The Role of Islam in Pakistan’s Future

Husain Haqqani
The Role of Islam in Pakistan’s Future
© 2004 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
The Washington Quarterly • 28:1 pp. 85–96.

Husain Haqqani is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace in Washington, D.C.

Although listed among the U.S. allies in the war on terrorism,
Pakistan cannot easily be characterized as either friend or foe. Indeed, Paki-
stan has become a major center of radical Islamist ideas and groups, largely
because of its past policies toward India and Afghanistan. Pakistan sup-
ported Islamist militants fighting Indian rule in the disputed territory of
Jammu and Kashmir and backed the Taliban in its pursuit of a client regime
in Afghanistan. Since the September 11 attacks, however, the selective co-
operation of Pakistan’s president and military ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharraf,
in sharing intelligence with the United States and apprehending Al Qaeda
members has led to the assumption that Pakistan might be ready to give up
its long-standing ties with radical Islam.
Nevertheless, Pakistan’s status as an Islamic ideological state is rooted
deeply in history and is linked closely both with the praetorian ambitions of
the Pakistani military and the Pakistani elite’s worldview. For the foresee-
able future, Islam will remain a significant factor in Pakistan’s politics.
Musharraf and his likely successors from the ranks of the military will con-
tinue to seek U.S. economic and military assistance with promises of reform,
but the power of such promises is tempered by the strong links between
Pakistan’s military-intelligence apparatus and extremist Islamists.
Pakistan’s future direction is crucial to the U.S.-led war on terrorism, not
least because of Pakistan’s declared nuclear weapons capability. The historic
alliance between Islamists and Pakistan’s military has the potential to frus-
trate antiterrorist operations, radicalize key segments of the Islamic world,
and bring India and Pakistan to the brink of war yet again. Unless Pakistan’s
all-powerful military can be persuaded to cede power gradually to secular ci-
vilians and allow the secular politics of competing economic and regional
interests to prevail over religious sentiment, the country’s vulnerability to
radical Islamic politics will not wane. With the backing of the U.S. govern-
ment, the Pakistani military would probably be able to maintain a façade of
stability over the next several years but, bolstered by U.S. support, would
also want to maintain preeminence and is likely to make concessions to Is-
lamists to legitimize its control of the country’s polity. The United States is
supporting Pakistan’s military so that Pakistan backs away from Islamist
radicalism, albeit gradually. In the process, however, the military’s political
ambitions are being encouraged, compromising change and preserving the
influence of radical Islamists. Democratic reform that allows secular politi-
cians to compete for power freely is more likely to reduce this influence.
Weakness of the Pakistani State
The disproportionate focus of the Pakistani state since its independence in
1947 on ideology, military capability, and external alliances has weakened
Pakistan internally. The country’s institutions, ranging from schools and
universities to the judiciary, are in a state of general decline. The economy’s
stuttering growth is dependent largely on the level of concessional flows of
external resources. Pakistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) stands at about
$75 billion in absolute terms and $295 billion in purchasing power parity,
making Pakistan’s economy the smallest of any country that has tested
nuclear weapons thus far. Pakistan suffers from massive urban unemploy-
ment, rural underemployment, illiteracy, and low per capita income. One-
third of the population lives below the poverty line, and another 21 percent
subsists just above it.
Soon after independence, 16 percent of Pakistan’s population was liter-
ate, compared with 18 percent of India’s significantly larger population. By
2003, India had managed to attain a literacy rate of 65 percent, but Pakistan’s
stood at only about 35 percent. Today, Pakistan allocates less than 2 percent
of its GDP for education and ranks close to the bottom among 87 develop-
ing countries in the amount allotted to primary schools. Its low literacy rate
and inadequate investment in education has led to a decline in Pakistan’s
technological base, which in turn hampers the country’s economic modern-
ization. With an annual population growth rate of 2.7 percent, the state of
public health care and other social services in Pakistan is also in decline.
Meanwhile, Pakistan spends almost 5 percent of its GDP on defense and is
still unable to match the conventional forces of India, which outspends Pa-
kistan 3 to 1 while allocating less than 2.5 percent of its GDP to military
spending.
Pakistan’s military dominance can be traced back to the early years of its
statehood. The partition of British India’s assets in 1947 left Pakistan with
one-third of the British Indian army and only 17 percent of its revenues.
