Pakistan's Baghdad Bob

Officials in Islamabad are notorious spinmeisters, but military spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas is fast becoming a prevaricator without peer.

BY DAVID KENNER | OCTOBER 27, 2009

As American tanks rumbled in to Baghdad on April 7, 2003, Iraqi InformationMinister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf, who became affectionately known as BaghdadBob, tried mightily to convince Western journalists to ignore the facts infront of their eyes. "I triple guarantee you, there are no American soldiers in Baghdad," he told reporters as American troops gathered a few hundred yardsaway. Later, he stated that American soldiers were "committing suicide by thehundreds on the gates of Baghdad," mere hours before coalition forces securedthe city.
Today,Baghdad Bob might have found a successor in the form of Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas,the director general of Pakistan's Inter-Services Public Relations, which handles media relations for the Pakistani armed forces. In a recent Washington Post column, David Ignatius celebrated Pakistan's new determination in confronting the Taliban, quoting Abbas saying that the ongoing offensive in South Waziristan brings an end to the Pakistani government's thinking that "somehow we'll be able to manage them, co-opt them, bring them on board."

Statementslike that are music to American policymakers' ears. But somehow, it seems like we've heard all of this from General Abbas before. In less than two years, the general has provided the media with a fairly impressive list of promises, assertions, and projections -- none of which have more than a tenuous basis in reality. Here are a few of his greatest hits. But don't worry: We're sure that, this time, he means every word he says.

Sponsorship of the Taliban

Claim: In the recent Frontline documentary aired on Oct. 13, "Obama's War," a perplexed correspondent tried to get a straight answer from Major General Abbas.  Is it true, he asked, that the Pakistani government knows where Taliban leaders such as Mullah Omar and Siraj Haqqaniare located? But Abbas would not budge: "There is no truth in Mullah Omar and Siraj Haqqani remaining in Pakistan side of the border. I refute that.  No one has shown any intelligence to the Pakistanis."
Taliban groups such as these, Abbas said, "operate from Afghanistan.  If somebody claims that everything is happening from this side of the border, I am sorry, this is misplaced, and we refute it."
Reality: In 2008, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen traveled to Islamabad to present the Pakistani government with evidence that elements of Pakistan's Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were supporting the Taliban. Mullen reportedly provided the Pakistani government with intercepted communications between the ISI and the Taliban to prove his point. "We spoke to, clearly, the ISI's relationship with various militant groups that they've had for some time," said Mullen in the same Frontline documentary. U.S. officials, from Barack Obama on down, have continued to emphasize Pakistan's role as an incubator of terrorist activities. The president stated this past March: "Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that Al Qaida is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan."

 Waziristan

Claim: On May 17, 2008, Abbas accompanied journalists to Waziristan to speak of the military's recent offensive in the region. He attempted to reassure reporters about a recent relocation of Pakistani Army troops: "The Army will still have a dominating presence [in Waziristan]. ...Until we are fully sure that the tribal elders and 'jirga' (tribal council) are fully in place, we will stay here."
Reality: On May 23, Taliban commander Qari Hussain -- whom the Pakistani military took credit for killing during another offensive in Waziristan in January -- held a press conference mocking reports of his death. "I am alive, don't you see me?" he said. Baitullah Mehsud, then the most influential Taliban leader in Waziristan, also addressed a news conference at a government school building to announce that the Taliban would continue its war against NATO forces in Afghanistan. For the Pakistani military, this all amounted to something considerably less than a "dominating presence" in Waziristan. In any case, the military presence there soon waned, precipitating the recent offensive into the region.

 Drone strikes

Claim: Abbas has repeatedly criticized the U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, and emphasized that the Pakistani military had no need for American help in its recent offensive. For that reason, the drone strike in the area of Bajaur on Oct. 24 was particularly inconvenient. Abbas, however, was unfazed: "Our information suggests that explosive material being loaded ata vehicle blew up," he told journalists.
Reality: The "vehicle"detonated near a bunker where Maulana Faqir Muhammad, deputy chief of Hakimullah Mehsud's Tehrik-e-Taliban, happened to be holding a secret meeting. That's either the most fortuitous location for an explosives accident in history, or a strike from a Predator drone. The International News and the Daily Times, both Pakistani newspapers, didn't fall for Abbas's spin -- they reported the explosion as a drone strike.

 Shamsi Airbase

Claim: On Feb. 17, Abbas was handed a bona fide public relations disaster. The Times of London reported that the United States was using Pakistan's Shamsi airfield, which lies about 200 miles away from Mullah Omar's stronghold of Quetta, to launch Predator drone strikes. After spending the past year issuing government condemnations of U.S. drone strikes, Abbas was faced with the inconvenient fact that the Pakistani state was quietly complicit in the launching of these attacks. But, like a good soldier, he pressed bravely on. As the Times of London reported: "Major General Athar Abbas, the chief military spokesman, confirmed that US forces were using Shamsi [airfield]. ‘The airfield is being used only for logistics,' he said, without elaborating."
Reality: Abbas's denial would have been more believable if the Google Earth images accompanying the Times's article did not clearly show Predator drones on the ground at Shamsi airbase. The U.S. government also evidently did not believe that Abbas's explanation would pass muster.  Two days later, on Feb. 19, U.S. officials would admit publicly to operating drones from Shamsi, and that the Pakistani government had been providing them with the locations of potential targets inthe tribal areas.

 Swat Valley

Claim: After a year of fighting in thecontested Swat Valley, the New York Times profiled the "terrified" residents caught between the Taliban and the Pakistani army on Jan.24. The article reported that Taliban fighters roam around the region freely,while the military hunkers down in its camps. Abbas, however, took issue with the accusation that the military lacks the will to fight, calling it "very unfair and unjustified." He also disputed that Mingora, the largest town in Swat, had fallen to the militants. "Just because they come out at night and throw down four or five bodies in the square does not mean that militants control anything," he argued.
Reality:  On Feb. 16, the Pakistani government would sign a treaty in the Swat Valley that allowed for the imposition of sharia law in the region, in exchange for a "permanent cease-fire" with the Taliban. It turns out that the Taliban's ability to "throw down four or five bodies in the square" did, in fact, say something about their ability to control the area - and at the height of their power the militants were able to assert their authority within 60 miles of Islamabad. The Pakistani government would only regain control of the Swat Valley after another offensive, begun in May 2009.

Famed French judge Bruguiere tells of a troubled Pakistan

In a new book, former investigative magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere says Pakistan has lost control of rogue military and intelligence officers, who are aiding militants.

"French officials in Pakistan were the target of threats and physical intimidation: A way of dissuading us from returning," Jean-Louis Bruguiere writes in his new book, "What I Could Not Say." (Jean-Pierre Muller / AFP/Getty Images / June 29, 2004)

By Sebastian Rotella

November 4, 2009

 

Reporting from Washington - The Pakistani government has lost control of rogue military and intelligence officers who aid Al Qaeda and its allies and play a double game with the West, a renowned French judge asserts in an upcoming book.

For three decades, Jean-Louis Bruguiere was an investigative magistrate, a powerful role that combines the duties of prosecutor and judge and allowed him to cultivate high-level contacts from Algiers to Moscow. He stepped down from that post in 2007, and now serves as the European Union's envoy to Washington on issues related to the financing of terrorism.

His 481-page book, "What I Could Not Say," is to be published Monday in France.

An advance copy obtained by The Times bolsters the 66-year-old official's swashbuckling reputation with previously undisclosed witness testimony and intelligence documents from a trove of case files.

Pakistan's government has long faced criticism that elements of its security services have protected militant groups. The government says it is trying to purge them, and it has launched offensives this year against militants in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan, where its forces are currently battling entrenched Taliban fighters.

The book details French investigations of extremist activity in Pakistan, including a case in which officials went as far as hiding militants from CIA inspection teams at a training camp run by the Pakistani military. Military handlers then sent the trainees on terrorist missions to the West, Bruguiere asserts.

The United States made strategic errors in dealing with Pakistan, he says, adding that it might be too late to clear the security forces of those who sympathize with the extremists.

Islamic radicals seemed to benefit from "a certain sympathy, to say the least" within Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency, he writes, citing one of his cases. "We did not have the impression that our interlocutors considered [Al Qaeda militants] to be terrorists."

