Showing posts with label violence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label violence. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 6, 2009

Fears rise over militants in Pakistan's Punjab

By Zeeshan Haider
BAHAWALPUR, Pakistan (Reuters) - Three burly gunmen stand menacingly at the gate of a mosque complex in the Pakistani town of Bahawalpur as hundreds of men file in listen to a prayer for victory of Muslim fighters around the world.
This is Osman-o-Ali, the headquarters of Jaish-e-Mohammad, an al Qaeda-linked militant group which has a long record of violence including an assassination attempt on former president Pervez Musharraf.
While Pakistan's attention is focused on the Taliban and al Qaeda threat on the Afghan border in the remote northwest, there are fears that the militants are quietly expanding their influence and winning recruits in the country's heartland.
"South Punjab is a fertile ground for extremists and militants," said security analyst Hasan Askari Rizvi.
The flourishing Jaish complex in Bahawalpur, in the south of Punjab province, illustrates the ambivalence that Pakistani authorities have long shown towards hardline Islamists.
Islamist factions were nurtured by the security agencies during the 1980s and 1990s when they sent their fighters into Afghanistan to take on Soviet occupiers and later into the Indian part of the Kashmir region to battle security forces.
But Jaish was officially outlawed by Musharraf in early 2002 after it and another group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, were blamed for an attack on the Indian parliament which brought nuclear-armed Pakistan and India to the brink of their fourth war.
Despite the ban, and repeated vows by governments to root out militancy, Jaish is thriving. It and an allied group are believed to have thousands of young cadres fighting Western forces in Afghanistan and the Pakistani army in the northwest.
Plots hatched here on the dusty plains and shabby towns of southern Punjab can reach around the world.
Rashid Rauf, a British-born al Qaeda operative and suspect in a 2006 plot to blow up transatlantic airliners, was a member of Jaish and was known to have lived in Bahawalpur with his wife.
"JIHAD HUB"
Security analyst Ayesha Siddiqa says south Punjab has become "the hub of jihadism" and the authorities are in denial.
The region is critical to planning, recruitment and logistical support for terrorist attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan, she wrote recently in Newsline magazine.
Punjab provincial law minister Rana Sanaullah acknowledged the hardliners have many thousands of sympathisers but he dismisses talk of a threat to the state.
"There is no challenge to the government," Sanaullah, who is also responsible for security, told Reuters in an interview in his office in the provincial capital of Lahore.
"They can detonate bombs or carry out suicide attacks but they cannot establish their bases in Punjab," he said.
On the outskirts of Bahawalpur, the Jaish group has acquired a plot of land of about 5 acres (1.7 hectares) which some people fear could be a militant training camp.
The plot is surrounded by a brick wall but from a nearby road one can see cows and buffaloes feeding in stables.
A security official said authorities had turned a blind eye to the acquisition of the land by an outlawed group but said they would not be allowed to pursue militant activities.
"Let me assure you they don't have the guts to challenge the government," said the official, who declined to be identified.
Mohammad Riaz Chughtai, a cleric with links to Jaish leaders, said the group planned to build a madrasa on the land and no militant training was going on.
But youngsters are being recruited in Punjab and sent for training on the Afghan border. Police recently detained five teenagers on charges of receiving militant training in South Waziristan, the main stronghold of the Pakistani Taliban.
"They wanted me to become a suicide bomber. They told me that jihad was obligatory," 16-year-old Mohammad Ibrahim told interrogators, according to a police transcript.
Sanaullah said there were tens of thousands of such people all over Pakistan, including many who previous governments trained for war in Afghanistan and then discarded.
"We can't kill all of them, arrest them or detain them for interrogation," Sanaullah said. "What we can do is that the one who is very active will be arrested and interrogated."
Rizvi said government negligence and lingering sympathy for the militants in some quarters were to blame.
"There is still sympathy for these militant groups," Rizvi said. "But they cannot establish a mini-state of their own as they did in the tribal areas."

(Editing by Robert Birsel)

Friday, October 2, 2009

U.S. Officials Get a Taste of Pakistanis’ Anger at America


KARACHI, Pakistan — Judith A. McHale was expecting a contentious session with Ansar Abbasi, a Pakistani journalist known for his harsh criticism of American foreign policy, when she sat down for a one-on-one meeting with him in a hotel conference room in Islamabad on Monday. She got that, and a little bit more.
After Ms. McHale, the Obama administration’s new under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs, gave her initial polite presentation about building bridges between America and the Muslim world, Mr. Abbasi thanked her politely for meeting with him. Then he told her that he hated her.
“ ‘You should know that we hate all Americans,’ ” Ms. McHale said Mr. Abbasi told her. “ ‘From the bottom of our souls, we hate you.’ ”
Beyond the continuation of the battle against militants along the Pakistani-Afghan border, a big part of President Obama’s strategy for the region involves trying to broaden America’s involvement in the country to include nonmilitary areas like infrastructure development, trade, energy, schools and jobs — all aimed at convincing the Pakistani people that the United States is their friend. But as Ms. McHale and other American officials discovered this week, during a visit by Richard C. Holbrooke, the special representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan, making that case was not going to be easy.
“We have made a major turn with our relationship with Pakistan under President Obama,” Mr. Holbrooke told reporters at a news conference in Karachi on Wednesday. Time and again, Mr. Holbrooke tried to delineate the differences between the Obama administration and the Bush era, painting the new administration as one that wants to see a better life and more business opportunities for Pakistanis.
He said his very presence in Karachi — Pakistan’s largest city and its commercial capital — demonstrated that drone attacks and the hunt for Al Qaeda were not the only American foreign policy activities in the country.
To polite applause, Mr. Holbrooke told local officials at the Governor’s House that the United States Consulate in Karachi would start granting business visas —100 a week — instead of making would-be business travelers to the United States go to Islamabad for the visas, as has been the case.
He stopped at a shantytown in the city to chat with schoolboys crowded into three classrooms, and even visited the home of a local resident, to get a feel for how people in Karachi live. On Tuesday, he met with opposition leaders in Islamabad, including Liaqat Baloch, the secretary general of the anti-American political party Jamaat-e-Islami, and Fazlur Rehman, the leader of another anti-American party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, who is sometimes referred to as the spiritual founder of the Taliban.
In Karachi on Wednesday, Mr. Holbrooke kept bringing up a trade bill that just passed the House, which would set up so-called reconstruction opportunity zones so that textiles and other goods made in Pakistan’s tribal areas could get preferential access to the United States market. And Ms. McHale, whose job is, in part, to try to repair America’s relations with the Muslim world, strayed from his side only when she ventured out on fence-mending missions of her own, meeting with 17 Pakistani journalists, 8 officials of nongovernmental organizations and members of several political parties, all in an effort to deliver one message: America cares about Pakistan.
But Mr. Abbasi’s reaction — a response that, Ms. McHale acknowledged, apparently reflects the feelings of about 25 percent of the population, according to a recent poll — demonstrated just how tough the job is. For all of the administration’s efforts to call attention to the nonmilitary ties that would bind the two countries, America is still being judged by many Pakistanis as an uncaring behemoth whose sole concern is finding Osama bin Laden, no matter the cost in civilian Pakistani lives.
“He told me that we were no longer human beings because our goal was to eliminate other humans,” Ms. McHale said Wednesday, recounting the conversation with Mr. Abbasi. “He spoke English very well, and he said that thousands of innocent people have been killed because we are trying to find Osama bin Laden.”
Following Mr. Holbrooke’s example when he received a similar lashing from Mr. Baloch, Ms. McHale said she argued her points with Mr. Abbasi, points that to many Americans would appear logical, but that often fail to impress over here: Al Qaeda and Mr. bin Laden attacked the United States on Sept. 11, 2001; the war in Afghanistan, unlike the war in Iraq, is blessed by the United Nations and is a multinational effort; America will always do whatever it takes to defend itself.
She said that even though she knew that she did not sway Mr. Abbasi, it was good to hear what he thought because she wanted to try to understand the source of much of the anti-Americanism in Pakistan.
Meanwhile, in Karachi, Mr. Holbrooke continued to push an agenda of soft power, telling business leaders that the United States wanted to invest in energy projects in Pakistan. But he acknowledged that some of the projects that Karachi technocrats put before him, with their complex ownership structures, would never get approval in the Congress.
The trade bill, now before the Senate, has labor provisions that are unlikely to get past free-trade Republicans, whose support is needed for it to pass.
And on top of that, in a concession to the United States textile industry, the bill would not include imports of cotton tops and pants, items that are made in abundance in Pakistan.

Pakistanis Continue to Reject U.S. Partnership



ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Even with the arrival of the Obama administration and the prospect of substantially increased aid, more Pakistanis — an overwhelming majority — continued to reject the United States as a partner to fight militancy in their country, a new poll finds.
The survey, conducted by the Washington-based International Republican Institute, underscored the difficulties the Obama administration faced in its efforts to tamp down Islamic militancy in this strategically vital nation.
The I.R.I. is a nonprofit pro-democracy group which is financed by the American government.
President Asif Ali Zardari, the widower of the slain former prime minister Benazir Bhutto and a relatively inexperienced politician, scored a 25 percent approval rating how he’s handling his job, 6 points more than in March.
His chief opponent, Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League-N, garnered a 67 percent favorable rating, down from 75 percent in March.The findings come as Washington is poised to spend $1.5 billion in assistance for Pakistan in the coming year, a big jump in American funds intended to help strengthen the civilian government rather than the military.
The poll confirms the persistent strand of anti-American discourse in Pakistan in the last few years, and its release coincides with particularly strong attacks in the Pakistani media about the American Embassy’s hiring private security firms to protect American diplomats.
Even as the Obama administration takes pride in the new funds for Pakistan, the increased aid has been criticized in the Pakistani news media and among politicians as too little, one calling it “peanuts.”
Face-to-face interviews were conducted July 15 to Aug. 7 with 4,900 adults throughout Pakistan’s four provinces, excluding areas in the North-West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The margin of sampling error is plus or minus one percentage point. The survey results will be available on the institute’s Web site, www.iri.org, on Friday. The I.R.I. has conducted surveys in Pakistan since 2002.
A troubling aspect of the findings for the Obama administration, analysts said, was the significant increase in the rejection of the United States as a partner in the war against Islamic militants.
According to the poll, 80 percent of the respondents said they were opposed to United States assistance in Pakistan’s fight against terrorism, a 19 percentage-point increase since the last survey conducted by the institute in March.
The survey says that 76 percent of the respondents were opposed to Pakistan partnering with the United States on missile attacks against extremists by American drone aircraft. Such strikes have been under way for several years against militants from Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the tribal areas, and have recently intensified.
An American missile from a drone aircraft killed Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban in August, a strike that was assisted by Pakistani intelligence, officials said
There were various reasons for the harsh attitude toward the United States, even as the Obama administration tried to reach out to Muslim nations, said Kamran Khan, a prominent journalist and the anchor of the most widely watched television news show.
“Most Pakistanis are exposed to the popular media and to extremist clerics who provide this perception,” Mr. Khan said. “The American side of the story is not available to the people.”
The American military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq colored Pakistani views of the United States, Mr. Khan said. “The United States is seen as an occupying force and moving unilaterally against Muslim nations.”
Although Mr. Obama was perceived as more “trustworthy and plain speaking,” Mr. Khan said these attributes were not enough to outweigh the hostility to American policies.
In order to improve American standing in Pakistan, the special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Richard C. Holbrooke, had ordered an overhaul of the public diplomacy programs and was sending several seasoned diplomats to bolster the embassy, a senior American official said.
A public affairs strategy centered on the American desire for a strong relationship with Pakistan and focused on describing the common enemy as Al Qaeda and the Taliban was about to begin, the official said.
The new effort included spending about $30 million on educational and cultural exchanges between Pakistan and the United States, and providing more Fulbright scholarships for Pakistanis to study at American universities.