Thus, the military started out as the dominant institution in the new state,
and this dominance has continued over the years. Since Gen. Ayub Khan
assumed power in 1958, ruling through martial law, the military has directly
or indirectly dominated Pakistani politics, set Pakistan’s ideological and na-
tional security agenda, and repeatedly intervened to direct the course of do-
mestic politics. On four occasions, despite the
constant rewriting of its constitution ostensi-
bly to pave the way for sustained democracy,
generals seized power directly, claiming that
civilian politicians were incapable of running
the country. Even during periods of civilian
government, the generals have exercised po-
litical influence through the intelligence appa-
ratus, notably the Interservices Intelligence
(ISI) organization. The ISI plays a behind-the-
scenes role in exaggerating political divisions
to justify military intervention. Partly due to the role of the military and
partly because of their own weakness, Pakistan’s political factions have often
found it difficult to cooperate with one another or to submit to the rule of
law. As a result, Pakistan is far from developing a consistent system form of
government, with persisting political polarization along three major, inter-
secting fault lines: between civilians and the military, among different eth-
nic and provincial groups, and between Islamists and secularists.
The first crack in contemporary Pakistan’s body politic continues to be
this perennial dispute over who should wield political power. Musharraf has
described Pakistan as “a very difficult country to govern” in view of its
myriad internal and external difficulties. Musharraf’s view reflects the think-
ing of the Pakistani military and is possibly self-serving. The military does
not allow politics to take its course, periodically accusing elected leaders of
compromising national security or of corruption. Repeated military inter-
vention has deprived Pakistan of political leaders with experience governing,
leading to serious lapses under civilian rule. Because the military periodically
co-opts or fires civilian politicians, established and accepted rules for politi-
cal conduct have failed to evolve. Issues such as the role of religion in mat-
ters of state, the division of power between various branches of government,
and the authority of the provinces are not settled by constitutional means or
through a vote. The military does not let civilians rule, but its own rule
lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the general public, creating an atmosphere of
permanent friction. Thus, instead of governing, Pakistan’s rulers, including
Musharraf, have been reduced to managing ethnic, religious, and provincial
tensions.
The second major source of conflict in Pakistan is based on these ethnic
and provincial differences. Although the majority of Pakistan’s ethnically dis-
parate population has traditionally identified with secular politicians, that ma-
jority has not always determined the direction of Pakistan’s policies, even
when its opinion is expressed in a free and fair election. Highly centralized
and unrepresentative governance has created grievances among different eth-
nic groups, and the state has yet to create any institutional mechanisms for
dealing with such discontent. The constitutional provisions relating to pro-
vincial autonomy, which could placate each province by allowing self-govern-
ment, have often been bypassed in practice. Intraprovincial differences, such
as those between the Baluchis and the Pashtuns in Baluchistan, between the
Punjabis and Saraiki in Punjab, between the Pashtuns and Hindko speakers in
the North West Frontier Province, and between the Sindhis and Mohajirs in
Sindh, have also festered without political resolution.
The third relates to the ideological division over the role of Islam in na-
tional life. Having started out as a pressure group outside the Pakistani par-
liament, Pakistan’s religious parties have now become a well-armed and
well-financed force that wield considerable influence within different
branches of government. Religious groups have benefited from the patron-
age of the military and civil bureaucracy, which has viewed them as useful
tools in perpetuating the military’s control over foreign and domestic policy.
Because the Islamist worldview is incompatible with the vision of a modern
Pakistan, the violent vigilantism of some Islamists has become a serious
threat to Pakistani civil society and has also promoted sectarian terrorism.
Operating outside the framework of the rule of law, the Islamists have the
potential to disrupt the conduct of foreign policy, especially in view of their
support for anti-India militants in Kashmir and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Islam and the Rise of Militancy
Radical Islamic groups, which portray themselves as the guardians of Pakistan’s
ideology, have had a special status conferred on them by the military and
civil bureaucracy that normally governs Pakistan. The Islamists claim that
they are the protectors of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent capability, as well as
the champion of the national cause of securing Kashmir for Pakistan. Secu-
lar politicians who seek greater autonomy for Pakistan’s different regions or
demand that religion be kept out of the business of the state have come un-
der attack from the Islamists for deviating from Pakistan’s ideology.
Establishing Islam as the state ideology was a device aimed at defining a
Pakistani identity during the country’s formative years. Indeed, Pakistan’s
leaders started playing on religious sentiment as a means of strengthening
the country’s national identity shortly after Pakistan’s inception. Emerging
from the partition of British India in 1947 as the result of a relatively short
independence movement, Pakistan faced several challenges to its survival,
beginning with India’s perceived reluctance to accept Pakistan’s creation.