Published as interviews with Jean-Marie Pontaut, an editor at L'Express magazine, the book is a portrait of one of Europe's best-known crime fighters. The stocky, square-jawed, restless Bruguiere comes from a line of judges dating back to Napoleonic times. He tells of interrogating fanatics and eating crocodile meat during a harrowing investigative trip to Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo. But he also writes about growing up among Surrealist painters, who were friends of his father, an art aficionado. And he participated in Paris' leftist student protests of May 1968.

Tracing a history of modern-day terrorism, the book describes the nine-year investigation of the 1989 bombing of a flight from Chad to Paris that killed 170 people. The global hunt culminated in the convictions, in absentia, of top Libyan officials. The judge also recounts the fight against far-left and Palestinian groups supported by the Soviet Union.

After terrorist attacks on France in the 1990s, Bruguiere became an expert on Al Qaeda and an early warning voice. Today, he says, errors by Washington contributed to the crisis in Pakistan.

"The situation in Pakistan is among the most worrisome," he writes. "The central government has lost control of certain elements of the army and the ISI, an intelligence service that no longer has the trust of its foreign partners."

The judge cites his investigation of Willie Brigitte, a Frenchman who was convicted of terrorism charges in 2007.

After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, Al Qaeda militants helped Brigitte go to Pakistan to train with hundreds of Arabs and Westerners and several thousand Pakistanis and Afghans at a mountain complex in Punjab. Affiliated with Al Qaeda, the camp was run jointly by the Lashkar-e-Taiba extremist group and Pakistani security forces, which supplied arms and instructors, the book says.

CIA officers accompanied by Pakistani officials made four inspections of the camp, part of an agreement in which Pakistan had promised to prevent foreign militants from training with Lashkar, Bruguiere writes.

"But, since most of the officers of Lashkar belonged to the army, these inspections were doomed to draw a blank," the book says. "The foreign recruits were alerted on the eve of the arrival of the inspection teams by their instructors, military men informed by their hierarchy.

"The trainees then had to . . . erase any traces of their presence and head to an elevation of more than 13,000 feet while the inspection lasted."

The book says Brigitte testified that his handler was a Pakistani military officer, identified as Sajid, who sent the Frenchman to Australia to join a cell plotting bomb attacks on targets that included a nuclear plant. Alerted by French investigators on Brigitte's trail, Australian police arrested the group in 2003.

Sajid also dispatched militants for missions in Britain and in Virginia, where authorities later convicted Americans who were part of a group known as the "paintball jihadis" and who were fellow trainees of Brigitte, the book says. A French court convicted Brigitte on terrorism charges and sentenced him to nine years in prison.

In 2006, Bruguiere went to the Pakistani port city of Karachi to investigate a suicide bombing that had killed 11 French naval contractors three years earlier. Pakistani security officials were uncooperative and hostile, he asserts.

"French officials in Pakistan were the target of threats and physical intimidation: a way of dissuading us from returning," he writes.

The George W. Bush administration underestimated the threat in Pakistan largely because it was distracted by the war in Iraq, Bruguiere says. He says U.S.-French tensions over Iraq did not harm anti-terrorism cooperation, and he writes about his many friends and allies in U.S. law enforcement.

But Bruguiere says he warned U.S. officials that the war would worsen Islamic extremism. He dismisses former Vice President Dick Cheney and former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz as "men who did not understand the Arab world" and "felt invested with a quasi-divine sense of mission."

At the same time, Bruguiere shares with U.S. conservatives a deep suspicion of Iran. Attacks by Iranian operatives in France and elsewhere show that Tehran's security apparatus is the "real heart of power," the book says.

Iran has used systematic deception to manipulate Western diplomats in talks about its nuclear program, while preparing a global terrorist infrastructure that could be used in a confrontation with the West, Bruguiere charges.

Iran also could strike in unexpected ways in remote places such as West Africa or Latin America, where Tehran's longtime ally Hezbollah has an entrenched presence, Bruguiere warns.

"These networks . . . are able to create circumstantial alliances with drug cartels operating in Colombia and Mexico," the book says, referring to the convergence of extremists and traffickers as "a complex configuration of threats directed at the United States."

rotella@latimes.com

The new lobbyists vying for US attention

While US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to Islamabad highlighted the often bumpy relationship between the United States and Pakistan, the BBC's Diplomatic correspondent Jonathan Marcus reports on the struggle between the Indian and Pakistani lobbies for influence in Washington.

The 2008 Mumbai terror attacks divided the US-based lobby groups

I have come to a downtown Indian restaurant in Washington DC to try to gauge the balance of forces in a growing battle for influence on Capitol Hill.
Across the table is Sanjay Puri, the chairman of US Inpac - the US India Political Action Committee.
Sanjay Puri says that Inpac's goal is to give a political voice to some 2.7m Indian-Americans.
"This is not about representing India's interests," he insisted.
"We look at things from an American perspective.
"It is in America's interests," he went on, "to have strong trade ties with India.
"It is important for us to have a strategic relationship with India, which happens to be the democracy in a region where we need a stable partner."
Across town, in a small office building not far from the Senate, I visited Taha Gaya, the executive director of Pal-C - the Pakistani American Leadership Centre.
'Not fighting'
Taha is a law graduate and has worked as a congressional staffer on Capitol Hill.
Describing himself as a second-generation Pakistani-American, he seeks to lobby on behalf of his community and insists that he is not fighting the Indian-American lobby.
"There is no doubt that India is the growing economic power in the region," he told me - but he said that there was also "no reason why Pakistan should not benefit from the economic growth of its neighbour next door".
Taha Gaya explained that on some issues the two lobbies had sometimes worked together.

Our activities are not aimed against the people of Pakistan or against the State of Pakistan Sanjay Puri

But the Mumbai attacks last year changed all that.
"When Mumbai happened," he explained, "we saw a resurgence of participation from the older generation of Indian-Americans - those who had grown up in India" - who, he claimed, reverted to what he described as "the old more negative dynamic".
Inevitably then the two lobbies seem destined to be on different sides of the barricades.
The recent US foreign aid bill for Pakistan is a good example. Pro-India groups lobbied hard for all sorts of conditions to be inserted into the bill.
Sanjay Puri was part of this campaign. This was not about supporting India's interests, he insists, and neither was it motivated by hostility towards Pakistan.
"Our activities are not aimed against the people of Pakistan or against the State of Pakistan," he told me.
"It is about accountability and transparency. We are very active in making sure that when US taxpayers' money is being spent, especially in these difficult economic times, there has to be a level of transparency."

Protesters in Pakistan were angry US foreign aid had conditions attached

The Indian-American community, he told me, "is supportive of aid that relates to democracy in Pakistan, education, reforms progress on women's rights and so on".
"But if Pakistan says that it needs F16 jets to hunt down terrorists," he adds, "I don't think the average American is going to buy that."
For a referee in this struggle, I turned to Professor Walter Andersen, director of the South Asia programme at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.
A former diplomat, he has watched the development of these US-based lobbying groups with great interest.
The galvanising event he told me, was the struggle over the US-India nuclear deal which came to a head in 2008.
The US wanted to help India with civil nuclear technology but was prevented from doing so by legislation banning the export of fuel or know-how to any country that had not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. So the Bush administration sought to make an exception for India.
"The Bush team very smartly contacted the India lobby," Professor Andersen told me, "and worked very closely with it."
The US Chamber of Commerce and its India section also got involved because of the prospect of business.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is soothing ties in Pakistan

"So you had American business interests, the administration and the Indian-American lobby all very actively pushing for this. There was a lot of opposition. In some ways it went down to the wire," he noted, "but their persistent effort paid off."
The battle may be joined on Capitol Hill but Professor Andersen notes that it is an increasingly unequal struggle.
"As Americans look at India and Pakistan," he told me, "the gap is growing in terms of positive and negative; much more positive on the Indian side and much more negative on the Pakistan side."
"The negativity on the Pakistan side," he explains, "is related to the violence there and the sense that there has been double-dealing by the Pakistani government. On the one hand they say they are with us and then maybe parts of the military really do support some of these jihadi groups for Pakistani foreign policy purposes."
Mumbai attacks
Perceptions of India, he explains are very different.
It is viewed as a vibrant democracy with a dynamic economy. And of course India is seen by many Americans as confronting a similar terrorist threat to that faced by the United States.
Professor Andersen also emphasises the impact of the Mumbai attacks.
"These had almost three days of continuous coverage on US television," he told me. "There was American interest in what happened; there was American sympathy and Pakistan, by contrast, came off quite badly."
All in all, the growing strength of the India lobby is a factor complicating the Obama administration's approach to the region.
"I suspect that that the Obama administration was not at all happy with the conditionalities that were written into the appropriations bill for Pakistan," Professor Andersen said.
"The pro-India groups were explicit that they wanted such conditionalities and they had friends in the Senate and the Congress who went along."