Thursday, October 1, 2009

Remaining Mumbai attacks evidence in Pakistan: India

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\10\01\story_1-10-2009_pg7_6

* Chidambaram says all ‘baking ingredients’ in Pakistan
* Infiltrations into Kashmir have gone up a bit

By Iftikhar Gilani


NEW DELHI: New Delhi has indicated that Pakistan should look for the remaining evidence against the Mumbai attacks suspects on Pakistani soil if Indian dossiers are insufficient, with Indian Home Minister P Chidambaram asking “Pakistan to bake fully evidence against the perpetrators of the attack if it is half-baked”.

Addressing a press conference on Wednesday, Chidambaram claimed the remaining evidence was available on Pakistani soil.

“If it is half-baked, they (Pakistan) are welcome to bake it fully,” he said while replying to a question about Pakistan’s statement that a “half-baked” case against Hafiz Saeed could not be taken to court. “All the baking ingredients are in Pakistan,” he said, adding that all the evidence on Indian soil has had been shared with Pakistan.

About the encounters in Kashmir, the Indian minister said while infiltrations had gone up a bit, the levels of violence and causalities had been lower in 2009 compared to corresponding periods over the last years.

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

Militant Group Is Intact After Mumbai Siege

By LYDIA POLGREEN and SOUAD MEKHENNET
Published: September 29, 2009

KARACHI, Pakistan — Ten months after the devastating attacks in Mumbai by Pakistan-based militants, the group behind the assault remains largely intact and determined to strike India again, according to current and former members of the group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and intelligence officials.
Despite pledges from Pakistan to dismantle militant groups operating on its soil, and the arrest of a handful of operatives, Lashkar has persisted, even flourished, since 10 recruits killed 163 people in a rampage through Mumbai, India’s financial capital, last November.

Indian and Pakistani dossiers on the Mumbai investigations, copies of which were obtained by The New York Times, offer a detailed picture of the operations of a Lashkar network that spans Pakistan. It included four houses and two training camps here in this sprawling southern port city that were used to prepare the attacks.

Among the organizers, the Pakistani document says, was Hammad Amin Sadiq, a homeopathic pharmacist, who arranged bank accounts and secured supplies. He and six others begin their formal trial on Saturday in Pakistan, though Indian authorities say the prosecution stops well short of top Lashkar leaders.

Indeed, Lashkar’s broader network endures, and can be mobilized quickly for elaborate attacks with relatively few resources, according to a dozen current and former Lashkar militants and intelligence officials from the United States, Europe, India and Pakistan.

In interviews with The Times, they presented a troubling portrait of Lashkar’s capabilities, its popularity in Pakistan and the support it has received from former officials of Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment.

Pakistan’s chief spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, or ISI, helped create Lashkar two decades ago to challenge Indian control in Kashmir, the disputed territory that lies at the heart of the conflict between the nuclear-armed neighbors.

Pakistani officials say that after Sept. 11, 2001, they broke their contacts with the group. No credible evidence has emerged of Pakistani government involvement in the Mumbai attacks, according to an American law enforcement official.

But a senior American intelligence official said the ISI was believed to maintain ties with Lashkar. Four Lashkar members, interviewed individually, said only a thin distance separated Lashkar and the ISI, bridged by former ISI and military officials.

One highly placed Lashkar militant said the Mumbai attackers were part of groups trained by former Pakistani military and intelligence officials at Lashkar camps. Others had direct knowledge that retired army and ISI officials trained Lashkar recruits as late as last year.

“Some people of the ISI knew about the plan and closed their eyes,” said one senior Lashkar operative in Karachi who said he had met some of the gunmen before they left for the Mumbai assault, though he did not know what their mission would be.

The intelligence officials interviewed insisted on anonymity while discussing classified information. The current and former Lashkar militants did not want their names used for fear of antagonizing others in the group or Pakistani authorities.

But by all accounts Lashkar’s network, though dormant, remains alive, and the possibility that it could strike India again makes Lashkar a wild card in one of the most volatile regions of the world.

India and Pakistan have fought three wars since they were created by the bloody partition of British India in 1947. Whether they begin again the long journey toward peace or find themselves eyeball to eyeball, nuclear arms at the ready, depends in no small measure on the actions of this shadowy group.

A new attack could reverberate widely through the region and revive nagging questions about Pakistan’s commitment to stamp out the militant groups that use its territory.

It could also dangerously complicate the Obama administration’s efforts in Afghanistan. Success there depends in part on avoiding open conflict between India and Pakistan, so that Pakistan’s military can focus on battling the Taliban insurgents who base themselves in Pakistan.

Even so, American diplomatic efforts to improve India-Pakistan relations have been stillborn. So delicate is the Kashmir issue that Indian officials bridle at any hint of American mediation.

Meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, the two sides failed to restart talks last weekend, with India demanding greater steps by Pakistan to prosecute those responsible for the Mumbai attacks.

The dossiers show that at the level of the police, the two countries can cooperate, and have exchanged DNA evidence, photographs and items found with the attackers to piece together a detailed portrait of the Mumbai plot.

But the files are laced with barbs and recriminations, reflecting the increasingly acid tenor of their relations. Despite pledges to work together to fight terrorism, the Pakistani and Indian intelligence services are not on speaking terms, according to officials in both countries and the United States.

The gaps heighten the risks of a new attack substantially, American officials fear.

“The only cooperation we have with the Pakistanis is that they send us their terrorists, who kill our people, and we kill their terrorists,” a senior Indian intelligence official said in an interview.

Asked how much his agency communicated with its Indian counterpart, a senior Pakistani intelligence official made an O with his thumb and forefinger.

“Zero,” he replied.

Brazen Planning

The Pakistani investigation concludes “beyond any reasonable doubt” that it was Lashkar militants who carried out the Mumbai attacks, preying on their victims in a train station, two five-star hotels, a cafe and a Jewish center over three days starting last Nov. 26.

According to testimony by the only surviving attacker, Ajmal Kasab, 22, Lashkar recruits were vetted and trained around the country, including at well-established camps in Muzaffarabad, in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, as well as in Mansehra, in North-West Frontier Province.

A core group, the 10 chosen for the Mumbai assault, was eventually moved to Karachi and its suburbs, where the real drilling began and where Pakistani investigators later retraced the plotters’ steps.

Beginning as early as May 2008, the group trained and planned brazenly while living in various neighborhoods in and around Karachi. They made scores of calls using cellphones, some with stolen numbers, starting in August. They set up voice lines over the Internet.

At one water sports shop, they bought inflatable boats, air pumps, life jackets and engines. One of their training camps, with five thatched rooms and a three-room house, was located near a creek, where they conducted water drills in the open.

The police later recovered an abundance of evidence: militant literature, pocket diaries, spent and live ammunition, empty gun magazines, life vests and receipts for supplies, including distributed weapons and explosives, the Pakistani dossier says.

At the other camp, which they named Azizabad, the group and their trainers set up a classroom.

Using handwritten manuals, the recruits were trained how to use cellphones to keep in contact with their handlers during the attack. They pored over detailed maps of the Indian coastline, plotting the course they would take to Mumbai. They learned how to use global positioning devices.

Working from Millat Town, a dusty, middle-class Karachi suburb on the eastern edge of the city, Mr. Sadiq organized the cadre. Neighbors described him as quiet and pious, riding around the streets with his two young sons perched on his motorbike. The Pakistani dossier says he was a committed Lashkar militant.

In an interview, his uncle, Lala Yasin, said the same thing, adding proudly that Mr. Sadiq was willing to do anything to liberate Kashmir from India’s grip.

“Lashkar-e-Taiba does not kill people without reason,” Mr. Yasin said at his home in Karachi, a few blocks from where his nephew planned the Mumbai attacks.

“It is the champion of jihad,” he explained. “Muslims are like a body and if one part of your body is aching, the entire body may be jeopardized.”

A Limited Crackdown

Pakistani authorities have arrested seven men linked to the Mumbai attack, including Mr. Sadiq and Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi, a man well known as the chief of operations for Lashkar. They are searching for at least 13 other suspects.

But their investigation has come up short of the founder of Lashkar, Hafiz Saeed, the man Indian and Western officials accuse of masterminding the attacks.

In June, a Pakistani court freed Mr. Saeed from detention, declaring that it did not have enough evidence to hold him.

Under continuing pressure, Pakistani authorities this month confined his movements once again. But they say they have no new evidence against him.

Rehman Malik, Pakistan’s interior minister, said that there was simply not enough evidence to charge Mr. Saeed with a crime, and that all the evidence pointed to Mr. Lakhvi as the mastermind.

“Lakhvi was the head, and that is why he has been taken into custody,” Mr. Malik said in an interview. “He has been charged and now they are all under trial.”

Indian officials say they have sent Pakistan a six-page summary of evidence of Mr. Saeed’s complicity in the Mumbai attacks, a copy of which was given to The Times. The document, based on India’s own intelligence and testimony from Mr. Kasab, quotes Mr. Saeed giving detailed instructions to the group that carried out the attack.

“One Hindustani boat has to be hijacked for going to Bombay from Karachi,” the document says, using Mumbai’s former name. Mr. Saeed also told the group that it should aim to begin the assault around 7:30 p.m.

“At this hour there is considerable crowd at the places of our target,” the document quotes him as saying.

Pakistani officials and legal experts say the evidence is not as clear-cut as India says. The case against Mr. Saeed rests almost entirely on the testimony of Mr. Kasab, the surviving attacker, and serious questions remain about the way the Indian police obtained his statements, they say.

Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the organization Mr. Saeed now leads, bills itself as a charity and denies any links with Lashkar. Abdur Rahman Makki, Mr. Saeed’s deputy and brother-in-law, called any accusations against Mr. Saeed baseless.

“I do not think that there is anything left to talk about after the High Court’s decision that Hafez Saeed has no link to the Mumbai incident,” he said in an interview.

Yet he was not shy about admitting that Mr. Saeed, a fiery preacher, regularly exhorted young people to fight in Kashmir. “Hafiz Saeed always speaks and discusses about the jihad that is mentioned in the Holy Koran,” Mr. Makki said. “Not only Pakistanis, any Muslim has the duty to support the oppressed Kashmiris.”

All parts of India where Muslims are a majority must be freed, he said.

Meanwhile, despite promises to crack down on terrorists, Pakistan’s government has taken few concrete steps.

The former director of Pakistan’s elite national investigative force was appointed to lead the country’s new counterterrorism body in January. But it took seven months to get any money to get the agency moving, and only now is it beginning to hire staff members and flesh out its mission, law enforcement officials said.

Cracking down on Lashkar and other groups linked to the Kashmir struggle, and who do not explicitly seek to overthrow Pakistan’s government, was not urgent, they said.

“I have many other things that are higher priority now,” said one senior police official in Punjab, the province where DNA tests pinpointed the families of the Mumbai attackers, according to the dossier. “Why would a case in Mumbai be so important when Pakistan is the front line of the war on terror?”

Links to Intelligence Agencies

For Pakistani authorities, the political problems posed by arresting Mr. Saeed, or undertaking a broader crackdown on Lashkar, may outstrip the legal ones.

The organization and its cause — to “free” Kashmir — remain close to the hearts of the Pakistani public as well as the military and intelligence establishment.

Since the Mumbai attacks, “our funds increased and more people wanted to join us,” a senior Lashkar operative in Karachi said in an interview. A midlevel ISI officer told The Times this year that Lashkar’s membership extended to 150,000 people.

Despite official denials, Pakistan’s spy agency, the ISI, maintains links to Lashkar, though the current level of support remains murky, according to the senior American intelligence official interviewed by The Times, as well as Pakistani analysts, retired military officials and former Lashkar members.

“Hafiz Saeed is the army’s man,” said Najam Sethi, an analyst and newspaper editor in Lahore, Pakistan. He and other analysts said the ISI was in no hurry to discard a group it helped create for a covert war against India.

“They have not abandoned it altogether,” said Hasan Askari Rizvi, a military analyst in Lahore. “It is not a total reversal; it is a realization that this is not advisable at this time.”

Senior ISI officials disputed the view. While acknowledging that the ISI had worked closely with Lashkar-e-Taiba in the past, they said things were different now.