Pakistan’s secular elite used Islam as a national rallying cry against perceived
and real threats from predominantly Hindu
India. They assumed that the country’s cler-
ics and Islamists were too weak and too de-
pendent on the state to confront the power
structure. Therefore, unsure of their fledgling
nation’s future, the politicians, civil servants,
and military officers who led Pakistan in its
formative years decided to exacerbate the an-
tagonism between Hindus and Muslims that
had led to partition as a means of defining a
distinctive identity for Pakistan, with “Islamic
Pakistan” resisting “Hindu India.” Notwithstanding periodic peace processes,
hostility between India and Pakistan continues, and in Pakistan it serves as
an important element of national identification.
This political commitment to an “ideological state” gradually evolved
into a strategic commitment to exporting jihadist ideology for regional influ-
ence. During the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, the Pakistani military used Is-
lamist rhetoric and the help of Islamist groups to exclude elected secular
leaders supported by the majority Bengali-speaking population from power
in East Pakistan prior to its secession. The Bengalis’ rebellion, with India’s
assistance, and their brutal suppression by the Pakistani military followed an
election that would have given power to Bengali politicians in a united Paki-
stan. After the 1971 war, Pakistan was bifurcated with the birth of an inde-
pendent Bangladesh, exacerbating Pakistan’s insecurity.
Whereas India and Bangladesh have each evolved as secular democracies
focused on economic development, Pakistan continues to be ruled by a civil-
military oligarchy that sees itself as defining and also protecting the state’s
identity, mainly through a mix of religious and militarist nationalism. Hence,
in western Pakistan, the effort to create national cohesion between Pakistan’s
disparate ethnic and linguistic groups through religion assumed greater sig-
nificance, and its manifestations became more militant. Religious groups,
armed or unarmed, gradually became more powerful as a result of this alli-
ance between the mosque and the military. Radical and violent manifesta-
tions of Islamist ideology, which sometimes appear to threaten Pakistan’s
stability even today, can be seen in some ways as a state project gone awry.
Pakistan’s rulers have traditionally attempted to “manage” militant
Islamism, trying to calibrate it so that it serves the state’s nation-building
function without destabilizing internal politics or relations with Western
countries. Pakistan’s emphasis on its Islamic identity increased significantly
as the civilian semiauthoritarian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971–
1977) channeled Pakistan’s Islamic aspirations
toward foreign policy. Pakistan played a key
role in developing the Organization of Islamic
Conference and opened up to special rela-
tions with Islamic groups and countries.
Gen. Zia-ul Haq’s military regime (1977–
1988) took matters a step further domestically,
basing Pakistan’s legal and educational system
on Islamic law, formalizing the preexisting state
ideology into an official policy of Islamization.
Through his Islamization efforts, Zia made Pakistan an important ideological
and organizational center of the global Islamist movement, including its
leading role in the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan in the 1980s by al-
lowing Afghanistan’s mujahideen to operate from bases in Pakistan, inflict-
ing a heavy toll on the Red Army.
The success of the jihadist experiment against the Soviets encouraged
Pakistan’s strategic planners to expand the jihad against India and into post-
Soviet Central Asia. Pakistan’s sponsorship of the Taliban in Afghanistan,
together with the presence in its territory of Islamist militants from all over
the world, derived from Islamabad’s desire to emerge as the center of a glo-
bal Islamic resurgence. Ironically, religious fervor did not motivate all Paki-
stani leaders who supported this strategy; in most cases, they simply embraced
Islam as a politico-military strategic doctrine that would enhance Pakistan’s
prestige and position in the world. The focus on building an ideological
state, however, has subsequently caused Pakistan to lag behind in almost all
areas that define a functional modern state.
In the last few years, the situation has deteriorated even further. The Is-
lamists are not content with having a secondary role in national affairs and
have acquired a momentum of their own. Years of religious rhetoric have in-
fluenced a younger generation of military officers. The ISI, in particular, in-
cludes a large number of officials who have assimilated the Islamist beliefs
they were rhetorically called on to support in the course of jihad in Kashmir
and Afghanistan. Because Musharraf and the Pakistani military still see
secular politicians, rather than the Islamists, as their rivals for political
power, they have continued to use Islamists for political purposes. Last year,
Musharraf’s administration sought the backing of the Islamists for a set of
constitutional amendments increasing the president’s power and in return
recognized an Islamist as the leader of the parliamentary opposition. Major
figures of the secular opposition have been exiled or jailed on corruption or
sedition charges, positioning the Islamists as Pakistan’s major opposition
group. This has enabled Islamists to exercise greater influence than would
have been possible in an open, democratic political system, given the poor
electoral performance of Islamic groups in Pakistan’s intermittent elections
since gaining independence.
