i.e. the issue of fundamental rights of individual citizens was confused with the issue of the state’s control of individual citizens’ lives, i.e. the State’s right to determine what is best for its citizens, including their religion.
Principally, the only point of a constitution is its ability to protect the life, property and other fundamental rights of individual citizens. Also, the state’s control of its individual citizens is a relic of the monarchical past where the ruler was the law, and acted like a father or mother taking care of his subjects. When the rule of law is supreme, it means the laws and the state give equal protection to every citizen’s life, property and other rights. That is why all attacks on the constitution first require the suspension of these fundamental rights.
That brings us to two beliefs: first, that it is right to deprive others of their natural freedom, and second, that it is not. Whether those who deprive others of their freedom also try to control their lives or not is beside the point; what is important is whether this deprivation is achieved by force or by (false) law. That such rule of law, ensuring the fundamental rights of each citizen to live life as they wish, was missing in Pakistan, created a vacuum which many groups and parties — religious, sectarian, ethnic and otherwise — and conglomerations of intellectual, political, business and military elites rushed to fill. It is obvious that this vacuum was deliberately kept intact and even prolonged.
In fact, what is happening around us in Pakistan today again proves that the nature of the crisis is constitutional. It explains the onslaught of the Taliban as a violent resurrection of that mindset, which was never dealt with constitutionally. The absence of a constitution and, when we had one, its sheer violation by all elites — intellectual, religious, political, business, and military — strengthened that mindset.
Additionally, this mindset was deliberately strengthened by all the elites to perpetuate their rule and hegemony, and to protect their parasitism. It was nourished, nurtured, and trained at the cost of constitutional provisions relating especially to fundamental rights and religious freedom.
What was sowed by the intellectual, political, religious, business, and military elites is today beginning to rear its ugly head and its consequences are affecting ordinary citizens in the form of absolute insecurity that threatens their very existence without any reprieve in sight. This tragedy is deeper than our imagination can fathom. The number of hardcore Taliban in Pakistan may well be smaller than is repeatedly being claimed these days by the political and military elites — hundreds or thousands who will be wiped out in months. But who can enumerate the number of “soft” Taliban living amongst us?
This “soft” category can be divided into active and passive. Religious groups and parties fall into the active, while the passive are those ordinary citizens who are unaware of their own Taliban mindset. This passive category openly believes in depriving others of their freedom and controlling their lives according to its own scheme of thought. That may be why we see no mass agitation against the Taliban in spite of them killing fellow Pakistanis indiscriminately.
To fight this war we first have to admit that we are in the midst of an intellectual as well as a real war. The constitution of 1973 should be the rallying point for all who do not believe in depriving others of their freedoms and who believe in the fundamental human rights ensured in the constitution. Not only will that help us fight both the hardcore and soft Taliban but will also help to bring harmony, peace, stability and happiness to Pakistan.
The writer is founder/head of the Alternate Solutions Institute, http://asinstitute.org a think tank dedicated to the cause of personal freedom and rule of law. He can be contacted at: khalil@asinstitute.org
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)