Clinton puzzled at Pakistan failure to find al Qaeda

By Andrew Quinn

Reuters
Thursday, October 29, 2009; 10:10 AM

LAHORE, Pakistan (Reuters) - U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's said on Thursday it was "hard to believe" that no one in Pakistan's government knew where al Qaeda leaders were hiding, striking a new tone on a trip where Washington's credibility has come under attack.

Scores of al Qaeda leaders and their operatives, including Osama bin Laden, are believed to be in hiding in the rugged border territory that divides Pakistan and Afghanistan, but both countries routinely accuse the other of being the main sanctuary
"I find it hard to believe that nobody in your government knows where they are and couldn't get them if they really wanted to," she told a group of newspaper editors during a meeting in Lahore.
"Maybe they are not 'get-at-able'. I don't know," she said.
Clinton's pointed remark was the first public gripe on a trip aimed at turning around a U.S.-Pakistan relationship under serious strain, but bound in the struggle against religious extremism.
"I am more than willing to hear every complaint about the United States," Clinton said, ""but this is a two way street.
"If we are going to have a mature partnership where we work together" then "there are issues that not just the United States but others have with your government and with your military security establishment."
Clinton, who has sought to use her own personal outreach to overcome rising anti-American sentiment in Pakistan, earlier repeated her conviction that the two countries' common interests far outweighed their differences.
"I am well aware that there is a trust deficit," Clinton told students at a "townhall-style" meeting at Government College University in Lahore.
"My message is that's not the way it should be. We cannot let a minority of people in both countries determine our relationship."
Clinton's arrival in Pakistan on Wednesday was overshadowed by a car bomb blast that ripped through a market in the city of Peshawar, killing more than 100 people, in one of the largest recent attacks by Islamic militants seeking to destabilize the nuclear-armed country.
Clinton urged Pakistan's youth to stand firm against the forces of religious extremism, saying it threatened everything that both Americans and Pakistanis hold dear.
She carried the same message in her meetings with Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari and other high officials in Islamabad on Wednesday.

Clinton was due to meet Pakistan's army and security chiefs on Thursday, where she was expected to discuss Pakistan's latest military campaign against extremists in South Waziristan as well as the U.S.-led war against Taliban religious militants in neighboring Afghanistan.
PERSONAL AFFINITY
U.S. officials have cast Clinton's visit to Pakistan as a chance to counter anti-American broadsides from extremist religious leaders and to showcase Clinton's personal affinity for a country she says she knows and loves deeply.
On Thursday, she toured the massive red sandstone Badshahi Mosque in central Lahore, extolling the cultural achievements of a country more often in the headlines for political and religious strife.
But the tense security situation in Pakistan was clear. Gunmen stood guard in the mosque minarets, while Lahore's normally busy main streets were emptied and armed police kept bystanders penned back in narrow alleyways as Clinton's motorcade sped past.
While acknowledging the many bumps in U.S.-Pakistan relations, Clinton nevertheless asked for understanding, patience and commitment, saying her own experience in deciding to join the Obama administration after running against Barack Obama for the presidency was instructive.
"What we have together is far greater than what divided us," Clinton told the students, referring to her relations with Obama. "And that is what I feel about the United States and Pakistan."
(Editing by David Fox)

Rupee losing fast against regional currencies

By Shahid Iqbal
Sunday, 25 Oct, 2009

The Pakistan Rupee continues to suffer.— Photo from File

Business

Forex reserves ease to $14.46 billion

Forex reserves ease to $14.46 billion

KARACHI: Pakistani rupee is losing fast against regional currencies as it remained just half against the Indian Rupee, and the Bangladeshi Taka also appears much stronger than the Pakistani currency.

Money experts said weakening economy and terrorism are the main causes of sinking rupee which witnessed sharp devaluation even in the local economy as buying capacity of the currency eroded during a couple of years.

Money market players and experts observed that devaluation against regional currencies was a clear sign of poor performance of economy, even poorer than Bangladesh which was not considered a competitor of Pakistan in the recent past.

‘To get 100 Indian rupees, we have to pay Rs185 to Rs190,’ said a currency market player on Saturday.

Indian economy showed strength during a year when the global economy was in difficult situation because of financial meltdown in the United States and Europe which finally engulfed the entire world.

However, some experts believe that the way Pakistani currency lost its weight was not purely a global impact; instead it was more domestic than global phenomenon.

‘Severe problem of imbalances on foreign payment, fast depleting foreign exchange reserves, very high inflation and poor economic performances shattered confidence on local currency,’ said Imran Kaleem, a currency expert.

He said the local currency is so vulnerable that even households in the country are trying to save their money in other stronger currencies.

It was observed that many people keep US dollar and other currencies in their vaults.

Exchange companies told Dawn on Saturday that once again the households have started buying dollars to protect their savings from value erosion.

‘The US dollar is gaining against the local currency mainly because the demand is high,’ said Asif Ali, a currency exchange dealer.

He said most of the demand was for $1000 to $2000 which showed that it was a family saving while it also reflected the falling confidence on local currency.

Currency experts said the gulf between open and inter-bank market rates of dollar has widened and was enough to attract dollars from other than banking channels.

The rate of US dollar in the inter-bank market was Rs83.30 while it was Rs83.70-80 in the open market.

A dollar holder will obviously prefer selling its dollar in open market or bringing dollar through channels other than the banks.

However, currency dealers said it became extremely difficult to bring dollars from other than the banking channel and it was obvious from the rising volume of remittance coming through the banking channels.

Remittances increased by 24 per cent in the first quarter of the current fiscal.

‘The US is a massive economy which gives weight to its currency dollar but the Bangladeshi Takka is also gaining against Pakistani rupee which is a serious question of economic stability of our country,’ said Abid Saleem, an analyst at a brokerage house.

One hundred and twenty-five Pakistani rupees are required to get 100 Bangladeshi Takkas. The rate was noted on Saturday. Bangladesh got some good achievements in textile exports but it is not a large economy with good resources.

In fact, it depends on imported cotton to produce textile goods which earns the country foreign exchange and provides biggest number of jobs in the country.

‘Terrorism shattered the confidence of local as well as foreign investors forcing them to wait for good time while the government has so far been unable to stop frequent suicide bombings and attacks on security forces,’ said Aamir Aziz, an exporter of readymade garments.

He said foreigners lost confidence in our ability to produce and ship their demanded goods in time.

‘Every segment of economy is relative, like currency is attached with economic performance. Pakistani rupee may fall further if economy does not improve and war like situation in North of Pakistan ends,’ said Aamir.

Kashmir ‘quiet diplomacy’ under way: Chidambaram

http://http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\10\23\story_23-10-2009_pg1_1


New Delhi seeking ‘unique, honourable solution’ to dispute
* India not afraid of talking to anybody
* Kashmir media, separatists, political parties praise Chidambaram’s commitment

By Iftikhar Gilani

NEW DELHI: The Indian government is working on “quiet diplomacy” as part of efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue, and “this will only be made public after the desired results are achieved”, Indian Home Minister P Chidambaram has said.

“There will be a unique, honourable and acceptable solution to the problem in Jammu and Kashmir. We are working on it,” Chidambaram told reporters last week on the sidelines of the All India Editors’ Conference in Srinagar.

Chidambaram also said that the Indian government was not afraid of talking to anyone – an apparent reference to Pakistan.

In a commitment praised by the local media, political parties and separatists – the minister said the “separatist voice will be heard to work for an honourable solution to the problem”.

Popular Srinagar daily Greater Kashmir described Chidambaram as “a different leader”. “His visit was different than routine ones,” said an editorial in the newspaper. “There were no thunderous threats in his speeches for the dissenting political voices in the state, instead they cascaded with rapprochements and reconciliation ... he was right in stating that any solution that fails to recognise the uniqueness of the problem will not work.”

Urdu daily Srinagar Times wrote that Chidambaram was “sincere and iconoclastic in his approach for not ‘carrying any previous baggage’ and denying to get embroiled in the polemics of Atoot Ang”.

Among other newspapers, even a right-wing Jammu-based newspaper – The Excelsior – branded Chidambaram “one of the better Home Ministers of the country” because “he makes efforts to first understand and then clearly address an issue”.