Some Things Never Change: Musharraf’s Pakistan Today
Pakistan’s Islamists made their strongest showing in a general election dur-
ing parliamentary voting in October 2002, securing 11 percent of the popu-
lar vote and 20 percent of the seats in the lower house of parliament. The
Musharraf regime’s decision to bar two former prime ministers, Nawaz Sharif
and Benazir Bhutto, and several of their followers from the election helped
the Islamists achieve these electoral results. The two leading secular parties,
Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s
Party (PPP), had to contend with corruption proceedings relating to their
tenures in office as well as the Musharraf government’s intense propaganda
supporting these allegations. The candidates of the alliance of Islamic par-
ties—the United Action Council (Mutahhida Majlis Amal [MMA])—did not
face disqualification, and Islamic party leaders campaigned freely. Anti-U.S.
sentiment in the areas bordering Afghanistan particularly benefited the
MMA, which made electoral gains without dramatically increasing the share
of votes traditionally won by Islamic parties. Secular parties suffered due to
redistricting as well as the disqualification of some non-Islamist candidates.
PML and PPP leaders were forced into exile, but MMA leaders could cam-
paign freely. This ensured full turnout of Islamist voters at the polls while
some supporters of the major parties did not show up to vote.
The Musharraf government now recognizes the MMA as the main oppo-
sition in parliament, even though Bhutto’s PPP has the single-largest bloc of
opposition parliamentarians, 81, to the MMA’s 63. Critics argue that
Musharraf is deliberately projecting the MMA as his primary opposition to
create the illusion that radical Islamist groups are gaining power through
democratic means, thus minimizing the prospect that the international com-
munity, especially the United States, will press for democratic reform in Pa-
kistan, especially while Musharraf offers support in the war against Al
Qaeda. Musharraf has also made repeated pronouncements to reassure the
world of his intention to alter Pakistan’s policy direction radically since the
September 11 attacks, moving it away from its Islamist and jihadist past.
Musharraf’s administration continues to project the war on terrorism as a
U.S. war being waged with Pakistani help, even after attempts on his life and
that of his handpicked prime minister, Shaukat Aziz. Islamabad continues to
make a distinction between foreign fighters, such as those from Al Qaeda,
whom Pakistani forces have been pursuing, and homegrown terrorists who
were originally trained to fight Indian troops in Kashmir. Musharraf is, in
fact, even reversing Zia’s course of Islamization but only marginally. The
government now encourages women’s participation in public life, and cul-
tural events involving song and dance are openly allowed, even encouraged.
State-owned media has become more culturally liberal, and private radio
and television stations with unrestricted entertainment content have been
permitted. Controversial Islamic laws, however, such as those relating to
blasphemy and Hudood (Islamic limits), have not been withdrawn.
Still, although Musharraf speaks of a vision of “enlightened moderation”
for Pakistan, contradictions in his domestic, regional, and international poli-
cies are apparent. The greatest commitment he has demonstrated thus far is
his view that he is indispensable to Pakistan and that Pakistan is safer under
the stewardship of the military rather than under civilian democratic rule.
This duality in speaking of enlightened moderation while keeping alive the
perception that he is faced with Islamist opposition justifies military inter-
vention and governance and reflects the structural problem in Pakistan’s
politics, a situation created by the weakness of civilian institutions and the
armed forces’ dominance of decisionmaking.
Islam has therefore become the central issue in Pakistani politics because
of conscious and consistent state policy aimed at excluding secular politi-
cians from power while maintaining a centralized state controlled by the
military and civil bureaucracy, not just as the inadvertent outcome of deci-
sions made after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, as has been widely
assumed. Pakistan’s self-characterization as an Islamic ideological state is
thus unlikely to change in the near term. The country’s population remains
fractured by ethnic and linguistic differences, with Islam being used as the
common bond in an attempt to achieve unity.