“Prior to 9/11, we had a very strong contact with L.E.T., even on the leadership level,” one senior Pakistani intelligence official said in an interview. “But after 9/11, we broke our contacts with not only L.E.T. but also the Taliban.”

“Today we think that it would have been better if we had not cut our ties with them the way we did,” the official added, “so that we could control them more.”

A senior Lashkar militant said the group was divided — with the operational wing, led by Mr. Lakhvi, chafing for more attacks on India, and the spiritual wing, led by Mr. Saeed, advocating a more cautious approach.

The senior Pakistani intelligence official said that some within Lashkar might aspire to a more ambitious agenda, and suggested that parts of the group might have acted on their own.

“Lashkar went rogue,” the Pakistani intelligence official said. “Perhaps L.E.T. or dissident factions wanted to emerge as a global player,” like Al Qaeda.

New Attacks Expected

Even as new details emerge about the Mumbai attacks, senior American military, intelligence and counterterrorism officials express grim certainty that Lashkar is plotting new attacks.

The United States warned Indian officials this year about a Mumbai-style attack by Lashkar against multiple sites in India, according to a senior Defense Department official and a senior American counterterrorism official.

The counterterrorism official said the information, gleaned from electronic intercepts and other sources, was not specific and apparently did not result in any arrests. But it was significant enough for American officials to alert their Indian counterparts.

“There were indications of possible terrorist activity in the run-up to the Indian elections,” in May, “and that information was shared promptly with Indian officials,” said the counterterrorism official.

Pakistani officials, however, say they have been kept in the dark. “We heard that the Americans have warned the Indians that something in Mumbai might happen, but no one informed us,” a senior Pakistani intelligence official said.

If there is one thing on which intelligence agencies on both sides of the border agree, it is that the consequences of a new attack by Lashkar could be devastating.

“We do fear that if something like Mumbai happens in India again, there might be a military reaction from the Indian side and it could trigger into a war,” said a senior intelligence official in Pakistan.

“Right now we cannot guarantee that it will not happen again, because we do not have any control over it.”


Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker contributed reporting from Washington.

A Modest Proposal From the Brigadier

What one prominent Pakistani thinks his country should do with its atomic weapons



In the center of the biggest traffic circle of every major city in Pakistan sits a craggy, Gibraltarish replica of a nameless peak in the Chagai range. This mountain is the home of Pakistan's nuclear test site. The development, in 1998, of the "Islamic Bomb," intended as a counter to India's nuclear capability, is Pakistan's only celebrated achievement since its formation, in 1947. The mountain replicas, about three stories tall, are surrounded by flower beds that are lovingly weeded, watered, and manicured. At dusk, when the streetlights come on, so do the mountains, glowing a weird molten yellow.
Islamabad's monument to the atomic bomb occupies a rotary between the airport and the city center. Nearby stand models of Pakistan's two classes of missile: Shaheen and Ghauri. The Islamabad nuclear shrine stands at a place where the city is dissolving into an incoherent edge town of shabby strip malls and empty boulevards and rows of desolate government buildings. A little farther in one comes to the gridded blocks of gated homes. The neighborhoods are called sectors. The streets are numbered, not named.
Late last year, after nearly two months in Pakistan, I paid the last of many visits to house No. 8 on street 19, sector F-8/2, a modern white mansion known as Zardari House. The house has been used by Asif Ali Zardari, the imprisoned husband of Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's exiled former Prime Minister. Neither Zardari nor Bhutto has been there for a long time. Zardari has been confined for five years, most recently in Attock Fort, a medieval fortress perched over the Indus River between Islamabad and Peshawar. He is charged with a slew of crimes: large-scale corruption; conspiracy in the murder of Bhutto's brother Mir Murtaza; conspiracy to smuggle narcotics. Bhutto, who also faces corruption charges in Pakistan, lives in Dubai with their three children. Pakistan's leader, General Pervez Musharraf, has promised to have her arrested and tried if she ever returns to Pakistan. Outside the gate to the empty Zardari House sits a man with his back to the wall, a sawed-off shotgun across his knees.
I had been going there to consult with Brigadier Amanullah, known to his friends as Aman. Aman, in his early fifties and now retired, is lithe and gentle-natured and seemed to me slightly depressed. He works in a small office behind Zardari House, where, as the secretary to Benazir Bhutto in Islamabad, he coordinates Bhutto's efforts to return to Pakistan and regain its prime ministership. He also keeps in close touch with old colleagues, who include many powerful people in Pakistan. Aman was once the chief of Pakistan's military intelligence in Sind Province, which borders India. Pakistan's biggest city and a cultural center, Karachi, is in Sind. That put Aman squarely in the middle of things, his finger near many sorts of buttons. Today Aman is believed to act as Bhutto's liaison with the armed forces, and he maintains contacts with serving army officers, including senior generals. When I wanted to speak to someone in the Pakistani government, I asked Aman. When I wanted to speak to someone in the Taliban, or in military intelligence, or in the political opposition, I asked Aman. His replies were mumbled and monosyllabic. He never offered opinions. He would simply hear me out and, most times, tip his head and say, "Why not?" Within an hour after Aman and I parted, I would receive a phone call from his secretary. References would be made to "that man" or "that matter," and I would be given a phone number and a time to call. Having spoken with Aman, I was always expected.
On the day of my final visit Aman seemed more sullen than usual. He ushered me into a room adjoining the office. The room was long and spare. There was an oil painting on the far wall. The other walls were empty and lined with cushioned chairs. Aman sat across from me. We had tea and spoke about the latest events.
As we were wrapping up our conversation, I looked at the oil painting. It was a strange picture, a horizontal landscape about four feet across, with overtones of socialist realism. In the foreground a youthful Benazir Bhutto stood in heroic pose on an escarpment overlooking the featureless grid of Islamabad. Beside her stood her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a Prime Minister who in 1977 was ousted in a coup and two years later hanged. On the other side of Bhutto was Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the long-dead founding father of Pakistan. Their postures were exalted, their expressions a combination of pride and awe. Jinnah's arm pointed to the vast plain beyond the city, where a rocket was lifting out of billowing clouds of vapor and fire into the sky.
Aman noticed me looking at the painting and followed my gaze. I asked him if Benazir Bhutto had commissioned it, and Aman said no. He told me that one day when she was still Prime Minister, an unknown man, an ordinary Pakistani citizen, had come to the gate of Zardari House with the picture and told Aman that he'd painted it for the Prime Minister and wanted to present it to her as a gift. Aman said that he was immediately transfixed by the painting. He called to Bhutto inside the house, but she refused to come down to see the man. Aman was persistent, and eventually she came down.
"I insisted Benazir accept it as a gift," Aman told me.
We both looked up at the painting in silence. "A rocket ship heading to the moon?" I asked.
Aman tipped his head to the side. A smirk tugged at the corners of his mouth. "No," he said. "A nuclear warhead heading to India."
I thought he was making a joke. Then I saw he wasn't. I thought of the shrines to Pakistan's nuclear-weapons site, prominently displayed in every city. I told Aman that I was disturbed by the ease with which Pakistanis talk of nuclear war with India.
Aman shook his head. "No," he said matter-of-factly. "This should happen. We should use the bomb."
"For what purpose?" He didn't seem to understand my question. "In retaliation?" I asked.
"Why not?"
"Or first strike?"
"Why not?"
I looked for a sign of irony. None was visible. Rocking his head side to side, his expression becoming more and more withdrawn, Aman launched into a monologue that neither of us, I am sure, knew was coming:
"We should fire at them and take out a few of their cities—Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta," he said. "They should fire back and take Karachi and Lahore. Kill off a hundred or two hundred million people. They should fire at us and it would all be over. They have acted so badly toward us; they have been so mean. We should teach them a lesson. It would teach all of us a lesson. There is no future here, and we need to start over. So many people think this. Have you been to the villages of Pakistan, the interior? There is nothing but dire poverty and pain. The children have no education; there is nothing to look forward to. Go into the villages, see the poverty. There is no drinking water. Small children without shoes walk miles for a drink of water. I go to the villages and I want to cry. My children have no future. None of the children of Pakistan have a future. We are surrounded by nothing but war and suffering. Millions should die away."
"Pakistan should fire pre-emptively?" I asked.
Aman nodded.
"And you are willing to see your children die?"
"Tens of thousands of people are dying in Kashmir, and the only superpower says nothing," Aman said. "America has sided with India because it has interests there." He told me he was willing to see his children be killed. He repeated that they didn't have any future—his children or any other children.
I asked him if he thought he was alone in his thoughts, and Aman made it clear to me that he was not.
"Believe me," he went on, "If I were in charge, I would have already done it."
Aman stopped, as though he'd stunned even himself. Then he added, with quiet forcefulness, "Before I die, I hope I should see it."

Tuesday, September 18, 2007

Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism

Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism

Asia Report N°130
29 March 2007

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4742&l=1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

More than five years after President Pervez Musharraf declared his intention to crack down on violent sectarian and jihadi groups and to regulate the network of madrasas (religious schools) on which they depend, his government’s reform program is in shambles. Banned sectarian and jihadi groups, supported by networks of mosques and madrasas, continue to operate openly in Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi, and elsewhere. The international community needs to press President Musharraf to fulfil his commitments, in particular to enforce genuine controls on the madrasas and allow free and fair national elections in 2007. It should also shift the focus of its donor aid from helping the government’s ineffectual efforts to reform the religious schools to improving the very weak public school sector.

Karachi’s madrasas, which have trained and dispatched jihadi fighters to Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir, offer a valuable case study of government failures and consequences for internal stability and regional and international security. In 2006, the city was rocked by high-profile acts of political violence. In three separate attacks, suicide bombers killed a U.S. diplomat, assassinated the head of the most prominent Shia political group and wiped out the entire leadership of a Sunni militant group locked in a struggle for control over mosques with its Sunni rivals.

Not all madrasas in the city are active centres of jihadi militancy but even those without direct links to violence promote an ideology that provides religious justification for such attacks. Exploiting Karachi’s rapid, unplanned and unregulated urbanisation and its masses of young, disaffected and impoverished citizens, the madrasa sector has grown at an explosive rate over the past two decades. Given the government’s half-hearted reform efforts, these unregulated madrasas contribute to Karachi’s climate of lawlessness in numerous ways – from illegal land encroachment and criminality to violent clashes between rival militant groups and use of the pulpit to spread calls for sectarian and jihadi violence.

The Pakistan government has yet to take any of the overdue and necessary steps to control religious extremism in Karachi and the rest of the country. Musharraf’s periodic declarations of tough action, given in response to international events and pressure, are invariably followed by retreat. Primarily responsible for the half-hearted efforts is his dependence on the religious right, particularly his coalition partner in the Balochistan government, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), which runs the largest network of Deobandi madrasas. He needs these allies to counter his civilian opposition, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), which dominated politics during the democratic interlude of the 1990s.

Plans are announced with much fanfare and then abandoned. As a result, madrasas remain either unregistered or registered under laws that have no effective implementation. The sectarian, jihadi content of the madrasa curriculum is untouched, and there is no meaningful control over money flows into and through madrasas and other religious institutions. The absence of a single agency, under parliamentary control and with the requisite authority to regulate the madrasa sector, has empowered opponents of reform. Powers are scattered among multiple ministries and levels of government. Attempts to “mainstream” madrasa curricula through introduction of a range of non-religious classes have also proved futile, with most madrasas refusing to cooperate with very modest government reforms. In any case, the introduction of secular courses would only be of slight value unless there were also deep changes in the religious curriculum to end the promotion of violent sectarianism and jihad.

Government efforts, and donors’ money, should instead go towards increased support and reform of the public school system, including removal of the sectarian, pro-jihad, and anti-minority portions of its curriculum. Donors must monitor the reform of that public school curriculum closely and make sure that it is implemented with the requisite long-term commitment.