About Those Billions

Over the years, the U.S. has unloaded massive amounts of aid to Pakistan, including $7.5 billion more earlier this month. But the money doesn't always wind up where it's supposed to.

By Katie Paul | Newsweek Web Exclusive 

Oct 21, 2009

It was with the best of intentions that the U.S. funneled nearly $5.3 billion to Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. After all, that money helped strike down a Cold War adversary. But there were unintended consequences too—namely, the Taliban. Since 9/11, the U.S. has turned on the spigot again, sending more than $15 billion in assistance to Pakistan. President Barack Obama just approved another $7.5 billion this month, which triples aid while committing to another five years of funding. It also bolsters development efforts, which, according to bill coauthor Sen. John Kerry, will "build a relationship with the people [of Pakistan] to show that what we want is a relationship that meets their interests and needs."

But how effective will this round of money be? Officials at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad have alleged that Pakistan misspent some 70 percent of the U.S. funds that paid the Pakistani military to run missions in the unwieldy provinces along the Afghan border. U.S. officials accuse Pakistan of running a double game with the money, keeping the Taliban at bay just enough to persuade American benefactors to keep their wallets open, thereby ensuring a lifeline for the country's mangled economy. All of which raises the question: will any amount of money produce results?
A big part of that answer lies in determining how much bang the United States has gotten for its buck so far—whether or not some of the money was siphoned off along the way to fund Army generals' new houses or Taliban elements. Here's an accounting of aid sent over from the United States to Pakistan in recent decades, divided into eras based on the ebbs and flows of assistance. (Figures are in historical dollars.)
1950-1964: As the Cold War heated up, a 1954 security agreement prompted the United States to provide nearly $2.5 billion in economic aid and $700 million in military aid to Pakistan.
1965-1979: With the Indo-Pakistani hostilities in the late 1960s, the United States retreated. Between 1965 and 1971, the U.S. sent only $26 million in military aid, which was cut back even further to $2.9 million through the end of the decade. Meanwhile, economic aid kept flowing, totaling $2.55 billion over the 15 years. Everything came to a halt in 1979, however, when the Carter administration cut off all but food aid after discovering a uranium-enrichment facility in Pakistan. Pakistani leader Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq refused $400 million, split for economic and military aid from President Jimmy Carter, calling it "peanuts." The following year, he was rewarded with a much more attractive offer.
1979-1990: The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed everything. Pakistan's ISI security apparatus became the primary means of funneling covert U.S. assistance to anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan. From 1980 to 1990, the United States ramped up its contributions for both development and military purposes, sending more than $5 billion over the course of the decade.
1991-2000: But even while Pakistan was serving a strategic Cold War purpose, concerns persisted about the country's nuclear ambitions. That gave President George H.W. Bush an easy out from the massive funding commitments in 1990, after the fall of the Soviet Union. Aid over the next decade withered to $429 million in economic assistance and $5.2 million in military assistance, a drop-off Pakistanis still cite bitterly, accusing the United States of leaving them high and dry during the decade.
2001-2009: Since 9/11, the United States has once again bolstered its funding commitments, sending nearly $9 billion in military assistance both to aid and reimburse Pakistan for its operations in the unwieldy border regions with Afghanistan. Another $3.6 billion has funded economic and diplomatic initiatives. But U.S. officials and journalists' accounts have raised concerns that such funds are not being used as intended, and not just because of the typical concerns about corruption. Documented military and civilian government deals with Taliban elements, like a 2004 agreement with Waziri militant leader Nek Mohammed, have confirmed that money intended to fight the Taliban is, in many cases, being used instead to pay them off. (Islamabad is currently battling Taliban fighters in Waziristan.) When the deals fall through, as rapidly shifting alliances in Pakistan's tribal regions often do, that money ultimately ends up funding the insurgency. U.S. officials have expressed particular concerns about the Pakistani government's links to the Haqqani network in North Waziristan, which reportedly has ties to Al Qaeda. At the same time, former president Pervez Musharraf has recently admitted to using U.S. military funding to strengthen defenses against India.
2009-2014: A new five-year, $7.5 billion assistance package was passed by Congress in September and signed by President Obama in October, with stipulations explicitly prohibiting funds from being used for nuclear proliferation, to support terrorist groups, or to pay for attacks in neighboring countries. It also puts a new emphasis on the bottom line, reserving the right to cut off aid if Pakistan fails to crack down on militants. Those restrictions have opened a rift between the military and the civilian government in Pakistan, which maintain an uneasy relationship following nearly a decade of military rule under Musharraf. Military leaders worry they are being sidelined by the increased U.S. emphasis on development and accountability, claiming the bill threatens Pakistan's sovereignty. But supporters of the bill say the restrictions are no more stringent than previous ones, and accuse Pakistani military leaders of manufacturing a crisis to undermine the civilian government.
Sources: Government Accountability Office , Center for American Progress , New York Times , Senate Foreign Relations Committee , Frontline

Peter Goodspeed: All of Pakistan becoming warzone

As Pakistani troops battled on Monday for control of the small South Waziristan town of Kotkai, the hometown of the Pakistani Taliban's two top leaders, suicide bombers walked into the heart of the University of Islamabad and blew themselves up, killing seven people and wounding 26 others.
Within hours, Qari Hussain, the man responsible for recruiting and training the Taliban's suicide bombers, laid claim to the attack in a telephone call to the BBC and said his organization now considers all Pakistan to be a war zone.
Four days into the main military offensive of Operation Rah-e-Nijat (the Path to Salvation) and Pakistan is bracing for more bloodshed. There is a clear possibility the country could plunge into civil war.
Yesterday's near-simultaneous bombings outside a packed women's cafeteria and at the Islamic law faculty were the seventh major terrorist attack in Pakistan in just two weeks.
Recent suicide bombings in Peshawar, Shangla, Kohat and Islamabad, combined with full-blown military assaults on police targets in Lahore and Peshawar and the Pakistan Army's general headquarters in Rawalpindi, have dramatically picked up the pace of a terror campaign that appears increasingly to be co-ordinated between the Pakistani Taliban and Punjabi Islamist insurgents with links to al-Qaeda.
Rather than restricting their activities to the troubled tribal areas or to slinking across the border into Afghanistan, the Taliban are threatening to spread their fight into the heart of Pakistan.
Hours after yesterday's bombings, the southern province of Sindh closed all private and public schools for a week out of fear of further Taliban attacks.
Islamist terrorism has broken out of its boundaries in the tribal belt and become a national threat. Rather than staying to fight a full-blown war with the army in the hills and gullies of South Waziristan, Hakimullah Mehsud, head of Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP, the Pakistani Taliban), appears to have adopted a strategy of spreading chaos.
A guerrilla leader who sprang to prominence leading attacks on NATO's Afghan supply convoys in the Khyber Pass, he is now threatening to step up attacks on government services across Pakistan.
If the core of the TTP's leadership is not crushed quickly during the current military offensive, there will likely be a rash of suicide bombings, insurgent attacks and car bombings all over Pakistan.
Karachi, the country's commercial capital and home to nearly three million Pashtun tribesmen, could easily become a major terrorist target, the site of a bloody and brutal urban battle like post-war Baghdad.
The Pakistani Taliban have already shown signs they have learned the deadly trade secrets al-Qaeda employed so effectively in the Iraq insurgency. They are expanding their use of sophisticated explosives and suicide bombers with the intention of inflicting massive civilian casualties.
A stepped-up terror campaign will seek to drive a wedge between Pakistan's military and the fledgling and fractious civilian government.
It would also aim to sap public support for continuing to fight in the tribal belt.
The South Waziristan offensive is the military's fourth attempt since 2001 to crush rebels in the tribal areas. Three earlier operations bogged down in bloody fighting and ended with the government signing peace deals that ultimately allowed the Taliban to regroup, even expand their influence.
It is obvious the army has no intention of fighting a prolonged battle in South Waziristan. The 30,000 troops committed to Operation Rah-e-Nijat are nowhere near the 370,000 to 430,000 soldiers the New America Foundation says would be needed to hold the tribal areas and meet the minimum force-to-population ratios prescribed by traditional counter-insurgency doctrine.
By focusing its assault on the portion of South Waziristan occupied by the Mehsud clan, the military has already cut a non-aggression pact with other Pashtun tribal leaders who continue to send insurgents into Afghanistan to fight NATO troops.
Pakistan is only interested in crushing those elements of the Taliban that pose a direct domestic threat. The army in South Waziristan has agreed not to bother two rival Wazir tribal leaders, Maulvi Nazir and Gul Bahadur, in exchange for being allowed to move freely through their districts in North Waziristan.
That's bound to infuriate the United States and NATO countries who have been pressuring Islamabad to crack down on all Taliban who are destabilizing Afghanistan.
But Pakistan's generals, the original patrons of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, are reluctant to renounce the group entirely.
They fear the United States and the West may suddenly abandon the region before Afghanistan is stabilized and want to retain enough influence with the Taliban to have a say in any final settlement.
"There is always a strategy to isolate your main target," Major General Athar Abbas, Pakistan's chief military spokesman, said yesterday as he described Pakistan's understanding with elements of the Taliban in North Waziristan.
"Sometimes we have to talk to the devil in this regard."
National Post
pgoodspeed@nationalpost.com

Commander: IRGC Waiting for Orders to Attack Terrorists Base in Pakistan

TEHRAN (FNA)- Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Force Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour urged Iranian officials to issue the required orders for his troops to attack the Jundollah terrorist group in Pakistan.

