Speaking of Pakistan

The U.S. and India must take steps to deepen their cooperation against South Asian terrorism.

By C. CHRISTINE FAIR

Pakistan is likely to loom large in the meetings between President Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh this week. Partly that's because Thursday is the first anniversary of the Mumbai hotel attacks that claimed 173 lives, including four Americans—attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups based in Pakistan. More broadly, there is a growing realization that Washington and New Delhi have many common security interests in Pakistan, which is a key country both to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and to the fight against Islamist terrorism.

So amid the fanfare of the Obama administration's first state visit, both sides will quietly focus on how they can best protect each other from the terrorist threats emanating from Pakistan. Americans are now more aware than ever of the threats India faces. Before the "11/26" assault, few Americans had ever heard of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based terrorist group operating largely, but not exclusively, in India. Though the attack was not India's deadliest—that was the 1993 attack on Mumbai's stock exchange—it changed the world's understanding of terrorism in India as real-time television footage streamed into American and European living rooms. It catalyzed discussions in Washington and Delhi about Lashkar-e-Taiba and the danger that group and its fellow travelers pose not just to India but to other countries.

India and the U.S. share a common vision of a stable, democratic, civilian-controlled Pakistan at peace with itself and its neighbors. But they have often disagreed on how best to achieve this end. It is unlikely that Mr. Singh's visit will yield an immediate consensus, but will likely continue to focus on law enforcement and counterintelligence cooperation.

Since 9/11, Delhi has watched warily as Washington enlisted Pakistan's help against al Qaeda by providing conventional military assistance and other allurements such as such as aid for Pakistan's participation on the war on terrorism. In total Pakistan has received more than $15 billion since 9/11. Washington had applied only episodic pressure on Pakistan to shut down militants operating in and against India and the disputed border region of Kashmir. Washington has wanted to encourage Pakistan to fight those militants that it can and will fight, even if Islamabad opposes actions against groups like Lashkar and the Afghan Taliban. And Washington needs Pakistan's support to fight the war in Afghanistan. Washington used to see Lashkar and other "Kashmiri groups" as India's problem, caring about these militant outfits only if they directly threatened U.S. interests. The United States and India have for too long been fighting their own, parallel wars on terror.

The 11/26 attack has changed regional and international dynamics, ultimately to Pakistan's disadvantage. First, Pakistan's inaction toward Lashkar and its front organization Jamaat-ul-Dawa puts to rest any doubt about Pakistan's commitment to retaining the organization as a strategic reserve to do the state's bidding in the region. Pakistan's failure to take meaningful action against Lashkar came to the fore in April 2009 when the organization, with the tacit assent of the government, provided high-visibility assistance to Pakistanis displaced by military action in Swat. It is now obvious, despite Islamabad's recent efforts to pursue the Pakistan Taliban and the sanctuaries it provides to al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, that the Pakistan government is part of the problem of international terrorism.

Second, whereas Lashkar was previously a "niche specialty" for counterterrorism experts within the U.S. government, now nearly every policy, law-enforcement, intelligence and military agency has dedicated resources to protect the U.S., its friends and its assets from Lashkar. The Mumbai attack lent increased urgency to deepening U.S.-India cooperation centered on joint law enforcement and counterterrorism concerns. While less "sexy" than military-to-military engagements, this kind of Indo-U.S cooperation is vital to securing both nations against future terrorist threats.

Third, the proximity of Lashkar to Pakistan's intelligence and security services, along with continued revelations about those services' assistance to the Afghan Taliban, remind the U.S. and others that the Pakistan government continues to fight a selective war on terror, preserving those militant groups that serve the state's foreign policy goals. This has forced many analysts and policy makers to acknowledge that Pakistan is unlikely ever to abandon terrorism as a tool of foreign policy even while domestic terrorists tear at the fabric of the state.

India has taken important steps under the leadership of Home Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram, who is keen to make sweeping changes in India's domestic security arrangements. He wants to learn from India's past mistakes and from other countries, including the U.S. This is an opportunity for Washington and Delhi to explore ways to deepen intelligence sharing, to continue developing contacts between local and federal law enforcement agencies, expand government and non-governmental engagement on the nature of the terrorist threat and best practices to counter it, and to deepen the focus on maritime security cooperation to limit the maritime opportunities for a variety of illegal actors.

Mr. Singh's visit reminds us all that while India and the U.S. have come a long way since 2000, there is much work to be done in jointly securing the safety of their citizens from groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba. Whether both states will rally to the challenge remains to be seen.

Ms. Fair is an assistant professor in the security studies program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.