Exploiting the military government’s weakness, the religious parties and madrasa unions have countered all attempts to regulate the madrasa sector. By backtracking, the government has further emboldened sectarian and extremist forces, resulting in a significant contribution to the violence that plagues Karachi and indeed the rest of the country. The prospects for breaking the links between the madrasa sector and violent extremism would increase if the national elections this year are democratic, free and fair. If they are, it is likely that the religious parties will be marginalised and the national-level moderate parties – with much greater political will to enact meaningful reforms – returned to power.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Pakistan:

1. Adopt an effective, mandatory and madrasa-specific registration law that, in conformity with international conventions on terrorism and extremism:

(a) bars jihadi and violent sectarian teachings from madrasa syllabi;

(b) requires the disclosure and documentation of income and expenditure based on an annual, independent and external financial audit;

(c) requires the documentation of students and their areas of origin and monitors living conditions of students in madrasas; and

(d) establishes controls over financing from domestic and foreign sources, accompanied by regular and proactive monitoring.

2. Establish a single Madrasa Regulatory Authority, headed by the interior minister, operating under parliamentary oversight and with the necessary resources and powers to:

(a) suspend registration of madrasas until such a new law is in force that also includes a new, mandatory registration regime and contains meaningful financial and curricular regulations; and

(b) commission an independent, comprehensive survey to obtain authentic data on the number of madrasas and the size of the student body.

3. Do not treat madrasa certificates as the equivalent of degrees issued by recognised boards of education and universities.

4. Take effective action against all extremist groups and parties, in particular by:

(a) disbanding, pursuant to Article 256 of the constitution, all private militias, including those organised for sectarian and jihadi causes;

(b) dismantling the infrastructure of groups banned under the Anti-Terrorism Law by making public the evidence for which the groups were proscribed, prosecuting their leaders and preventing members from regrouping and reorganising under new identities;

(c) closing all madrasas affiliated with banned organisations or with other sectarian and jihadi organisations;

(d) taking legal action against the administration of any mosque or madrasa whose leader calls for internal or external jihad;

(e) taking legal action against the administration of any mosque or madrasa or religious leader responsible for issuing an apostasy fatwa, whether verbal or written;

(f) cancelling the print declarations (licences) of jihadi and sectarian publications and prosecuting publishers;

(g) blocking the circulation of audio/video cassettes and CDs propagating jihad and sectarian ideologies by prosecuting those responsible for producing and/or selling them;

(h) enforcing existing laws against hate-speech and incitement of communal violence; and

(i) signing immediately the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

5. Improve the quality of life for urban residents and prevent the misuse of mosques and madrasas by:

(a) clearing mosques and madrasas encroaching on state land and dismantling those occupying public parks in Karachi and other cities;

(b) establishing zoning regulations that restrict establishment of madrasas with hostels in residential neighbourhoods; and

(c) enforcing strictly the ban on loudspeakers used in mosques for anything other than permitted religious activities.

6. Reform the public education system by purging material that promotes religious hatred, sectarian bias or historical accounts that justify jihad.

To the International Community:

7. Demand that the Pakistan government honour its commitments to madrasa reform, and in particular urge it to:

(a) close immediately all madrasas linked to banned extremist organisations and all other jihadi and sectarian groups;

(b) establish a Madrasa Regulatory Authority under the ministry of interior and parliamentary oversight and with sufficient powers to enforce meaningful madrasa regulation; and

(c) institute curriculum reform and financial control mechanisms.

8. Give financial support solely for reform of the public school system instead of aiding government attempts to “mainstream” madrasa curricula.

9. Monitor strictly evangelical preachers who work with expatriate Muslim communities in European Union countries and North America.

10. Make diplomatic and financial support to the Pakistan government contingent on the holding of free, fair and democratic national elections.

Islamabad/Brussels, 29 March 2007

Pakistan Under Siege

Pakistan Under Siege

by Zia Mian; FPIF; August 24, 2007

http://www.zmag.org/content/print_article.cfm?itemID=13621&sectionID=1

Pakistan is 60 years old. For over 40 years of its life, it has been ruled directly or indirectly by its army. Each cycle of military rule has left the country in desperate crisis.

The rule of General Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in 1999, has been no different. Beset on all sides, he now seeks, with American help, to ride out the storm and stay in power.

Down this path lies even greater disaster.

Origins of Failure

Pakistan’s leaders have failed it from the beginning. At independence, its founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, adopted the British colonial title and powers of governor-general. He died within a year, leaving no clear vision of the country’s identity or future, no broad-based, cohesive, national political party or movement to guide it, no tradition of democracy. Pakistan fell into the hands of a civil service and army that knew only colonial habits.

There were four governor-generals and seven prime ministers in the first 10 years, rising and falling through palace intrigues, but all powerless in the end. Pakistan could not even create a constitution. Then, in 1958, came the first military coup. General Ayub Khan told the country the army had no choice. There was, he said, “total administrative, economic, political and moral chaos” brought about “by self-seekers, who in the garb of political leaders, have ravaged the country.”

General Ayub Khan ruled for a decade. His two goals were strengthening the army and modernizing of the society and economy. The General negotiated a close military alliance with the United States, which was looking for Cold War clients around the world. American dollars, weapons, advisors, and ideas poured into Pakistan. The result was the 1965 war with India, wrenching social change, and grievous inequality. By the end of his rule, it was said that 22 families controlled two-thirds of Pakistani industry and an even larger share of its banking and insurance sector.

Eventually, the people rose in revolt. The demands for representation were greatest in East Pakistan, home to the majority of Pakistan’s people. Elections were held and a nationalist party from the East emerged victorious, but the army and its political allies were mostly from West Pakistan and would have none of it. The army went to war against its own people. There were appalling massacres. In 1971, with help from India, East Pakistan broke free and became Bangladesh.

Lost Generation

The army relinquished power in the West. But the new civilian leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, lacked a democratic temperament, and treated opposition as threat. He nationalized large sectors of the economy, further strengthening already unaccountable bureaucrats, doled out government jobs to his followers, established Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, and refined the practice of buying public support by appeasing the mullahs.

In 1977, the army took back control, and executed Bhutto. The new ruler, General Zia ul Haq, sought to Islamize Pakistan. He introduced religious laws, courts, and taxes, supported radical Islamist madrassas (seminaries) and political parties, and altered school textbooks to promote a conservative Islamic nationalism. Work on the bomb proceeded apace.

The United States turned a blind eye to both the dictatorship and the bomb. It poured billions of dollars into Pakistan to buy support for a war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The Pakistan army trained and armed Islamic militants from around the world, with American money, and sent them across the border to fight godless communism. The jihad was born.

General Zia died in a mysterious plane crash in 1988, and the Soviet Union admitted defeat and left Afghanistan. Elections were held, only to have the army become the power behind the throne. America re-discovered that Pakistan was building the bomb, and imposed sanctions. It was too late.

The new crop of leaders, including Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir, descended into corruption and intrigue, each seeking the army’s help to take office. There were nine prime ministers in 10 years. Some actively courted the mullahs, none tried to undo the Islamic order created by General Zia. A generation was abandoned to intolerance, violence, and radical Islam.

The army demanded the lion’s share of national resources. The politicians paid up, even though the economy crumbled and one-third of Pakistanis fell below the poverty line. The army continued to dominate foreign policy. It helped create, train, arm, and lead the Taliban to power in Afghanistan. The goal was to create a client regime and secure Pakistan’s western borders. The people of Afghanistan paid a terrible price.

A similar strategy was tried in Kashmir. Pakistan organized and armed Islamist fighters and sent them to battle. Kashmiris, who have struggled for decades for the right to decide their own future free from Indian rule, found themselves trapped between the violence unleashed by Indian armed forces and Pakistan-backed militants.

Amid the chaos, in 1998, India and then Pakistan tested nuclear weapons and a year later went to war. Both sides hurled nuclear threats. Pakistan’s elected politicians went along, claiming credit at every opportunity.

The Musharraf Era

There were few protests when the army, led by General Pervez Musharraf, seized power in 1999. “The armed forces have no intention to stay in charge longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish,” he promised. Instead, he rigged elections and made a deal with Islamist political parties willing to support him as president.

After the September 11 attacks, the United States dropped its opposition to General Musharraf. It needed Pakistan’s support for another American war. Money poured in (over $10 billion so far), and demands for a return to democracy disappeared.

After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, many Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters fled across the border to Pakistan’s tribal areas where they have reconstituted themselves. Under U.S. pressure, the Pakistan army has tried to go into the tribal border areas to show they are tackling the Taliban and al-Qaeda there. They have met resistance. Also, there are many in the army who do not want to fight what they see as an American war. The army has resorted to missile attacks from aircraft, helicopter gun ships, and artillery. As civilian casualties have grown, local people have turned against the army, and some have joined the militants.

The al-Qaeda and Taliban influence has started to spread from the remote border areas to larger towns and even major cities in the two border provinces. These militants have made common cause with local Islamist groups, who find recruits in Pakistan’s countless madrassas and its many Islamic political parties. Militants have attacked soldiers, policemen, local officials, ordinary people, and national leaders, including Musharraf. Suicide bombings have claimed hundreds of lives across the country.

Islamist fighters have taken over whole villages. Emulating the Taliban, they repress women, close girls’ schools, attack DVD and music shops, destroy TVs, and demand men grow beards and go to the mosque. The movement has spread even to the capital. For six months, Islamist students and fighters occupied a mosque in Islamabad and set up their own court. The government sat by until forced to act by national and international pressure. The bloody storming of the mosque served only to fuel the militancy and enrage public opinion.

Sectarian violence has accompanied the rise of the militant Islamists. Armed Sunni groups, some linked to major political parties, have attacked Shias and religious minorities with abandon. Hundreds have died. Even though the groups are banned, they operate with impunity, their leaders appearing in public.

The Islamists are not the only armed resistance to the state. There is an insurgency in Pakistan’s largest province, Baluchistan, fuelled by demands for greater autonomy and control over their natural resources. It is a longstanding grievance. The Pakistani army crushed the latest in a series of four insurgencies. Baluch groups have obstructed and attacked gas facilities, gas and oil pipelines, electricity transmission towers, and train tracks. They have also targeted foreign companies seeking to explore new gas fields in the province and working on other development projects there. They have also called protests and strikes.

The Democratic Challenge

The army’s effort to confront Islamists and Baluch insurgents has created its own crisis. Over the past few years, the government has taken into custody hundreds of people and, after they “disappeared,” denied ever having arrested them. Their families found an ally in the chief justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court. He has demanded that the government produce the missing people in court. General Musharraf responded by firing the chief justice. Musharraf’s greater fear is that an activist court would block his effort to continue in power as president.

There was a national movement for the reinstatement of the chief justice. Judges resigned, lawyers went on strike, and police attacked demonstrations by lawyers outside the Supreme Court. Across the country, large crowds gathered to hear and support the chief justice. The Supreme Court declared that the chief justice must be reinstated. Musharraf had to concede defeat.

The Court is now hearing the cases of the missing people. The government has produced some and dragged its feet on others. The chief justice has threatened to jail a senior law enforcement official and summon the chiefs of Pakistan’s armed forces if the government will not produce the people in court. As elections loom, and Musharraf seeks to retain power, the Court has already begun to hear appeals on voter registration.

Some hope that restoring a semblance of democracy could turn the tide against the Islamists and reduce the nuclear danger. Musharraf, with U.S. help, is trying to cobble together a deal to stay in power. He is considering dumping his Islamist allies in exchange for support from Benazir Bhutto, who would be cleared of the corruption charges that she fled and allowed to return from exile. It will not be enough.

In the Musharraf years, the army has consolidated its power in new ways. Generals rule provinces, run government ministries, administer universities, and manage national companies. The army’s business interests now span banking and insurance, cement and fertilizer, electricity and sugar, corn and corn flakes. They will not give this up without a fight.

For the army, the outside world appears threatening too. As India’s economy grows and it increases military spending in leaps and bounds, Pakistan’s army looks for ways to keep up. With the United States cultivating a new strategic relationship with India, the army fears losing its oldest ally. It worries how it will sustain its nuclear, missile and conventional weapons arms race with India. The army must extract yet more from Pakistan’s economy. A civilian government rule will not be allowed to challenge these priorities.