"This is not acceptable to us that terrorists enter Iran from a neighboring country and stage terrorist action," Pakpour told FNA on Tuesday.

The Pakistan-based terrorist group Jundollah, headed by Abdolmalek Rigi, has claimed responsibility for a Sunday deadly attack in the city of Sarbaz in Sistan and Balouchestan province which killed 42 and wounded 28 others.

Lieutenant Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) ground force Brigadier General Nourali Shoushtari, Sistan and Balouchestan province's IRGC commander General Mohammadzadeh, Iranshahr Corps commander, Sarbaz Corps commander and Amiralmoemenin Brigade commander were among the martyrs of the terrorist attack.

"No doubt Rigi is in Pakistan and the members of his gang are being trained by certain arrogant countries like the US and Britain and a number of arrested members of the group have confessed to this fact," Pakpour added.

Meantime, the commander pointed out that such acts of terrorism cannot stir sensations and feelings of the IRGC members hard enough to drive the IRGC out of the path of rationality.

"Yet, IRGC will no doubt stage a crushing retaliation and this course and method of action (of ours) is unstoppable," the IRGC Ground Force commander underscored.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Monday called on the Pakistani government to help Iran arrest and punish the terrorists in charge of the recent attack.

"Iran and Pakistan enjoy brotherly relations with each other but the presence of the terrorist elements in Pakistan is not justifiable, and the government of Pakistan should help arrest and punish the criminals as soon as possible," Ahmadinejad said in a phone call with his Pakistani counterpart Asif Ali Zardari on Monday.

Zardari, for his part, voiced regret and extended his condolences to the people and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran over the terrorist incident in Sistan and Balouchestan.

Reminding terrorist acts in Pakistan, Zardari said that his government has started massive operations to confront and root out terrorism in the country.

Iran Guards want to hunt rebels in Pakistan: TV

TEHRAN (Reuters) - A senior Iranian Revolutionary Guards commander called on Tuesday for permission to allow the force to confront "terrorists" inside the territory of neighboring Pakistan, state television reported.
The report, which did not give any direct quotes, said the commander of the Guards' ground forces, Mohammad Pakpour, called for the "issuing of necessary permissions allowing the Guards to confront terrorists on Pakistani soil."
It did not give details or specify whether he was referring to possible permission for such an operation from the Pakistani government.
Iran says the Sunni rebel group Jundollah (God's soldiers), which has claimed a suicide bombing in southeastern Iran that killed 42 people on Sunday, operates from across the border in Pakistan.
(Reporting by Hossein Jaseb and Reza Derakhshi; writing by Fredrik Dahl; editing by Jon Hemming)

Pakistan Notebook

Impressions from one front in what we used to call the War on Terror.

By Clifford D. May

Islamabad — I picked an interesting moment to visit Pakistan: four terrorist attacks in less than a week. The first was at the World Food Programme office here in the capital: five killed. The second was in the Khyber Bazaar in Peshawar: more than 50 killed. The third was at the military’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, where Taliban insurgents, armed with automatic weapons, grenades, and rocket launchers, fought for 22 hours. According to government spokesmen, a brigadier, a colonel, and three commandos were killed. More than two dozen hostages were taken, but most reportedly were saved when a would-be suicide bomber was shot and killed before he managed to detonate his vest.

A couple days later, terrorists attacked a military convoy, killing about 40 near the Swat Valley — territory only recently liberated from the Taliban by Pakistani military forces following a difficult and costly battle.

If you look closely, you’ll see a message written in this blood: “You, Pakistan’s so-called leaders, can’t provide food for the hungry or security for the marketplace. Your soldiers and officers can’t even protect themselves. You are useless and weak. You will submit. Or we will destroy you.”

Pakistanis can be remarkably nonchalant about terrorism: They have suffered 129 terrorist attacks in the two years since the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Since Sept. 11, 2001, at least 5,000 Pakistanis have been killed in acts of terrorism.

But the assault on the GHQ seems to have shaken people up. Hitting the Pakistani equivalent of the Pentagon is, as a headline in the daily newspaper Dawn puts it: “audacious.” The military is the country’s strongest, proudest, and most durable institution. Retaliation is expected, probably in Waziristan, where the Taliban seems to have made recent gains. 

I was invited to Pakistan by the State Department under a “U.S. Speaker and Specialist” program intended to improve the dialogue between Pakistanis and Americans. My hosts have been the American embassy in Islamabad and the U.S. consulates in Lahore and Karachi. Terrorist attacks have been carried out in all three cities. Americans have been among the targets. An American security official tells me: “There will be more. It’s a question of when, not if.”

I have been speaking at universities; meeting with journalists, government officials, religious leaders, and think-tank scholars; and doing radio, television, and newspaper interviews. People seem eager to talk to me, to tell me what they think, question me, argue about terrorism — how to define it, what causes it, how Pakistanis and Americans should respond. 

There are not many Americans and Europeans running around Pakistan these days. That’s a victory for the terrorists. Last month, a Greek aid volunteer, Athanasius Lerounis, was kidnapped. He had been in Pakistan for 15 years building schools, water-supply systems, and clinics. The Taliban wants $10 million in ransom plus the release of some of their comrades from Pakistani jails in exchange for letting him go.

Non-Muslim minorities today constitute only about 3 percent of Pakistan’s population. In Karachi, a sprawling, sweltering seaside metropolis of more than 15 million people, a sophisticated Pakistani tells me: “This used to be such a cosmopolitan city. It was enriched by the presence of Christians, Parsis [Zoroastrians from Iran], even Jews. It was a better place then.” When the people who are different are driven out, he theorizes, the people who remain behind do not get along better — they just discover more differences among themselves.

Pakistan is a nation of 175 million people — the third largest Muslim-majority country in the world. Since last year, it has had a democratic government — but not a particularly popular one. Before that, it had a military dictator; he had even less support. Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons — al-Qaeda says it intends to acquire them in time; the Taliban will help if it can. The Kerry-Lugar bill, passed by Congress and soon to reach President Obama’s desk, calls Pakistan “a major non-NATO ally and a valuable partner in the battle against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.” 

But it is a conflicted ally and a fragile partnership. As recently as last May, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates voiced the suspicion that within the Pakistani military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency are those who “play both sides” — who have sympathies for and links with various militant jihadi groups. 


America has not won many hearts and minds in Pakistan. A recent Pew Research Center survey found that almost two-thirds of Pakistanis describe the U.S. as an “enemy.” Kerry-Lugar would triple aid to Pakistan yet it has been greeted by many in the military, the opposition parties and the media as an insult to Pakistan’s sovereignty and dignity. Why? Because of its “conditionalities” — in large measure because it tries to make sure that money given to Pakistan will be spent only for purposes Americans intend and approve. 

I find people admirably hospitable. Many are friendly. But on the campuses, in particular, mixed in with hard but fair questions, is a large measure of anger and resentment. The grievances cited include: The U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. support for India and Israel, U.S. drone attacks against militants in Pakistan (which allegedly kill many innocents — though both U.S. and Pakistani officials deny that), Vietnam, Hiroshima — the list goes on. 

I meet with a group of religious leaders. They are remarkably diverse in their views. One refers to “moderate Islam.” Another says: “There is no such thing as ‘moderate Islam.’” I ask what term he would use for the Islam of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. “Oh, that’s not Islam at all,” he says. “So they are heretics?” I ask. “If we call them apostates and they call us apostates, where does it get us?” he replies. I respond, “What do you do instead? Ignore those around the world slaughtering innocents in the name of Islam and hope that someday they might see things differently? Why would that happen?” He thinks hard, but does not come up with an answer.