U.S. Policy Response (or Lack Thereof)
On several occasions, Pakistan has been seen as a state on the brink of fail-
ure, temporarily restored with U.S. military and economic assistance only to
return to the brink again. Pakistan, suffering from chronically weak state in-
stitutions, continues to face a deep identity crisis and a rising threat from in-
dependent, radical Islamists. The government’s fears about its viability and
security have led Islamabad to seek an alliance with the United States while
pursuing a nuclear deterrent and subconventional military capability, that is,
Islamist terrorism, against India. The U.S. response to the September 11 at-
tacks left Pakistan with little choice but to turn more drastically toward the
United States. Confronted with an ultimatum to choose between being with
the United States or against it, Pakistan’s generals opted to revive the alli-
ance. At every stage since, however, Pakistan has proven to be a U.S. ally of
convenience, not of conviction, seeking spe-
cific rewards for specific actions.
Pakistan has historically been willing to ad-
just its priorities to fit within the parameters of
immediate U.S. global concerns. The purpose
has been to ensure the flow of military and
economic aid from the United States, which
Pakistan considers necessary for its struggle for
survival and its competition with India. The
military, which has dominated the Pakistani
state since the mid-1950s, has embraced a tri-
partite policy that emphasizes Islam as a national unifier, rivalry with India as
the principal objective of the state’s foreign policy, and an alliance with the
United States as a means to defray the costs of Pakistan’s massive military ex-
penditures. Ironically, these policy precepts have served to encourage extrem-
ist Islamism, which in the last few years has been the source of threats both to
U.S. interests and global security.
The United States even recognized the troubling potential of Islamist
politics in the very first years of U.S. engagement with Pakistan. In a policy
statement issued on July 1, 1951, the U.S. Department of State declared
that, “[a]part from Communism, the other main threat to American inter-
ests in Pakistan was from ‘reactionary groups of landholders and uneducated
religious leaders’ who were opposed to the ‘present Western-minded govern-
ment’ and ‘favor a return to primitive Islamic principles.’”

However, over
the last four decades—until September 11—the U.S. government did little
to discourage Islamabad’s embrace of obscurantist Islam as its state ideology,
empowering Pakistan’s religious leaders beyond their support among the
populace and tying the Islamists to Pakistan’s military-civil bureaucracy and
intelligence apparatus.
Washington has never been able to develop a policy that exclusively fo-
cuses on dealing with Islamabad and its dysfunction. Instead, Pakistan has
generally been placed into broader U.S. policy objectives: containment of
communism in the 1950s and 1960s, restrictions on Soviet expansion in Af-
ghanistan during the 1980s, nuclear nonproliferation during the 1990s, and
the war on terrorism since September 11. Washington’s quid pro quo ap-
proach in dealing with Pakistan has often helped confront the issue at hand
while creating another security problem down the road. Gen. Ayub Khan
had found U.S. eagerness to contain communism during the 1950s useful to
extract the right price for Pakistan’s participation in anti-Communist trea-
ties. U.S. Cold War support subsequently enabled the Pakistani military to
use force in the Bangladesh crisis of 1971, leading to Pakistan’s bifurcation.
History repeated itself when the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghani-
stan in 1979 made Pakistan a front-line state in resisting Communist expan-
sion. Just as General Khan had previously, Zia bargained for more aid in
return for allowing Pakistan to be the staging ground for an anti-Soviet in-
surgency during the 1980s. Zia also used the cover of the Afghan jihad to
acquire nuclear weapons capabilities for Pakistan, circumventing U.S. legis-
lation aimed at nonproliferation. With help from the United States, Zia also
modernized Pakistan’s military and prepared for a broader jihad to expand
Pakistan’s influence in the region, building a cadre of Islamist guerrillas and
giving rise to Pakistan’s ambitions to create a client regime in Afghanistan,
which in turn resulted in the Taliban’s ascendancy and ability to provide
sanctuary for Al Qaeda. Washington’s preoccupation with the success of the
anti-Soviet struggle enabled Pakistan to defeat two U.S. objectives (nuclear
nonproliferation and security in the Middle East and South Asia) while at-
taining one (the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan) and empow-
ered an entirely new threat of radical Islamic terrorism.
In some ways, Islamabad’s relationship with Washington has become a
contributing factor to the Pakistani crisis by allowing Pakistan’s leaders to
believe that they can continue to promote risky domestic, regional, and pan-
Islamic policies. The availability of U.S. assistance, offered to secure Paki-
stani cooperation in U.S. grand strategy, has exacerbated Pakistan’s dysfunction
and its structural flaws.
The Solution: A Man or a System?