Military rule and puppet politicians have brought Pakistan to its present dreadful state. Rather than keeping Musharraf in power, the world must demand that Pakistan’s army yield control over government and economy once and for all. Only a freely elected and representative government that can actually make decisions can pursue economic development as if people mattered, confront the Islamists, and make peace with India.

Zia Mian is a physicist with the Program on Science and Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and a columnist for Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org). An earlier version of this piece appeared in The Philadelphia Inquirer.

Testimony on Madrasas and U.S. Aid to Pakistan

Testimony on Madrasas and U.S. Aid to Pakistan before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Samina Ahmed

Testimony of Dr. Samina Ahmed, South Asia Project Director, International Crisis Group, to the House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Hearing on “Extremist Madrasas, Ghost Schools, and U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Are We Making the Grade of 9/11 Commission Report Card?”

I want to thank Chairman John F. Tierney for holding this important hearing and inviting me to testify on behalf of the International Crisis Group on the threats posed to regional and international security by violent sectarian and jihadi groups in Pakistan and the network of extremist madrasas on which they depend.

The Crisis Group has been in South Asia since December 2001, and has published reports directly relevant to the issues under this committee’s review. We are deeply concerned about the Musharraf government’s failure to dismantle jihadi and violent sectarian groups and regulate the madrasa sector that helps sustain them. We also believe that the Musharraf government deserves an “F” with respect to the 9/11 Commission call for it to make the decision to end Taliban command and control, recruiting and training centers in Pakistan. Expanding on the multiple threats posed by Islamist extremism in Pakistan, my testimony will focus on the state of Islamic radicalism in a country which, given the right international and domestic policies and political will, could play a key role in countering global terrorism.

Religious extremism in Pakistan has become the focus of international attention in the wake of the attacks of September 11. More than five years ago, Pakistan’s military government, in its role as a key ally in the war on terrorism, had pledged to curb militancy and religious extremism within the country and abroad, and to set Pakistani society on a sustainable course that would lead to political pluralism and religious tolerance. Although the Musharraf government has benefited enormously from its partnership with the United States, gaining billions of dollars in U.S. assistance as well as crucial diplomatic support, it has failed on a number of scores.

The Pakistan government has yet to crack down on violent sectarian and jihadi groups and to regulate the madrasas on which they depend. Many Islamist radical groups have been banned and then allowed to operate under changed names, including a number proscribed by the U.S. as terror organizations. Nor has the government regulated and reformed the madrasa sector, which remains their main source of recruitment. It has yet to make any meaningful progress in registering madrasas, regulating their curriculum, monitoring their funding, or checking their use in spreading political and sectarian prejudices. Extremist madrasas still provide and train recruits for local, regional and international jihads. Since Pakistan’s laws on terror financing also remain muddled and opaque, madrasa funding remains unaccountable. This lack of government action is undermining regional stability, promoting extremism, and preventing the spread of democratic ideals in Pakistan.

Lal Masjid: Madrasa Reform on Hold

Nothing more amply demonstrates the government’s lack of political will to combat violent sectarian and jihadi groups and to regulate the madrasa sector that helps sustain them than its failure to enforce the writ of the state against a jihadi madrasa complex situated in the very heart of the federal capital, Islamabad. Since January 2007, hundreds of hard-line male and female students from the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) complex which houses Jamia Hafsa (for women) and Jamia Fareedia (for men) have taken the law into their hands to protest the demolition of illegally constructed mosques and madrasas on state land. Demanding the imposition of the Sharia (Islamic law) in Pakistan, and attempting to forcibly impose their version of radical Islam on the country’s moderate majority, they have kidnapped women after accusing them of immoral conduct, occupied a state-run children’s library and attacked music and video shops.

The Lal Masjid complex is led by two clerical brothers, Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Ghazi Abdul Rasheed, who had been detained for harboring and abetting terrorists in 2004 but were released after Musharraf’s Religious Affairs Minister Ijazul Haq took up their cause. Lal Masjid’s madrasa managers still publicly support the Taliban; and encourage their students to join the anti-Western jihad in Afghanistan. The two clerical brothers have even warned Islamabad that their 10,000 men and women students would launch suicide attacks if the state attempts to forcibly suppress their Taliban-style movement.

The Lal Masjid complex is state-run and state-funded. Yet President and Army Chief Pervez Musharraf’s government has not dismissed the managers of Lal Masjid’s madrasas from public service, let alone enforced the law. Instead, the government has agreed to rebuild the demolished mosques on state land, with state funding. In an attempt to appease Lal Masjid’s jihadis, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, the leader of Musharraf’s ruling party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam—PML-Q) has even expressed his government’s willingness to take tangible steps to enforce the Shariah.

Lal Majid’s jihadis have become the focus of international attention largely because this jihadi madrasa complex is located in the heart of the federal capital. But scores of other jihadi madrasas are thriving countrywide, promoting violent sectarianism within Pakistan and training and dispatching jihadi fighters to Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir.

Five years after Musharraf declared his intention to crack down on extremist madrasas and regulate the religious education sector, his reform plan is in shambles.

*
The amended Societies Registration Act of 1860, the law enacted by the Musharraf government for registering and regulating madrasas is riddled with loopholes and exceptions. This law does nothing to clarify the real number of madrasas. It also fails to generate any useful information about their activities.
*
Despite bans and restrictions, the enrolment of foreign students is insufficiently regulated.
*
There are no meaningful financial disclosure and oversight mechanisms of funding or other financial information. The madrasa law does not provide for independent audits or include useful information about donors or details of expenditures.
*
Madrasa curriculum reform, or the government’s scheme of ‘mainstreaming’ the madrasas, focuses on adding modern, non-religious courses but excludes the violent sectarian, jihadi content of the religious curriculum from its purview.
*
Madrasas and mosques still disseminate jihadi views, despite laws against hate speech, through books, newspapers, pamphlets, handbills, audiotapes and videotapes.
*
Madrasas run by banned sectarian and jihadi groups operate freely countrywide and continue to provide foot soldiers to radical Islamist organizations, for the jihads in Afghanistan and Kashmir and to al-Qaeda linked terror groups.

Domestic Extremism and International Terror

The U.S. State Department’s 2006 Country Report on Terrorism has called Pakistan “a major source of Islamic extremism and a safe haven for top terrorist leaders”. Senior U.S. military and intelligence officials, testifying before Congress, have warned of a resurgent al-Qaeda, aligned with local groups, extending its operations from bases in Pakistan to the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. With jihadi madrasas still indoctrinating Pakistan’s youth, justifying the use of indiscriminate force on religious grounds, and providing recruits for homegrown terrorist groups, many with links to al-Qaeda, there is good reason for concern.

More than five years after Musharraf promised to crack down on terrorism and to end the jihadi culture in Pakistan, jihadi and violent sectarian groups, many listed as terrorist by the United Nations and the United States and banned by his government, have been allowed to operate freely under changed names or through front organizations. These include the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), renamed the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Jaish-e-Mohammad which calls itself the Khadam-ul-Islam. Their leaders operate freely, issuing public calls for jihad, with the jihadi madrasas providing their organizations an endless supply of recruits. The infrastructure of these terror groups and hence their capacity to mount terrorist attacks remain intact.

The Musharraf government’s successes against al-Qaeda, including its 600 arrests, appear impressive but should be weighed against its failure to eliminate Pakistan’s homegrown terrorist organizations with links to transnational terrorism. In fact, the divide between homegrown terrorists and al-Qaeda is artificial at best. Both are motivated by a distorted religious ideology and rely on terror tactics.

Most al-Qaeda adherents, foreign or local, have close connections with domestic jihadi organizations. A Karachi-based al-Qaeda linked jihadi group conducted the suicide attack that killed a U.S. diplomat in Karachi in March 2006. Links between mainstream Islamist parties, such as the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), the second largest party in the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), Musharraf’s coalition partner in the Balochistan provincial government, and international terrorist networks have also come into the limelight after the arrests of a number of high profile al-Qaeda operatives from the homes of JI workers, including al-Qaeda operations chief Khalid Sheikh Mohammad in 2003.

Yet Musharraf’s government remains the MMA’s coalition partner in Balochistan. The military government has also worked openly with banned jihadi groups including Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the renamed LeT, in the earthquake-hit areas of Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Government inaction and the military’s continued support for jihadi organizations operating in Kashmir bears major implications for Pakistani, regional and international security.

*
Sectarian violence is at an all-time high, even in regions such as Balochistan where such attacks were once unknown. In July 2003, an attack on a Shia mosque in Balochistan’s capital, Quetta, left 54 Shias dead; a Deobandi attack on a rival Sunni group killed 47 people in Karachi in April 2006; on 27 January 2007, a suicide bomber killed at least 13 people, including the city police chief, in a sectarian attack in NWFP’s capital Peshawar.
*
In the absence of a robust anti-money laundering law, promised in 2002 but still to be placed before parliament, terror financing to jihadi madrasas as well as homegrown and foreign terrorist groups flows unhindered.
*
With the support of their local allies, al-Qaeda has revived and reorganized its base in Pakistan.
*
Pakistan-based jihadi groups including the renamed LeT still conduct terror attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir; this terror activity could disrupt the normalization of relations between the two nuclear-armed South Asian adversaries.

Madrasas, Talibanization and Compulsions of Military Rule

After almost eighth years of absolute rule, Musharraf has yet to live up to his pledges to confront and eliminate Islamic extremism. This failure owes far less to the difficulty of implementing reforms than his military government’s political compulsions. Musharraf has chosen to co-opt the Islamist parties that run Pakistan’s jihadi madrasas to consolidate his regime and to neutralize his moderate political opposition. Whatever measures taken thus far to contain Islamist radicalism have been largely cosmetic, and primarily aimed at easing international pressure.

In 2002, the military government rigged the national elections. Musharraf’s moderate civilian opposition, Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League (PML-N), which dominated politics during the democratic interlude of the 1990s were marginalized. Even during the 1990s, efforts made by elected governments to rid Pakistan of Islamic extremism were thwarted by the military, including, for instance, Bhutto’s efforts to reform the madrasa sector and Sharif’s attempts to subdue violent sectarianism. Their governments were dismissed by the military well before their full terms.

Under Musharraf, with the military’s support, for the very first time in Pakistan’s history Islamist parties, members of the six party MMA alliance captured two of the four provincial (state) governments in Pakistan in the rigged 2002 national polls. The MMA now rules these strategically located provinces bordering on Afghanistan-- the Northwest Frontier Province and Balochistan, where it is a coalition partner with Musharraf’s PML-Q. The Islamist parties have repaid Musharraf for his support by helping him gain a vote of confidence in parliament, which extended his presidency until 2007.

Lacking a civilian constituency, Musharraf remains as dependent today on the religious parties, particularly his coalition partner in the Balochistan government, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), the pro-Taliban party, and the major partner in the MMA alliance, to counter his moderate civilian opposition. The JUI runs the largest network of Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan. Not only are most sectarian, jihadi madrasas associated with the Deobandi sect, the JUI’s madrasa network also provides sanctuary, support and recruits to the Taliban and their Pakistani militant allies. The JUI-led Balochistan and NWFP governments also actively promote religious vigilantism and are responsible for the creeping Talibanization of Pakistan’s predominantly Pashtun tribal belt.

The military’s policy of appeasing homegrown militants in Pakistan’s tribal belt has focused on peace deals that have amnestied pro-Taliban militants. The military’s virtual retreat to the barracks, ceding control over this strategic region bordering on Afghanistan to the Islamist radicals, has given the Taliban a secure base of operations. Emboldened Taliban and their Pakistani allies are now targeting U.S. and Afghan troops across the border and imposing oppressive Taliban-style policing and court systems in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The implications of the military government’s policies are more than evident.