Flying from Lahore to Karachi, I sit next to a young man with a bushy beard, reading a book on sharia finance. I try to keep to myself but eventually we begin talking. He is a pilot for Pakistan International Airlines. Also, it emerges that he is an enthusiastic trekker and is pleased when I tell him that, years ago, I hiked in northern Pakistan, that I visited Hunza, Gilgit, Skardu, and the Swat Valley. He gives me the URL of a website where he has posted his photos from these fabled places. 

He tells me he is worried about the possibility of more wars and conflict and a deteriorating economy. He has a wife and two children, a five-year-old and a three-year-old. He has a brother, a doctor, who lives in Oklahoma. But he also tells me that he does not think America can be trusted. The usual reasons: The U.S. is too close to India and “the Zionists.” What’s more, Pakistanis suspect that Americans want to take away their nuclear weapons. That would mean “a small and weak Pakistan under the control of India — if it even remains as Pakistan and is not divided into small states.” He adds: “Who created the Taliban? It was America herself!” 

Many Pakistanis view the Taliban as an enemy. But others will tell you that there is a “good Taliban” and a “bad” Taliban. If that is meant to imply that some groups that call themselves Taliban don’t really buy into the ideology and are therefore “reconcilables” — fine; I have heard that also from senior American military officers in Afghanistan. But sometimes it seems to be implied that the “bad” Taliban attacks Pakistanis, while the “good” Taliban attacks Americans. And there are those who condone the “bad” Taliban as well. Their thinking goes like this: The Taliban attacks the World Food Programme because it supports the Pakistani government, which supports the U.S. government, which supports India and Israel. So you have to cut them some slack. 

On a television program, Breakfast with Dawn, the interviewer reads a passage from one of my columns and asks me to defend it. I’m puzzled. I have written that al-Qaeda’s central leadership is based on Pakistani soil. I ask her what requires defending. She says I can’t prove that al-Qaeda is here and Pakistanis doubt it is true. 


Ironically, Pakistan is awash in conspiracy theories lacking even the most flimsy evidentiary basis. There are those who contend that 9/11 was a CIA operation, probably in league with the Mossad. What, I ask, would be the motive? To have an excuse to invade Muslim countries, comes the reply. On another television show, Islamabad Tonight, an otherwise smart and well-traveled panelist tells me that President Obama wants to establish permanent military bases in Afghanistan. “You really think Obama wants that?” I ask incredulously. “Yes,” he says. “It’s not a matter of the personality. It’s big-power politics, the Great Game.”

America is criticized for “occupying” Afghanistan. America also is faulted for having abandoned Afghanistan in the 1990s, after working with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to support the Afghan insurgency against the Soviets. The result of that abandonment: anarchy leading to the rise of the Taliban. My response becomes: “So there are just two things you insist Americans must never do: leave and stay. What third option would you recommend?” This generally gets a laugh. Pakistanis are not without humor.

At the University of Karachi, I debate these and related issues, one after another. I say I find it curious that no one ever mentions the genocide of black Muslims in Darfur, the brutal oppression of protestors in Iran, the plight of the Chechens and the Uighurs. But no one does — not even after I’ve said that.

As for terrorism, I propose that we agree that whatever your grievances, it is wrong to address them by killing other people’s children. Most in the audience seem to find that sensible — at least in theory. At the end of the conversation, I receive polite, even warm applause. But one young man, clean-shaven and in western dress, throws his shoe at me. It misses, more because of his lack of pitching skill than my agility. Almost everyone else in the room appears mortified. Apologies are repeatedly proffered, even from students who had asked hostile questions and to whom I’d responded sharply. The student is thrown out of the classroom. I learn later that he then limped on down to the local press club. The next day, the shoe-throwing incident is reported on the front-page of major newspapers and debated on editorial pages.

At Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, a professor of international relations responds to my remarks by instructing: “Injustices and terrorism are two sides of the same coin.” I reply that the world has never been — and I’m afraid never will be — free of injustices. But by his reasoning, we not only must accept terrorism — we should give it license. If I decide to address the injustice of 9/11 — or of Darfur — by blowing up this university, would that be okay with him? Just two sides of the same coin? He doesn’t concede the point, but at least he keeps his shoes on. And others tell me they think I’m right and he’s wrong.

Pakistan is having a historic debate and it is having it in the midst of a civil war. Pakistan is a front-line state in a global conflict. For a while we called it the War on Terrorism; now we can’t even agree on a name. I’m persuaded that the majority in this country is on the right side of the debate, the civil war, and the global conflict. But among history’s lessons is this: When moderate majorities face radical and determined minorities, there is no guaranteeing the outcome.



— Clifford D. May, a former New York Times foreign correspondent, is the president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on terrorism.

Media may be next target

Meanwhile, a Taliban group also sent two letters to the Lahore Press Club – one on October 12 and the other on October 14 – warning that if the media “does not stop portraying us as terrorists … we will blow up offices of journalists and media organisations”.
Kinda like “firings will continue till morale improves”


http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\10\16\story_16-10-2009_pg1_5

* ‘Taliban group’ sends threatening letters to Lahore Press Club, demands Taliban be referred to as ‘mujahideen’

ISLAMABAD/LAHORE: Top security sources have said offices of private TV channels, the National Press Club in Islamabad, other press clubs across the country and offices of the print media are likely to be the next target of terrorists.

A senior security official told Online that a TTP commander’s call was intercepted, and he was heard giving directives to subordinates to target offices of security forces in all the major cities of Pakistan, in addition to launching attacks on media offices all over the country.

The security official said information had also been received that terrorist networks were operating in rural areas because of links between banned outfits and the TTP. “They could mount pressure on the government from all sides,” he said, adding that terrorists had changed their strategies. He indicated that terrorists were now trying to target top officials in attacks.

The officials said, “We also have authentic reports that terrorists could kidnap a school bus of some reputed educational institution.” The sources said a private TV network had been directly threatened by terrorists.

Meanwhile, a Taliban group also sent two letters to the Lahore Press Club – one on October 12 and the other on October 14 – warning that if the media “does not stop portraying us as terrorists ... we will blow up offices of journalists and media organisations”.

Sources in the press club said both the letters were written by the ‘Sarf Mission’, which introduced itself as “a group affiliated with the Taliban”. The group claimed that it could mount attacks anytime after October 10.

Lahore Press Club Secretary Zahid Abid told Daily Times that in the first letter, it was written that after the attacks on a UN office, the General Headquarters and former prime minister Benazir Bhutto – “it is very easy for us to launch an attack anywhere”.

According to the letters, the Taliban would target chief editors, editors and reporters of media groups, said Abid, adding that the Taliban also threatened the Mughalpura and Harbanspura police stations in the letters.

“If the chief justice does not release our colleagues, the Taliban will also target him and his family,” warned the letters. The group said that Taliban should be referred to as mujahideen. online/staff report

GHQ attack -- beyond conspiracy theories

Hit and run

Thursday, October 15, 2009
Shakir Husain

The writer lives in Karachi

General Headquarters (GHQ) is the nerve centre of the Pakistani military and is guarded by an Infantry battalion, along with a similar number of defence security guards (DSG). Well over a thousand military officials work at the GHQ and they are responsible for running Pakistan's military machine. Ten terrorists created mayhem for around 22 hours, disrupting normal operations within GHQ. It took a team of SSG commandos who were brought in from 70 kilometres away to end the stand-off after the terrorists took hostages in a building within the GHQ. All the terrorists were Pakistani citizens. The one surviving terrorist, Dr Usman, is a well-known jihadi, with links to groups in Punjab. The civilian intelligence apparatus had received intelligence about such an attack at the GHQ and informed their military counterparts a few weeks before the attack took place. These are the facts.

Around the facts news anchors and our favourite conspiracy theorists have been frothing at the mouth with conspiracy theories, which involve the Americans, the Israelis, the Indians, the Afghans, and the list keeps multiplying by the hour. I'm personally waiting till they get to the Angolans. While the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has been mentioned, it has only been a cursory mention at best, with the focus on the "hidden hand" which is trying to destabilise Pakistan. The mindset can be encapsulated by a statement made by Liaquat Baloch of the Jamaat-e-Islami on a special debate set up by a local television channel on the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Mr Baloch stated that the jihadis killing Pakistani civilians and the military were "misguided" and were only doing so because the Americans were in Afghanistan. It all starts with "if the Americans were not in Afghanistan…" to give the impression that these are peace-loving people who are only killing and maiming Pakistani citizens because they are "misguided." "Misguided" adults do not kill innocent people. Religious parties like the Jamaat have a long history of entanglement with organisations like the TTP and various other jihadi outfits, and have never come out and condemned them for their actions.