Currently, U.S. hopes in Pakistan are pinned to Musharraf’s commitment to
U.S. interests. Assassination attempts on Musharraf, from which he has nar-
rowly escaped, have raised the question of whether U.S. policy interests
would be adequately served beyond Musharraf’s indefinite tenure. Although
it may be difficult for U.S. and Pakistani policymakers to force an end to
Pakistan’s status as an Islamic ideological state, changes in the nature of the
Pakistani state can gradually wean the country away from Islamic extrem-
ism. Musharraf can’t. Over the years, military rule has fomented religious
militancy in Pakistan. Under military leadership, Pakistan has defined its na-
tional objective as wresting Kashmir from India and, in recent years, estab-
lishing a client regime in Afghanistan. Unless Islamabad’s objectives are
redefined to focus on economic prosperity and popular participation in gov-
ernance, which the military remains institutionally reluctant to do, the state
will continue to turn to Islam as a national unifier.
If Pakistan proceeded along the path of normal political and economic
development, it would not need the exaggerated political and strategic role
for Islam that has characterized much of its
history. The United States, for its own inter-
ests, cannot afford the current rise in Islamic
militancy in a large Muslim country that has
nuclear weapons capabilities, a large standing
army, and a huge intelligence service capable
of conducting covert operations to destabilize
neighboring governments in the Persian Gulf,
South Asia, and Central Asia.
The influence of Islamists in Pakistan can
perhaps be best contained through democ-
racy. In elections, a majority of Pakistanis has repeatedly demonstrated that
the populace does not share the Islamist vision for the country. Despite the
MMA’s unprecedented electoral performance in 2002, the alliance garnered
only 11 percent of the total votes cast. The Islamist vote as a percentage of
total registered voters has been more or less stagnant since the 1970s. The
strength of the Islamists, however, lies in their ability to mobilize financial
and human resources. Islamists run schools, operate charities, and publish
newspapers; moreover, they are able to put their organized cadres on the
streets. Thus, in the absence of democratic decisionmaking, the Islamists
can dominate the political discourse. Pakistan’s secular civil society is either
apolitical or insufficiently organized, and secular political parties have con-
sistently been dismembered by successive military governments.
Strengthening civil society and building secular political parties as a
countervailing force in Pakistan can contain the demands for Islamization
made by the religious parties and radical Islamist groups. Whenever an
elected political leader has rejected Islamists’ demands, fears of a backlash
have failed to materialize. Between 1972 and 1977, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was
able to successfully expand the role of women in the public arena despite Is-
lamist opposition, and in 1997, Prime Minister Sharif faced only a limited
reaction when he reversed the decision to observe Friday as a weekly reli-
gious holiday. Conversely, the Islamists have won their major policy victories
thanks to regimes seeking their support to garner political legitimacy or to
achieve strategic objectives. Unlike the situation in Muslim countries such
as Egypt and Turkey, the Pakistani state and particularly the military have
encouraged political and radical Islam, which otherwise has a relatively nar-
row base of support. Democratic consensus on limiting or reversing Islamiza-
tion would gradually roll back the Islamist influence in Pakistani public life.
The Islamists would maintain their role as a minority pressure group repre-
senting a particular point of view, but they would stop wielding their current
disproportionate influence over the country’s
overall direction.
The United States can help contain the
Islamists’ influence by demanding reform of
Pakistan’s governance. Washington should
not condone the Pakistani military’s support
for Islamic militants, its use of the intelli-
gence apparatus for controlling domestic
politics, and its refusal to cede power to a
constitutional democratic government. In its
role as an aid donor, Washington has become
one of Islamabad’s most important benefactors. A large part of U.S. eco-
nomic assistance since the September 11 attacks, however, has been used to
pay down Pakistan’s foreign debt. Because Washington has attached few
conditions to U.S. aid, the spending patterns of Pakistan’s government have
not changed significantly. The country’s military spending continues to in-
crease, and spending for social services is well below the level required to
improve living conditions for ordinary Pakistanis. Consequently, the United
States should use its aid as a lever to influence Pakistan’s domestic policies.
Even though Musharraf’s cooperation in hunting down Al Qaeda terrorists
is a positive development, Washington must not ignore Pakistan’s state spon-
sorship of Islamist militants, its pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles at
the expense of education and health care, and its refusal to democratize.
Each of these issues is directly linked to the future of Islamic radicalism in
Pakistan.
Notes
1. “Win-Win Situation for Pakistan, Says Musharraf,” November 27, 2001, http://
www.sindh.gov.pk/press_release/win_situation.htm (accessed October 6, 2004)
(press release by the Government of Sindh).
2. As cited in Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule (Cambridge and New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1990), p. 127.