*
Following peace deals with the military government, using the region to regroup, reorganize and rearm, Taliban and other foreign militants, including al-Qaeda are launching increasingly severe cross-border attacks on Afghan and international military personnel, with the support and active involvement of Pakistani militants.
*
Appeasement has not only allowed local militants to establish Taliban-style governance structures, but Talibanization is also spreading into NWFP’s settled districts.
*
Taliban-linked command and control centers also operate from Quetta in Balochistan and Peshawar in NWFP, urban centers that are fully under the control of the Pakistan military, according to every knowledgeable observer, including current Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, former NATO Commanding General James Jones, the head of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and Chief of Operations at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lt. General Douglas Lute who have testified on this issue before the U.S. Congress.

Upcoming Elections and US Policy Choices

In 2007, presidential elections and national elections are due in Pakistan. If these elections are free, fair and democratic, the moderate parties, which retain the largest segment of popular support, will form government, and the religious parties will be marginalized, creating an enabling climate for meaningful reform of the madrasa sector.

The choice that Pakistan faces is not between the military and the mullahs, as is generally believed in the West, including the United States. It is between genuine democracy and a mullah-military alliance that is responsible for the religious extremism that poses a threat to Pakistani, regional and international security. Real reform of the Pakistani state and polity will only be possible through the strengthening of the country’s moderate parties and forces, with free and fair elections as an essential precondition and first step.

To prevent the military from once again derailing democracy and to pressure it from abandoning its policy of using Islamist proxies to promote perceived regional interests in Afghanistan and India, the United States must send a clear signal of zero tolerance, as it did in the immediate aftermath of September 11, backed by the threat of targeted military-specific sanctions.

The United States must change its policy of unconditional support for General Musharraf; instead it should insist on benchmarks for tangible reform.

The U.S. should call on the Musharraf government to:

*
Effectively regulate and reform the madrasa sector, and close all jihadi madrasas and those affiliated with banned organizations.
*
Dismantle the infrastructure of groups banned under Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Law, prosecute their leaders and prevent members from regrouping and reorganizing under new identities.
*
Immediately enact meaningful anti-money laundering legislation and sign the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

The United States should:

*
Make military assistance conditional on Pakistan denying the Taliban sanctuary and a base of operations on its soil; and ending Taliban recruitment, training and finances.
*
Make diplomatic support and levels of financial support to the Pakistan government contingent on free, fair and democratic elections in 2007.

Origins and Growth Patterns of Islamic Organizations in Pakistan

Awesome article !!!

There are well meaning people suggesting corrective action, but who is listening?

Contrarian

MOHAMMAD WASEEM
Origins and Growth Patterns of Islamic Organizations in Pakistan


http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach2.pdf.

During the flurry of scholarly studies after September 11,
2001, researchers typically focused on investigation into Quranic
teachings, analysis of jihad and jihadis and interpretations of the
“Muslim mind” in general. This approach was sometimes put in a
larger context of the perceived clash of civilizations. The specific
Islamic civilization was characterized as a relatively emotive, undisci-
plined, medievalist and essentially irrational force inherently disrup-
tive of the modern civilization led by the West. Often, jihadi parties
and groups, topped by the erstwhile Taliban and its ally al-Qaeda
operating in the region surrounding Pakistan, provided the basic
material for outlining the emergence of a self-propelling motivating
force in the form of Islamic organizations. According to this
approach, this inner state of mind of Muslim terrorists inspired by
jihadist teachings lies at the heart of the problem.
Paul Brass distinguishes this so-called primordial approach from
the instrumentalist or circumstantialist approach, which considers
Islamic ideology as a social construct sponsored by the elite in pursuit
of political objectives.

While the primordial approach stresses the
innate mobilizing and inspiring strength of the appeal of Islamic val-
ues and norms, the circumstantialist approach focuses on state poli-
cies and organizational goals. The latter approach has been an obvi-
ous casualty in the heat of debate during the war against terror. It has
been generally discounted as irrelevant and inapplicable to the current
Muslim challenge to the world peace and stability. For example, in a
recent opinion poll in the United States, 82 percent of people believed
that terrorism was not related to public policy as pursued by
Washington. In most Muslim countries, including Pakistan, there are
estimated to be as many people or even more who would believe oth-
erwise. In other words, the Muslim self-statement is rooted in the cir-
cumstantialist approach to Islamic militancy. According to this, it is
the perceived unjust policies of the United States that should be held
responsible for the emergence of anti-American feelings throughout
the Muslim world. It is argued that the content and style of Islamic
organizational activities can be most fruitfully evaluated in a contex-
tual framework.
We propose to look at the issue of Islamic militancy in Pakistan
with reference to the postcolonial state, which cultivated Islam as a
supreme source of legitimacy. In addition, we shall discuss the emer-
gence of political Islam as an electoral force, a quarter of a century
after independence. Similarly, we want to analyze the political role of
sectarian organizations along with their madrassa-based educational
and training activities. Finally, we shall discuss the input of interna-
tional Islamic networks in the emergence of the militant thought and
practice.

State and Islam IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POPULAR RESPONSE to Western policies or to
policies of pro-Western regimes in the Muslim world, there can be
fundamental differences in the potential of Islamic movements to
challenge, reshape or topple the ruling set-up. This depends largely on
the nature of a specific Muslim state. On the one hand, there are the
ex-British colonial societies including India, Sri Lanka, Kenya and
Ghana as well as Muslim states such as Malaysia, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Sudan, and Nigeria. Here, a kind of “tutelary democ-
racy” prevailed at the time of independence, comprising objectified
sources of authority in the sense of rule of law and rule of public
representatives on the one hand and the power base of traditional
elite operating in the modern state sector through electoral politics on
the other.

No populist revolution has upturned a government in any
of the Commonwealth countries in the postwar era, from either reli-
gious or class perspective.
On the other hand, there are non-ex-British colonies such as
Vietnam, Kampuchea, Angola, Mozambique and Muslim states of
Algeria and Indonesia. Here, the second component of the British
colonial legacy, i.e., the traditional elite acting as a broker between the
state and society, was missing. As the “assimilationist” policies of
colonial governments co-opted the local elite, the latter lost legitimacy
in the public eye and thus rendered initiative into the hands of radi-
cal urban intelligentsia. Following the pattern of their modern prede-
cessors who had fought against the French colonial rule, Islamic
groups in Algeria ran a populist election campaign and almost cap-
tured the state in the aborted 1993 elections.
At the other end, Muslim countries with a non-colonial past, includ-
ing Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria, lacked the first
component of the colonial state, i.e., objectification of the sources of
authority in the form of constitutional rule. Here, the state depended
in the last resort on a “community of trust” represented by Pehlavi
dynasty, Kabul nobility, House of Saud, Takritis and Alavis, respec-
tively.

The process of modernization, postwar communication
explosion and horizontal mobility—especially urbanization—created
enormous pressures on these states. They lacked an internally differ-
entiated legal-institutional mechanism to keep the oppositional move-
ments decentralized as well as de-ideologized. Iran and Afghanistan
collapsed in the face of these movements, while Saudi Arabia faces
grim prospects of a populist challenge in the first decade of the
twenty-first century.
Pakistan is a constitutional state, with a colonial legacy deeply
rooted in the rule of law as well as electoral democracy, which was
disrupted by four stints of military rule. Paradoxically, the new state
was carved out of India as a Muslim state in the teeth of opposition
from some Islamic groups and parties led by Jamiat Ulema Hind
(JUH). However, certain lesser Islamic groups became part of the
Pakistan movement and later emerged as an in-built pressure group
within the post-independence state system. We can outline four major
currents of Islamic thinking and activity in British India that together
formed the Islamic tradition as part of the political culture of
Pakistan in its early phase: mass agitation such as the Khilafat move-
ment and Hijrat movement (1920–24); institutions of Islamic learning
such as at Deoband, Breilly and Lucknow, which provided a frame-
work for the Muslim self-statement about classical values and norms
of Islam and the contemporary response of Muslim societies to
Western domination; Islamic revivalist movements led by Wahabis at
one end and Ahmadis at the other, with organizations such as Tableeq
and Tanzim operating in the middle for restoring the glory of Islam;
and mulla activism in the Pakhtun tribal area adjoining Afghanistan,
which characterized the local rebellion against a remote, impersonal
and alien state in a narodnik spirit.

Islam in Pakistan has represented
all four trends represented by street agitation, anti-Western intellectual
discourse, religious scholarship of madrassas and the potential for a
xenophobic tribal rebellion in the North West Frontier Province
(NWFP), respectively. While the general public displayed these
strands of Islamic thought and action, the official Islam focused on
the “two-nation theory” and later Pakistan ideology as sources of
state legitimacy and profile of national destiny.
For a quarter of a century after independence, the modernist
Muslim elite kept the reigns of government firmly in its own hands.
The logic of Partition as fulfillment of the demand for a separate
Muslim homeland carved out of British India kept Islam at the center
of the nationalist discourse. Additionally, the migrant-led ruling

elite—including the first governor general Jinnah and the first prime
minister Liaqat, who came from Bombay and United Provinces (UP)
in India, respectively—opted for a model of centralist rule sometimes
described as the viceregal system.