Another guest on the same show was the attractive yet hysterical Marvi Memon of the PML-Q. Yes, they are still around. One of her reasons for rejecting the Kerry-Lugar Bill was the clause which calls for Pakistan dismantling training facilities for terrorist groups and not providing any territory to them to launch attacks on another state. Her inexplicable logic was that if we accepted this clause, then we would lose the "moral high ground" in the future. Moral high ground?

The Pakistani state has very little reason to claim the moral high ground. Our soil has been used to conduct operations in other states and individuals like A Q Khan have sold nuclear secrets to other countries for profit. She called the clause "lethal" because we would admit that we had training facilities on our soil in the past and our territory had been used in the past. This is an educated parliamentarian's view and shows the quality of substance during any sort of debate in Pakistani politics.

By denying the facts we are not achieving or retaining any sort of "moral high ground" but are losing a sense of what her former leader Pervez Musharraf called "ground realities." Losing touch with reality is a dangerous thing. It is dangerous because by believing the garbage we are trying to sell to the people, our decision-making process becomes flawed.

When companies juggle numbers to paint a rosy picture to the shareholders in the Annual Report, the top management is aware of the shortcomings and the potential dangers that they pose. Until and unless the leadership of all political parties and the military establishment unanimously accept the dangers posed to the very existence of the Pakistani state by these jihadi groups and organisations like the TTP, this battle has already been lost.

The TTP and its cohorts have executed four high-impact attacks in the past ten days, which have taken a total of 140 lives. This is not the work of "misguided" people. These are cold-blooded killers who have no hesitation in carrying out what they have been indoctrinated to believe is a "higher cause." The government has been announcing the operation in South Waziristan for months now; yet, for some reason, the assault has not begun. Ministers in shiny suits and garish ties who have been threatening to wipe out the scourge of terrorism in South Waziristan remind me of schoolyard brawls where a boy would ask his friends to hold him back otherwise he would demolish the opponent in a sort of noora kushti. So the enemy has had a couple of months to prepare for what's coming and the element of surprise is gone. They must have collected supplies and equipment, and managed to dig in for the long fight ahead.

In the meantime, they have launched these four attacks meaning to let the government, and more importantly the military, know that they can punch above their weight and give anyone a bloody nose – not just the civvies. The symbolism of the attacks have not been lost on anyone either. The UN Food Programme was targeted to let the goras know that they're not safe. The suicide bombing in Swat, which had been declared clear of the TTP, to let everyone know that it was still susceptible. Then there was Peshawar, to let everyone know who's boss. And then, of course, one of the most heavily-guarded installations in the country, the GHQ, to let the army know that even their headquarters wasn't safe. Ordinary people cannot help but ask that if ten civilians can tie up two battalions for 22 hours, then how safe are they?

Like societies, military forces must evolve; and they have evolved. The Pakistani Army has been geared to fight a set-piece battle since its inception. After fighting three wars with India, this is understandable. Yet, today the greatest threat to Pakistan is internal, and not external. Even if the TTP and its friends are being "handled" by the "foreign hand" as the nutters would have us believe on a regular basis, the bulk of the fighting is being done by Pakistani citizens. Sure we have a smattering of Uzbeks and Arabs running around in the North; but the bulk of the recruits are Pakistani kids recruited from madrasas all over the country. We have the intelligence assets and systems in place to find out the who, when and what – it's time to change our collective mindset and kill the enemy before they inflict more damage to an already battered state. The military needs to understand that we need more counterinsurgency troops, equipment, and training. And not tanks, submarines, and other high-priced items which are being peddled. This is a battle which requires agility, mobility, and lucid minds – not hysterical rabblerousing.

Pakistan's Partial War on Terror

The past week's spate of suicide bombings in Pakistan and the siege of its military headquarters are again casting the spotlight on that country's war on terror. Attention will—and should—focus in particular on Islamabad's many failures to control militants on its own soil. Pakistan is now paying the heavy price for its earlier attempts to use terrorist groups as strategic tools.
For decades Islamabad has viewed and used terrorist groups as assets to be cultivated. Before the Soviet invasion, Pakistan used Islamist militants for operations in India and Afghanistan. Today, Pakistan aids the Afghan Taliban mainly in the belief that if U.S. and international commitment to Afghanistan wanes, it would be better to be friendly with a group like the Taliban that can keep Indian influence in the country at bay—the same logic behind Pakistan's pre-2001 support for the Taliban.
At home, Pakistan has tolerated a raft of terrorist groups ostensibly linked to Kashmir, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group responsible for last year's Mumbai massacre, continues to operate under various names. Its leadership roams free and its offices remain open. Jaish-e-Mohammad, responsible for several attacks in India and against international and domestic targets within Pakistan, is similarly unconstrained. Pakistan's track record against so-called anti-Shi'a militias, such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipha-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan, has been equally lackluster despite vicious attacks against Shi'a who are perhaps one-fourth of Pakistan's population. These varied groups are ensconced not in the unruly tribal areas, but in Pakistan's most populous and militarized province: the Punjab. Punjab hosts six army corps, yet these groups proliferate and operate with impunity literally under the nose of Pakistan's army.
Islamabad has long believed it could exploit these groups for strategic aims while preventing them from causing too much "unapproved" trouble. The government would have likely come to some modus vivendi with the Pakistan Taliban, had its leaders agreed to focus upon Afghanistan rather than Pakistan. Islamabad cracked down militarily on the Pakistani Taliban earlier this year only after it was clear that deal-making had failed. With respect to the so-called Kashmiri groups, Pakistan only sought to moderate their activities to prevent serious Indo-Pakistan crises and international pressure while maintaining their basic operational readiness.
Now it's possible to see exactly how shortsighted and dangerous Pakistan's strategy has been. First, all these groups are more interconnected than at first might appear, and in ways that make them much harder to control than Islamabad may believe. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi shares membership and resources with Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Pakistan Taliban. Both Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Mohammad facilitate the movement of persons outside of Pakistan into the terrorist sanctuaries in the tribal areas, provide suicide bombers to the Pakistan Taliban, and facilitate high-value operations throughout Pakistan. With the exception of Lashkar-e-Taiba, all support the Afghan Taliban and all are close to al Qaeda. They all share connections with Pakistan's intelligence agencies and some civilian leaders.
Some of these groups have now bitten the hand that once fed them. These groups are vexed by Pakistan's support of the U.S. fight against al Qaeda, provision of logistical support for the Afghan war to undermine the Taliban, the state's complicity in Washington's use of drones in the tribal areas and Pakistan's own military operations in the Pashtun belt.
It is unlikely the recent attack on the Army headquarters, perpetrated by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, will focus some minds in Pakistan on this complex problem. Pakistanis prefer to attribute their terrorism problem to blowback from the U.S.- and Saudi-sponsored anti-Soviet jihad, or to blame India for domestic attacks. Polls I have conducted suggest Pakistanis are unaware of both the activities of Pakistani militant groups operating on their soil and the long-standing ties between these groups and their security and intelligence agencies.
In reality, Pakistan needs to own responsibility for its mistakes and reverse course swiftly. Other countries, especially the U.S., can help, but so far have shown a worrying lack of interest in doing so.
Washington has largely failed to understand the problem of Pakistan's militant landscape and forge appropriate policy. Since September 11, the U.S. has worked to secure Pakistan's sustained fight against al Qaeda, yet the U.S. demanded Pakistani action against the Afghan Taliban only from 2007 onward. The delay happened in part because the Taliban was believed to have been vanquished. Even when the Taliban re-emerged in 2005, Washington was slow to prompt Pakistan to act for fear of compromising its cooperation against al Qaeda. Similarly, Washington has pressured Pakistan to act against the so-called Kashmiri groups only episodically, and only when their actions have sparked near-war crises between India and Pakistan. And Washington has tended to see anti-Shi'a groups as a domestic problem rather than the threat to regional security they really are.
During this period, the U.S. disbursed more than $13 billion to compensate or reward Pakistan for its cooperation in the war on terror even while it undermined the goals of the same. Congress is improving on this record. Late last month, the legislature proposed tying $7.5 billion of aid over five years to the strengthening of Pakistan's civilian governance. The bill also proposes binding security assistance to Pakistan's efforts to eliminate militant groups that have previously been viewed as state assets. The Pakistani army balked at these conditions because they would limit its ability to use terrorists strategically. But precisely for that reason, it's a good move.
Pakistan's efforts to fight the bad terrorists while protecting the good militants cannot be sustained. The latest string of attacks and bombings shows the high cost this policy is inflicting on Pakistan itself. Nor can the lackadaisical international response to Pakistan's action and inaction in the backdrop of enormous financial largess be justified. Despite army balking, Washington should insist that Islamabad act against terrorism comprehensively as a condition for further security assistance. In the end, Pakistanis may benefit most from such steadfast commitment.
Ms. Fair is an assistant professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

South Punjab – Pakistan’s ‘new zone of militancy’

* Poverty-stricken, extremely feudal and illiterate south Punjab can be possible shelter for Taliban, other jihadi outfits
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\10\11\story_11-10-2009_pg1_10
Daily Times Monitor

LAHORE: Fears are growing that Pakistan’s militant threat may be extending deep into the country, far beyond the Afghan border region, BBC has reported.

Extremist groups linked with Al Qaeda are believed to be making in-roads into Punjab.

Abdul Razaq, a villager from south Punjab, had one thing left after the explosion which consumed half his village and claimed 17 lives. What remained intact was a single wooden chair. His house, his livestock and most of his family were gone.

When the blast ripped through his hometown on July 13, he was flung into the branches of a tree.

After regaining consciousness, he started digging through the rubble for his children, who had been playing in the yard. He located them three houses away.

“We found one of my sons beheaded,” he said, running both hands along the sides of his neck. “I collapsed when I saw his body. My other son was alive for a few moments and then stopped breathing. When we dug out my daughter, she was already dead.”

The explosion in his village was one of a series of brutal wake-up calls about the growing militant threat in south Punjab.

Senior police officers, independent analysts and militants in custody suggest that southern Punjab could be Pakistan’s next battleground. Internal police documents also paint a picture of a province at risk.

Poverty-stricken: One report states that the poverty-stricken, extremely feudal and increasing illiterate south of Punjab could possibly provide shelter to the Taliban and other jihadi outfits. It has the potential of becoming a nursery or a major centre for sectarian recruitment.

Some experts argue that it has already reached that point. One describes it as a “factory for suicide bombers”.

Police say Al Qaeda has access to a labour pool via the banned sectarian group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), among others.

Al-Qaeda is operating as a parasitic presence on a loose network of militant groups in Punjab, according to Azmat Abbas, an analyst who has been tracking militancy for years.

Police in the town of Sargodha confirm that Al Qaeda, operating under the banner of the Punjabi Taliban, is the main enemy they face.

They have managed to crack several militant cells this year, arresting more than 30 suspects, including alleged masterminds and financiers.

“We have made a dent,” said District Police Officer Usman Anwar.

“They are on the run, looking for hideouts. Our raids have stopped recruitment for the future. The heroes they worshipped are now in jail.”

Several of those arrested in recent months were not even on police radar screens – such as the man who blew up Abdul Razaq’s village. He was a respected local schoolteacher.

“He was just like a brother,” a villager said. “He was born here and educated here. How could we know what he was doing at home?”

The man who admits that he is to blame for the blast is linked with militants fighting in Afghanistan. He said he was storing explosives for them. When asked if he ever thought of the friends and neighbours he had killed, he wept as he replied.

“I am ready to go on my knees and beg forgiveness from everyone affected,” he said.

“I pray the dead rest in peace. Had I known what would happen I would never have kept the explosives. I am grieving because I made such a big mistake and so many people died.”

But he said he would have been happy if his explosives had killed British and American forces in Afghanistan.

“I would have been very happy,” he said. “If God gives me a chance in the future I will go and fight the Americans and the British.”

The schoolteacher said he was trained at a militant camp in Afghanistan in 1998, but never fought there. He stressed that in those days jihadis had the government’s support.

The sovereignty hysteria

The hysterical reaction to the Kerry-Lugar bill by formerly rational TV anchors, analysts and politicians is painful to watch. True, one does not expect any better from those who only oppose and criticise for the sake of doing so, but to hear saner voices in the mad din is distressing.
In Shakespeare’s words,
[They] have no spur
To prick the sides of [their] intent, but only
Vaulting [patriotism] ambition, which o’erleaps itself,
And falls on th’other...
In his soliloquy, Macbeth argued with himself against the murder of King Duncan, who was not only his relative but also a pious and good king. In recognising that he had ‘no spur to prick the sides of his intent, but only vaulting ambition’ he admitted that his only justification for contemplating the murder of his cousin, the king, was his ambition, and he describes it in terms of a rider who jumps too high and as a consequence ‘o’erleaps’ to fall on the other side of the steed.
I cannot help seeing slow-motion images of these rider-critics, once again, in their shining suits of patriotism o’erleaping and falling on th’other (the last time was after the Mumbai carnage). These otherwise reasonable, intelligent and sensible persons all admit to the factual nature of Pakistan’s transgressions in the past, based on which the bill places restrictions upon the country.
None deny Pakistan’s past role in nuclear proliferation; none deny Pakistan’s past misuse of American aid towards aiding and consolidating Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives; none now deny the involvement of Pakistanis in the Mumbai attack; and none deny the presence of the Taliban in south Punjab. Moreover, none disagree that today Pakistan is on a precipice, gazing down into a void due to these very reasons.
Yet an unreasonable emotion, which they probably identify as patriotism, prompts these detractors to aggressively attack every ‘string’ attached to the proposed non-military aid bill that aims to shoot down the very causes they themselves recognise as being at the root of many of Pakistan’s troubles. So hateful are the ‘strings’ to them that they would rather have no aid than have their state be forced to quit fomenting extremism and terrorism. Admirable patriotism!
I ask them to sincerely examine their emotions and try to discern whether it is truly patriotism they feel, or pain, humiliation and anger at a spade being called a spade, and being told to become a proper cudgel. Love for one’s country should not plunge one into blind denial and a fit of tantrums. ‘Yes! These may be valid concerns, but who is the US to tell us so? We would rather eat grass….’ To those who speak these words, it has become an issue of preserving sovereignty.
First, critics of the bill must answer a humiliating question: the preservation of whose sovereignty are they referring to? Is it of the same country whose armed forces were forced to fight the Taliban in Swat because of American threats of on-the-ground forces and aerial attacks, Afghan-occupation style? Or is it of a country that has accepted drone attacks in the tribal areas, launched by foreign forces to take out entrenched Al Qaeda and Taliban elements?
With mixed feelings of pain and relief, I must remind all that had the country in question actually been sovereign, and had the US not successfully arm-twisted Islamabad and GHQ into action this year, we would quite possibly have been the proud citizens of the Islamic Emirate of Pakistan, ruled by the benevolent Emir Mullah Omar today.
Second, how are American attempts to stop nuclear proliferation by a state that demonstrated rogue behaviour in the past a sovereignty issue? The bill is clear in its aims of stopping Pakistan from pursuing self-destruction. Is there anyone who denies that our adventures in Kashmir and Afghanistan have landed us in the fine mess we are in today? Or that the world is a safer place with countries like Iran on the brink of going nuclear?
Sensible patriotism might have entailed insistence on the insertion of clauses of transparency in the processes involved, not throwing tantrums at the principles contained within the bill. The objectives and principles contained in it are actually constructive from the Pakistani people’s point of view. But if a cool-minded analysis of the bill reveals any modalities that might put the national interest at risk, then those ought to be negotiated.
For example, opinion-makers might want to ask our parliament to negotiate provisions in the bill whereby, for example, a transparent legal process within Pakistan would precede any decision on the fate of suspected nuclear proliferators, to safeguard against any perceived threats from unjustified future demands from the US.
Should the US whimsically decide to accuse Pakistan of atrocities carried out in neighbouring countries at some future date, instead of raising spurious objections like those of a PML-N parliamentarian pertaining to the possibility of sudden stoppage of the construction of hospitals from aid funds, a more honest and wise approach would be required.
It would be infinitely more mature for our politicians to be appreciative of the US making aid contingent on a stop to the military’s extra-curricular activities, as well as the state’s refraining from promoting extremism and terrorism. They can then set about proposing safeguards against potential threats to national interests contained within the bill.
Can anyone disagree that much of the extremism in Pakistan today was sponsored by the state for a long time?