Governments used Islamic ideol-ogy to counter the demand for provincial autonomy in pursuit of their agenda for national unity. Ulema and Islamists in general occupied a secondary role in public life. While operating from the madrassa and the pulpit of the mosque, they demanded rule of shari’a in Pakistan. Under successive parliamentary governments (1947–58) followed by General Ayub’s military—and later presidential—rule
(1958–69), the ruling elite adopted various strategies to control, cajole
or co-opt Islamist elements. The latter condemned the former for
being lackeys of the secular West.
Emergence of Political Islam
THE 1970 ELECTION WAS A TURNING POINT in the history of Islamist
groups and parties. General Yahya’s military government (1969–71)
faced the leftist challenge from Zulfiqar Ali (Z.A.) Bhutto in West
Pakistan and the Bengali nationalist challenge from Mujiburrehman in
East Pakistan. It decided to back Islamist elements in both wings to
stem the tide of anti-establishment feelings. The 1970 election is gen-
erally identified with the emergence of politics of the Left in West
Pakistan, not the least because it led to the formation of Bhutto’s
populist government in Islamabad.
6
However, the 1970 election also
ushered in an era of politics of Islam. Ulema moved out of their
mosques and madrassas, and managed to get eighteen out of three
hundred seats in the national assembly (NA). Surprisingly, the conser-
vative Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI)—based on the Deobandi sect—got
seven NA seats in the Pakhtun tribal belt of NWFP and Baluchistan.
It formed coalition governments in the two provinces and even got
chief ministership for itself in NWFP. The relatively less strict Jamiat
Ulema Pakistan (JUP)—based on the Brelvi sect—also got seven
seats, while the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)—the essentialist party of univer-
sity graduates—won four seats.
While politics of the Left represented the popular wave under
Z.A. Bhutto, the opposition politics took a turn in the 1970s in favor
of Islamic parties. First, they moved from a mere pressure group to
becoming stakeholders in the political system itself, and sought to
Islamize the system from within. Second, they formed coalition gov-
ernments in the two provincial governments and thus got a share in
state power in terms of resource allocation to their constituents.
Third, in the event of a total defeat of the mainstream Pakistan
Muslim League (PML) factions in the 1970 elections, the mantle of
legitimacy for the role of opposition through the media and public
forums fell on the JI-JUI-JUP representatives in and outside legisla-
tures. They consistently criticized Bhutto for his un-Islamic (read
“socialist”) policies and introduced a comprehensive Islamic dis-
course for discussing the national agenda in public. Finally, they lent
a religious character to the anti-Bhutto movement after the contro-
versial elections of 1977. The relatively secular ethnic elite and lib-
eral mainstream politicians in the opposition’s Pakistan National
Alliance (PNA) felt obliged to accept the ideological leadership of
Islamic parties, not the least because the latter mobilized thousands
of madrassa students to bring demonstrations out in the street and
used mosques for propagating war against an “infidel” Bhutto.
Islamism almost forced itself as a source of legitimacy for the new
military leader General Zia (1977–88). The more the Pakistan People’s
Party (PPP) leader Bhutto displayed his potential to challenge Zia
from jail, the more Zia manipulated Islamic ideology for stabilizing
his regime. He issued the controversial Hadood Ordinances shortly
before hanging Bhutto ostensibly to pre-empt the much-feared agita-
tion from his party. Zia castigated democracy as an importation from
the West and instead upheld Islam as a source of legitimacy. The
Islamic parties JI, JUI and JUP joined Zia’s military government in an
all-out effort to stop Bhutto’s party from coming back to power in the
event of elections. Cooperation between army and Islamic parties that
started under Yahya came to fruition under Zia. The JI earned the
dubious title of Martial Law’s B team. Islam and democracy appeared
to be incompatible entities.
During the Zia period, Islamist groups and parties gained
immensely in terms of building an image of street power. The first
major agitation of Islamist elements in the 1953 anti-Ahmadiya
movement had brought down the Daultana government in Punjab
and subsequently the Nazimuddin government in the Center. In the
following decades, several governments took to their heals in the face
of a threat of Islamic agitation.
In 1962, Ayub accepted the demand from the Islamist group for
changing the name of the country from Republic of Pakistan to
Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In 1974, Z.A. Bhutto obliged Islamists
by declaring Ahmadis—his erstwhile allies in the 1970 elections—a
religious minority. In 1981, Zia conceded to the Shia activists by
exempting Shias from payment of Zakat, which was generally identi-
fied with Sunni jurisprudence. In 1995, Benazir Bhutto withdrew her
decision to audit the finances of madrassas, stop guerrilla training of
their students and reform their hate-based curricula in the face of a
nationwide strike. In 1998, Nawaz Sharif met the same fate when he
wanted to implement these reforms. In 2000, General Musahrraf
withdrew his proposal to reform the procedural aspects of the
Blasphemy Law in the face of a threat of street agitation from
Islamists. In this way Islamic parties demonstrated their street power
whenever their interests were threatened.
The war in Afghanistan, which was initiated, financed and spon-
sored by Islamabad and, indirectly but more effectively, by
Washington, took Islamic politics into its militant mode of opera-
tion. Afghan mujahideen and their counterparts from Pakistan
embraced the ideology of jihad against the Soviet Union. Islamic
parties, especially JI but also JUI with its base among the tribal
Pathan population in the vicinity of the war theater, accumulated
immense financial resources, gained access to the diplomatic world
and got hold of lethal weapons in large numbers. However, these
parties progressively lost electoral space. Their combined vote came
down from 21.5 percent in 1970 to 6.7 percent in 1993. In 1997, all
Islamic parties put together got two out of 207 National Assembly
seats. It was clear that their real strength and agenda had moved out-
side the narrow confines of electoral politics and even the territorial
limits of Pakistan.
The armed might of jihadist parties was rendered ineffective during
the U.S.-led war against terrorism in 2001–02. The loss of direction
for Islamists, combined with despondency, led to reworking of links
with ideological allies at home and abroad. As Pakistan moved to elec-
tions in October 2002, the anti-American sentiment provided a rally-
ing ground for Islamic parties.
Sectarian Dimension
ALMOST ALL ISLAMIC PARTIES and groups in Pakistan are based in spe-
cific sects and subsects. Only JI, along with its student body Islamic
Jamiat Talba (IJT), is supra-sectarian in approach and activity.

This party represented the Islamist conservative section of the urban mid-
dle class, educated in colleges and universities. JI has no constituency
in rural areas, few pockets of support among industrial workers and a
limited electoral strength. It has essentially operated as a pressure
group for Islamizing the state and implementing Sharia. It produced
Islamic literature in the Urdu language, which tried to grapple with
modern issues of politics and administration, education and health,
and manners and morals. JI aimed at Islamizing the state system of
Pakistan through electoral democracy, using the instrument of law. It
established its student wings in the institutions of higher learning
throughout the country. The military elite often used the JI’s endemic
presence in professions—e.g., Urdu press, as well as colleges and uni-
versities—to destabilize an incumbent government, especially a PPP
government. The party enjoyed its heyday under Zia who turned its
intellectual, organizational and ideological resources into a great asset
for his agenda to deflect democratic challenges at home and regulate
the support mechanism for the war in Afghanistan. Being educated in
colleges and universities, JI-oriented men and women have a strong
job orientation and indeed already have a considerable presence
within the power-wielding institutions of the state.
However, a sectarian party is the prototype of Islamic organization
today.
8
Pakistanis are predominantly Sunni and followers of the
Hanafi school of thought (as opposed to the relatively more strict
Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi schools popular in several Arab countries).
Sunni-Hanafis have their center of gravity in the Indo-Muslim civi-
lization, especially in the two seminaries at Breilly and Deoband in
northern India. Brelvis encourage saint-worship and shrine-worship,
indulge in superstitious practices and uphold the tradition of Sufi
orders established over centuries. They represent the majority in
Pakistan, with a large base in the peasant culture of Punjab. JUP, as
the leading Brelvi party, is typically non-militant. Brelvi ulema allow
separation between church and state inasmuch as their followers vote
for local influentials who may not be JUI nominees. JUP has gener-
ally kept a low profile, except during the 1977 anti-Bhutto movement.
It held an all-Pakistan Sunni conference in 2000. As an offshoot of
JUP in Karachi, the Sunni Tehrik represents a diehard approach to the
Sunni agenda.
While Brelvis represent oral orthodoxy cushioned by devotional
practices, Deobandis represent literate orthodoxy with a strict adher-
ence to the classical texts of Islam. This sect has produced several
organizations: JUH in the 1920s, Ahrars and Majlis Tahaffuz Khatm
e Nubawat (MTKN) in the 1940s and its leading party in Pakistan JUI,
which was sometimes divided into rival factions, such as Hazarvi ver-
sus Thanvi groups and Fazlurrehman versus Samiul Haq groups. As
JUI(s) embraced militant politics during the Zia period, the Sipah-i
Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) emerged as its sectarian outfit. The latter in
turn gave birth to a terrorist group Lashkar-i Jhangvi (LJ), which had
a clear mandate to kill Shias and destroy their infrastructure. As the
main anti-Shia groups for the last two decades, SSP and LJ were
widely held responsible for sectarian terrorism. Nawaz Sharif intro-
duced an Anti-Sectarian Bill in the national assembly in 1993 to con-
trol their activities. But the bill was allowed to lapse, ostensibly for the
fear of alienating the pro-Nawaz Sunni establishment. General
Musharraf finally banned LJ in 2001.
In Punjab, the appeal of Deobandis has been limited to some lower
middle class sections of the population. However, Pakhtuns of
NWFP and also Baluchistan emerged as natural followers of
Deobandism. The rigid adherence to Pakhtun tribal customs amply
correlated with textual rigidity and puritanical behavior preached by
Deoband. The popular Deobandi institution of Tablighi Jamat was
concerned with proselytization, correct ritual practice and a jihad of
soul through peaceful means rather than through militant action
against non-believers. On the other hand, the Pakhtun Deobandism,
and later Afghan Deobandism, flourished under war against commu-
nist infidels.

When the chief of the seminary at Deoband and his
entourage visited NWFP in 2001 to participate in the 150
th anniversary of their school, they were reportedly alienated by the deafening sound
of gunfire that welcomed them. Deobandism, along with tribalism
rooted in the Pakhtun segmentary lineage system, produced a jihadi
culture that soon spilled over to various areas of Punjab and Sindh. A
thriving gun industry in the tribal area and the U.S.-supplied arms in
the hands of Afghan mujahideen built the new jihadi infrastructure in
northwest Pakistan.
Another Sunni subsect called Wahabi, or Salafi, has recently gained
ground in major cities of Pakistan. Jamiat Ahle Hadith (JAH) remains
the major Wahabi party. It is widely known that Salafis represent and
safeguard Saudi Arabian interests in Pakistan. Being very strict about
Islamic teachings and disallowing liberal and modern interpretations of
the Quran and Sunna, this sect has a limited appeal beyond certain com-
mercial and professional middle class sections. After the 1991 Gulf War,
when most of Islamic parties and groups opposed the U.S.-led coalition
against Saddam Hussein, Saudi Arabia felt obliged to shift its patronage
away from parties such as JI and created a string of Salafi establishments
in Pakistan. In the backdrop of the continuing war in Afghanistan and
the emergence of jihadist struggle in Indian-held Kashmir, the new
Salafi outfit Dawat-ul-Irshad (DI) established guerrilla training camps
such as Ma’skar Tayaba in Kunnar province in Afghanistan and
Markaz Tayaba in Muridke near Lahore. Their guerrilla force, Lashkar
Tayaba, claimed several activities in Indian Kashmir. Salafis are ultra-
fundamentalists in their approach to theological matters.
10
The Shia-Sunni conflict has occupied the center stage in terms of
sectarian strife during the last two decades. The Shia, as a minority at
15 percent of the population, became overtly political in the late
1970s. First, Zia’s largely Sunni-based Islamization program shook the
Shia community out of complacency and caused widespread mobi-
lization in the pursuit of sectarian ends. Secondly, Khomeini’s revolu-
tion in Iran reinvigorated Shia minorities everywhere, especially in
Pakistan. Shias formed a new party, Tehrik Nifaz Fiqh-i Jafaria
(TNFJ), in a bid to safeguard their religious and economic interests,
and establish an Islamic state in Pakistan. The murder of the Shia rev-
olutionary leader Ariful Hussaini, allegedly at the hands of Sunnis,
was followed by revenge killings on both sides. SSP led a vehement
campaign for declaring Pakistan a Sunni state, and carried out numer-
ous acts of terrorism against Shias. Some younger Shias formed their
own militant organization, Sipah Muhammed (SM), which, however,
soon lost ground.
One can distinguish between the two generations of Islamists in
Pakistan’s history. The first-generation Islamists, who were generally
supra-sectarian, aimed at changing the law of the land, struggled to
enter the state through elections, operated through the printed word
and dabbled in conceptualizing the West, modernity, science, public
morality and statehood. The second-generation Islamists were sectar-
ian, localist and militant. They lacked intellectual tools for understand-
ing the dynamics of the state, the region, and the world at large. They
focused on simple polarities such as Islam and the West as good and
evil, respectively. They prepared themselves for war against the per-
ceived domination of Christians and Jews over the Muslim World.
The liberal intelligentsia often criticized the first generation for trying
to turn the wheel of history backwards. It condemned the second
generation for attempting to change the rules of game from ballot to
bullet and “externalizing” the public agenda in terms of a grand
polarity between Islam and the West in the world at large.
Institutional Setting
ISLAMIC SEMINARIES(MADRASSAS) have made news headlines ever
since mujahideen organized resistance against the Soviet incursion
into Afghanistan. The number of madrassas in Pakistan increased
from around 700 in both East and West wings to 868 in Punjab alone
in 1975 to 3,874 in the whole country in 1995. In 2002, more than
5,000 madrassas were supposed to be active on the ground.

In the 1980s, thousands of new madrassas were opened in the
backdrop of state incentives such as allocation of funds through the
Zakat Foundation. Many of these madrassas operated as base camps
for recruiting and training Afghan mujahideen. Typically, madrassas
have been socially embedded in sectarian communities. The five
major federations or associations of madrassas in charge of their
organizational and infrastructural requirements belong to Deobandi,
Brelvi, Salafi and Shia sects, and JI. Apart from a few centers of excel-
lence in Islamic teaching, these madrassas generally lack in quality.
Saudi Arabia and Iran allegedly provided financial and infrastructural
support to Sunni and Shia madrassas, respectively, and thus waged a
proxy war on the soil of Pakistan. Students of madrassas typically
belonged to families living at the edge of the society in terms of
poverty, suppression, economic breakdown and migration from rural
to urban areas. Students were socialized along the message of hostil-
ity toward others, including institutional and sectarian rivals and reli-
gious enemies, especially Hindus and Jews, the Westernized ruling
elite in Pakistan and the West. There are many respectable madrassas,
such as Jamia Ashrafia, Jamia Rashidia and Madrassa Khairul Ulem,
which impart classical knowledge of Islam. Indeed, madrassas gener-
ally remained confined to teaching religious classics and preaching
piety in their respective localities. However, a minority of these
madrassas was engaged in the jihadist activities, especially in the back-
drop of mujahideen’s war in Afghanistan, followed by Taliban’s rule
in Kabul from 1996 to 2001.
Benazir and Nawaz Sharif balked over the issue of regulating
madrassas for the fear of inviting the wrath of Islamist groups. The
Musharraf government issued a Madrassa Registration Ordinance in
June 2002 to control foreign funding, improve curricula and disallow
training in the use of arms.
An umbrella organization of madrassas,
Jamiat Ittehad Ulama (JIU), rejected the ordinance and opted for a
general strike. Its predecessor had been active against all official
attempts at regulation of madrassas from 1995 onward.
The thinking in official circles and in the educated middle class
about madrassas revolves around the idea of bringing them into the
mainstream education program. For that purpose, it has been sug-
gested to introduce computers, science education and other practical
arts in madrassas to enable them to produce students with the poten-
tial for productive participation in public life. However, a parallel
mode of thinking points out that such a policy will further
strengthen madrassa people in pursuit of their primitive goals
through militant activity with the help of modern organizational and
technological means. At the heart of the problem lies the inefficiency
and inability of the state to improve the regular school system and

link the educational and manpower policies to curb unemployment
and improve social services.
International Dimension
CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS
have internalized the techno-
logical dynamics of globalization. The speed and style as well as con-
tent of messages sent across the world have multiplied the impact and
scope of Islamic movement everywhere. We can outline three major
aspects of this phenomenon. First and foremost, it is the worldview
of Pakistani decision makers (as well as opinion makers) that provides
the conceptual framework for intellectual activity of local Muslims.
The articulate sections of the population in Pakistan have a worldview
characterized by an Indo-centric foreign policy, on-again, off-again
suspicion of the West, and a world of Islam perspective. The unre-
solved Kashmir Conflict has kept Indo-Pakistan relations at a boiling
point for most of the post-independence period. For eighteen years
after the emergence of Bangladesh, Kashmir remained on the back
burner of Pakistan’s foreign policy. As the last Soviet soldier left
Afghanistan, Kashmir emerged as the new area of Muslim struggle
against the non-Muslim rule in India. A decade of jihad, which
pushed Moscow out of Afghanistan, gave birth to a new doctrine of
armed struggle in pursuit of the goal of national self-determination.
The fact that it was a proxy war between the two superpowers and
that it was the U.S. commitment of financial, military and diplomatic
resources that decisively turned the tide in Afghanistan against the
Soviet Union did not represent the central point of understanding of
the mujahideen’s victory in Kabul, either in Afghanistan or in
Pakistan. A decade of mujahideen struggle in Kashmir started, which
occasionally brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war.
Large sections of Islamic groups and madrassa-trained students
emerged as the new generation of mujahideen committed to rid
Kashmir of Hindu rule. The new pattern of armed activity in Indian
Kashmir produced a variety of militant organizations. Some were
affiliated with Islamic parties in Pakistan, such as Hizbe-ul
Mujahideen with JI, and Lashkar Tauheed and Salafi Group for Call
and Combat with JAH. Others had Arab, Central Asian and Afghan
connections, such as Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, al-Jihad based in
Egypt, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, al-Qaeda Islamic Army,
Taliban Islamic Movement and Harkat-i-Islami. Similarly, al-Badr,
Jamiat al-Mujahideen, Harkatul Ansar (renamed Harkatul
Mujahideen) and Jaish-e-Muhammed (renamed al-Furqan) operated
in Indian Kashmir but cultivated close relations in Pakistan and other
Muslim countries. Various new groups have emerged in the triangle of
crisis comprising Kashmir, Pakistan and Afghanistan, including al-
Usman, al-Omar and al-Saiqa. Others were charity organizations such
as Wafa Humanitarian Organization and al-Rashid Trust, as well as
the controversial Ummat Tameer Nau, led by an ex-chief of Atomic
Energy Commission of Pakistan. One can also mention smaller out-
fits such as Karwan-i-Khalid, Zarb-Momin and Zarb-Islami. These
organizations operated in the three countries of India, Pakistan and
Afghanistan in pursuit of shared foreign policy and strategic objec-
tives, which were ideologically embedded in the larger civilizational
goals.
Confusion, conflict and suspicion of the West in Pakistan draw on
the colonial past, the historical legacy of the Crusades and, more
recently, the Arab-Israel conflict. All Muslims, Arab and non-Arab,
liberal and conservative, educated and non-educated, share the agony
of humiliation in the form of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian terri-
tories. Public opinion in Pakistan, as elsewhere in Muslim countries,
holds the West, especially the United States, responsible for this grave
aggression against a classical Muslim land. Israeli occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza has done more damage to relations of Islam
with the West than has any other issue during the last three and a half
decades. Other Muslim causes such as Kashmir, Chechynia, Bosnia
and Kosovo belonged to communities that were once part of Muslim
empires but became politically unprotected after the frontiers of
Islam shrank over the centuries. The dichotomous model of the
world, along the lines of Islam and the West, has taken root in Muslim
societies everywhere, even as their governing elite continue to look
toward the West for financial and diplomatic support as well as
national security. This attitude has crystallized into an Islam perspec-
tive whereby Muslims operate in a mini world of their own and seek
to establish institutional networks to unite this world against the wider
world presided by the West.
Secondly, transnational Islamic networking is a major development
in the non-state sector in recent decades. One can outline several
nodal points of contact between Muslim activists throughout the
world. First, Islamic militant groups from Muslim societies bear
grievances against the West for causing damage to their territorial
interests such as in Palestine. Second, historical Muslim minorities
struggle to safeguard their cultural, religious, economic and political
interests against policies of their respective majority-based states
such as Russia, India and China. Third, Muslim expatriates in
Western countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom,
France and Germany feel marginalized in terms of employment, cul-
tural autonomy and racial harmony. For example, the second-gener-
ation Pakistanis in Britain experienced multiple setbacks, including
loss of identity, loss of culture, and loss of status. Against odds of
all kinds, Islamic identity operates as irreducible minima for Muslim
migrants in the West, who suffer gross alienation from their respec-
tive state systems and mainstream educational, cultural and media
systems.

The response of Muslims in all these situations is the recourse to
the cause of Muslim unity, solidarity and fraternity. There is a rework-
ing of the Muslim project in process, which was initially started by the
Muslim Brotherhood in the first half of the twentieth century.

Islamic militants in Pakistan, as well as among British Pakistanis and
across the border in Indian Kashmir, tend to see their counterparts in
Hezbollah of Lebanon, Islamic Jehad of Egypt and Hamas of
Palestine. While terrorism in the West is perceived as disruption of a
just society by unjust means, Islamic militants understand terrorism as
a form of mandatory war against the unjust global society presided by
the United States.
Pakistani activist groups and individuals have frequently interacted
with their counterparts in Western societies as well as in other
Muslim communities. In comparison, there is far less activity by way
of transnational networking among civil society activists from uni-
versities and the media, as well as lawyers, engineers, doctors, artists,
writers and human rights activists. While globalization is progressing

rapidly through the communications explosion, the integrative and
assimilative activities in the cultural, educational and political fields
have failed to keep pace. The United States is widely criticized by the
liberal intelligentsia in Pakistan, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, for
hoisting a military dictator on top of the nation and for paying lip
service to the cause of democracy.
Thirdly, the self-statement of the West in terms of the perceived
clash of civilizations has not helped matters. The Western input in
the emergence and activation of the dichotomous worldview among
Muslims can be understood in terms of a continuing preoccupation
with the “otherness” of Islam. For example, terrorism is conceived
as a state of (Muslim) mind rather than as an issue related to U.S.
public policy. Similarly, there is rampant cynicism in Muslim coun-
tries rooted in the injustice syndrome, drawing heavily on unre-
solved conflicts such as Palestine and Kashmir. Policies, or indeed
non-policies, about the issue of settlement of millions of
Palestinian and Afghan refugees, among others, have turned their
temporary settlements into breeding houses of hatred and frustra-
tion. Similarly, the policy of rendering Muslim countries as rogue
states and thus pushing them to exit from the world system has
mobilized a large number of people in Muslim countries belonging
to South and Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, as
well as historical Muslim minorities and the Muslim expatriate com-
munity in the West.
Over the centuries, Pakistanis have lacked a continuous identity that
would have served as a wellspring of territorial nationalism in the
country. They are by definition pan-Islamic in their vision. The
process of moving away from Hindu-dominated Indian civilization,
which started in 1947 and acquired a new impetus in 1971 after the
emergence of Bangladesh, has got Pakistan deeply involved in the
destiny of the Islamic nations and groups the world over. Islamic
organizations in Pakistan thrive on their transnational vision and net-
works operating within a dichotomous framework of world politics.

Conclusion
OUR OBSERVATIONS POINT
to the complex origins and patterns of
growth of Islamic organizations in Pakistan. We have discussed the
way Islamic ideology functioned as the supreme source of legitimacy
for the state, and defined the parameters of the political context that
eventually laid down the turf for politics of identity. The Islamic move-
ment changed its character from a pressure group for establishing the
rule of shari’a in the first quarter of a century after independence, to
an electoral and then a militant force in the second quarter. The
regional input in the form of the war in Afghanistan combined with
Zia’s vehement pursuit of the Islamization program in the 1980s to
produce a dynamic pan-Islamic agenda and a vast Islamic network at
home and abroad based on sectarian parties and madrassas.
The army-dominated state apparatus in Pakistan has militated
against providing social, cultural, economic and political space to the
civil society in general and public representatives in particular. On the
other hand, Islamic parties and groups enjoyed a relatively free hand
to operate in the educational, cultural and, increasingly, political fields.
Even more significantly, the state elite sought to provide a role for
Islamist groups against various political forces identified with the
Left, ethnolinguistic communities, provincial autonomy activists and
the liberal intelligentsia. The involvement of Islamic militants in the
wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir contributed to privatization of for-
eign policy and militarization of Islamic activists. The international
Islamic networks finally provided a global agenda for the movement
in terms of endemic anti-Americanism. The unresolved conflicts
around the world involving Muslim communities, especially in
Palestine, sharpened the boundaries of the conflict. We can conclude
by observing that state policies, regional instability and non-resolution
of conflicts involving Muslims in the region and in the world at large
are the leading determinants of the nature and direction of Islamic
organizations in Pakistan.


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the Muslims of South Asia,” in D. D. Taylor and Malcolm Yapp, eds., Political Identity
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2. Myron Weiner, “Empirical Democratic Theory,” in Myron Weiner and Ergun
Ozbudun, eds., Competitive Elections in Developing Countries (Duke University Press,
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3. Charles Tripp, “Islam and the State in the Middle East” (paper presented at the
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6. For example, see S. J. Burki and Craig Baxter, “Socioeconomic Indicators of the
People’s Party Vote in the Punjab: A Study at the Tehsil Level,” in W. H. Wriggins,
ed., Pakistan in Transition (Islamabad: 1975), 64–67.
7. For details, see Vali R. Nasr, The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution: The Jamat Islami of
Pakistan (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995).
8. Mohammad Waseem, “Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan,” in K. M. de Silva, ed.,
Conflict and Violence in South Asia (Kandy, 2000), 71–74.
9. Barbara Metcalf, “Piety, Persuasion and Politics: Deoband’s Model of Islamic
Activism” (working paper), 5.
10. See Guilain Denoeux, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,”
Middle East Policy 9, no. 2 (June 2002).
12. Dawn (19 June 2002).
13. See Yunas Samad, “The Plural Guises of Multiculturalism: Conceptualizing a
Fragmented Paradigm,” in Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner, eds., The Politics of
Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community (London: Zed Books,
1997).
14. Laden Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, “Terror, Islam and Democracy,”
Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002).